Criminal Law

In prosecution on firearms charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress seizure of rifle attributed to defendant was found on property owned by restaurant, where defendant's camper trailer was located, where search was conducted pursuant to search warrant issued by state court judge, after Dist. Ct. found that, although warrant lacked probable cause to believe that any suspected crime was linked to several buildings on restaurant property that was subject of warrant, good-faith exception to exclusionary rule applied. Government has burden to demonstrate that officer enforcing warrant was acting in good-faith, and officer’s decision to obtain warrant is prima facie evidence of his good-faith. Also, while affidavit used to support issuance of warrant lacked important details as to officer’s knowledge that linked defendant to subject property, officer’s failure to specify source for his knowledge that defendant lived on subject property did not deprive affidavit of all indicia of probable cause to search all of property’s buildings, or that officer could not reasonably rely on warrant. Moreover, involvement of State’s Attorney in preparing and approving of warrant only bolstered holding that officer could rely in good faith on validity of warrant to carry out instant search.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant-prisoner’s conviction for inflicting bodily injury to federal officer in violation of 18 USC section 111, arising out of incident in which defendant discharged fire extinguisher on prison guard after failing to adhere to guard’s directives in encounter within prison, where guard experienced visual impairment and physical pain from chemical burns from exposure to fire suppressant and pepper spray. Section 111(a) penalizes individuals who “forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates or interferes with any” correctional officer, and instant incident fell within contours of section 111(a). Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that: (1) assault must be essential element in all offenses under section 111; and (2) because his indictment did not charge him with assault, he could only be convicted of different offense under 18 USC section 3559(a)(9). Ct. further noted that defendant’s argument would lead to absurd result, where individual could use force to resist, impede, intimidate or interfere with federal official, and yet escape stated reach of section 111(a) so long as said conduct did not constitute assault.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his Wisconsin armed robbery conviction on Double Jeopardy grounds, under circumstances where: (1) defendant’s trial counsel at first trial made improper reference in opening statement to hearsay statement that suggested defendant’s cooperation with police; (2) trial court granted prosecutor’s motion for mistrial based on said statement; (3) defendant was subsequently convicted of armed robbery charge at second trial; and (4) second trial judge sua sponte raised Double Jeopardy question and confirmed appropriate nature of mistrial order. Wisconsin state court decision that defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to make Double Jeopardy motion because said motion would have been without merit was entitled to deference in instant habeas setting. Moreover, said ruling was not unreasonable application of federal law, even if Ct. of Appeals might not have granted prosecutor’s motion for mistrial, where: (1) two state court judges determined that mistrial was necessary; and (2) there was no issue with regard to impropriety of trial counsel’s reference to hearsay statement, and defendant otherwise failed to show that either state court judge acted irrationally in either granting mistrial motion or confirming it.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying without prejudice defendant’s section 2254 petition that challenged his nine-year sentence, where focus of defendant’s petition was fact that Wisconsin court’s four-year and continuing delay in resolving defendant’s post-conviction petition that challenged his sentence, under circumstances where defendant had only six months left on six-year sentence to which defendant had agreed to in plea agreement, has essentially prevented him from addressing his rights under U.S. Constitution. Ct. of Appeals found that although instant dismissal was without prejudice, it still had jurisdiction to consider instant appeal, where record showed that Dist. Ct. entered final order, where it would be futile for defendant to go back to state court and wait for state court to act on his pending petition for post-conviction relief. Moreover, rather than directing defendant to go back to state court to obtain relief, Dist. Ct. should have acted on merits of defendant’s section 2254 petition that raised same issues regarding his sentence that were contained in his state-court petition for post-conviction relief, where instant four-year delay established that state court remedies in Wisconsin are ineffective to protect defendant’s rights.