Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of disorderly conduct. In ruling on Defendant's posttrial motion, court found that evidence against him was insufficient, yet granted a new trial and gave the State leave to amend its complaint. Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge on double-jeopardy grounds. Court rescinded its order granting a new trial and sentenced Defendant to 12 months court supervision. Court, having found Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, urged the State to convict him again, only with proof that would exceed beyond a reasonable doubt. Grant of a new trial violated Defendant's right against double jeopardy. As the court based its ruling on the merits rather than a procedural error, it was the equivalent of a vacatur of conviction and a judgment of acquittal. (JORGENSEN and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated criminal sexual assault. State presented one witness (the alleged victim) to prove the offense and 3 witnesses to establish that Defendant committed 1 prior bad act. As to the element of force, victim's testimony was inconsistent on whether she viewed Defendant as a physical threat and thus it confused the jury. The other alleged victim's unproven allegation was factually dissimilar to the charged conduct. Thus, probative value was low and no reasonable person could conclude that probative value of the other-crimes evidence outweighed the prejudicial effect. (HUTCHINSON and ZENOFF, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of armed robbery. Linking a cell phone to its owner by the addressing of text messages, e-mails, or the like therein would not be hearsay because the State would not be using the messages for the truth of their intentionally asserted content but of the addressing or direction of the messages.Court did not err in admitting testimony of detectives as to whose cell phone Defendant possessed that were rationally based on their perceptions, were helpful to the determination of a fact at issue, and not based on specialized knowledge.  A reasonable trier of fact could find Defendant guilty of robbing the victim (a cab driver), including based on images and video shown at trial. State's argument that Defendant threatened to kill victim although victim did not so testify was not improper, as it was based on evidence and reasonable inferences from evidence. The evidence that Defendant used a firearm in robbing 2 victims was not so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that a reasonable doubt of Defendant's guilt remains.Court's firearm definition instruction did not misstate the law or mislead the jury. (CONNORS and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of criminal abuse or neglect of an elderly person. Defense counsel was ineffective in failing to move for a directed verdict based on the statutory good faith exception, and in failing to request a jury instruction on the exception. These failures were objectively unreasonable and constituted deficient performance. Defense counsel's failure to request a jury instruction on the exception prejudiced Defendant and rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair.  (HOLDER WHITE and STEIGMANN, concurring.) 

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 1 count of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child,  2 counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and 1 count of possession of child pornography. There was no independent evidence corroborating Defendant's confession that related to the specific event upon which 1 count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and thus that conviction runs afoul of the corpus delicti rule. Defendant admitted to creating and possessing "collages" that combined, in a sexually explicit manner, images of actual children cut from parenting magazines with images of adult male genitalia that he cut from adult magazines. These "collages" involve the alteration of innocent pictures of real children so that the children appear to be engaged in sexual activity, and thus pose reputational or emotional harm and fall within the definition of child pornography. (TURNER and CAVANAGH, concurring.)

Defendant, age 15 at time of offenses,  was convicted, after bench trial, of 1st degree murder, attempted 1st degree murder, and aggravated battery with a firearm. Defendant's amended successive postconviction petition presents newly discovered evidence of investigations and reports of a systematic pattern of similar abuse by the 2 detectives who interrogated Defendant. This alleged pattern of abuse could be used to impeach detective's credibility and bolster Defendant's credibility, and undercuts appellate court's confidence in the guilty verdict. Evidence is so conclusive in nature that if these reports were allowed at Defendant's motion to suppress his confession, it would have likely changed the outcome on retrial. Absence of visible injury to Defendant in lineup photos, and the fact that officers were not present at time of confession, are not strong indicators that Defendant's confession was voluntary. Defendant presented sufficient evidence of an alternate suspect who had a strong motive to kill the victim. New evidence showed that detectives were aware of the alternate suspect's motive before Defendant's conviction. Defendant made a substantial showing that his due process rights were violated when State committed a Brady violation. (MIKVA and HARRIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated battery of a child. The victim was an infant in her care who sustained permanent injuries. Defense counsel provided deficient representation in failing to adequately cross-examine the State's expert pediatrician witness as to the bases for his opinions.  Defense counsel failed to advance the theory of alternative explanation of the infant's injuries through defense expert pediatric neurologist's direct testimony, and failed to capitalize on the significance of findings that contradicted State's expert's explanation of infant's injuries. Defense counsel's failures fall below the threshold of constitutionally mandated assistance of counsel. Defendant was prejudiced by these failings, as there is a reasonable probability that this led to a different outcome. Remanded for new trial. As the evidence was close, no double jeopardy bar to retrial. (ZENOFF and JORGENSEN, concurring.)