Criminal Law

Defendant appealed the second-stage dismissal of his successive post-conviction petition, arguing that his post-conviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance by failing to amend the petition as necessary to adequately present defendant’s juvenile sentencing claim. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the record did not rebut the presumption that post-conviction counsel provided reasonable assistance in substantial compliance with SCR 651(c). (COBBS, concurring and PUCINSKI, dissenting)

Defendant was convicted of vehicular hijacking with a firearm and was sentenced to 30 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court failed to properly admonish him pursuant to SCR 401(a). The appellate court initially reversed the trial court but the Illinois Supreme Court issued a supervisory order instructing the court to consider the effect of a recent case to determine whether the failure to properly admonish under Rule 401(a) is reviewable as second prong error. The appellate court concluded that defendant’s claim was not cognizable as plain error and affirmed his conviction on appeal. (MITCHELL and LYLE, concurring)

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession with intent to deliver and later sought to withdraw the plea. The trial court denied the motion and defendant filed a motion to reconsider. While the motion to reconsider was pending, defendant filed a notice of appeal. He then moved to dismiss the appeal as premature, which the appellate court granted, and the trial court then denied the motion to reconsider and defendant appealed. The appellate court vacated the denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and the supreme court granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal. The supreme court found that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the matter because the notice of appeal was not timely as the dismissal of defendant’s first appeal did not “reset the clock” for defendant to file a notice of appeal. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, and O’BRIEN, concurring)

The supreme court considered the question of whether a felony conviction for armed robbery committed when the defendant was 17 years old could serve as a qualifying or predicate felony for the offense of being an armed habitual criminal. The supreme court held that it could, noting that there was no minimum age requirement contained in the plain language of the AHC statute. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of cannabis. On appeal, defendant argued that his conviction must be reversed because the village improperly prosecuted him for a violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code and that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court affirmed and the supreme court upheld the judgments of the lower courts, finding that the relevant statutory law does not impose an affirmative duty on a municipality to submit proof of its written permission to prosecute into the trial court record and that the evidence supported a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was incapable of driving safely. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, and O’BRIEN, concurring)