Criminal Law

In a criminal appeal, the supreme court considered the question of whether the appellate court had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the State’s appeal from a circuit court order vacating the defendant’s three convictions and granting new trials following the appellate court’s prior remand from proceedings under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The court held that the trial court’s order was a final order resulting from post-conviction proceedings and, as such, the appellate court had jurisdiction and reversed the appellate court’s judgment to the contrary. (OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, and ROCHFORD, concurring and O’BRIEN, dissenting. NEVILLE took no part in the decision.)

Defendant, who was arrested during the Covid-19 pandemic, was found guilty of attempted first-degree murder, aggravated battery, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. On appeal, defendant argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to file a speedy-trial demand, that his convictions for attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery violated the one-act, one-crime rule, and that the circuit court misapprehended the minimum sentence defendant faced for attempted first degree murder. The supreme court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment finding that defense counsel was not ineffective, but on different grounds than the appellate court, and affirmed the sentencing for the defendant’s convictions. The supreme court also vacated a portion of the appellate court judgment remanding for re-sentencing on the UPWF conviction. (THEIS, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring and OVERSTREET, specially concurring)

The supreme court considered which specific intent the State must prove in an attempted first-degree murder case: intent to kill or intent to kill without legal justification. The court concluded that a conviction for attempted first-degree murder requires a finding that the defendant had the intent to kill without legal justification and that, in this case, the trial court erred when it incorrectly instructed the jury that it was only required to find that the defendant had the intent to kill. The court then affirmed in part and reversed in part, entering a conviction on the lesser-included offense of aggravated battery with a firearm and remanding for sentencing for that offense. (OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, and ROCHFORD, concurring and THEIS, dissenting. O’BRIEN took no part in the decision)

Defendant was convicted of four counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, four counts of criminal sexual assault, one count of aggravated kidnapping, one count of home invasion, and one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and was sentenced to a total of 123 years in prison. After the trial, but prior to sentencing defendant filed a pro se post-trial motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court appointed the public defender who filed an amended post-trial motion, which the trial court denied. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred when it appointed new counsel to represent defendant without conducting a Krankel inquiry. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed. (HARRIS and DeARMOND, concurring)

In a civil forfeiture matter, the appellate court affirmed an order of the trial court by finding that section 36-1.5(a) of the Criminal Code does not require that the State obtain a circuit court’s preliminary determination that there is probable cause to subject the seized property to forfeiture within 14 days of seizure, but rather merely requires that the State request a hearing within that time frame. (DAVENPORT and ANDERSON, concurring)

Defendant, who was charged with armed habitual criminal, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon by a person with a prior felony conviction, appealed from the trial court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s prior denial of pretrial release. The appellate court affirmed both the order denying defendant’s motion for relief and the denial of pretrial release, finding that the record supported the conclusion that the State established defendant’s dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence and that no conditions of release could mitigate this risk. (MIKVA and NAVARRO, concurring)