Defendant appealed from the trial court’s decision to detain him before trial after he was charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault, home invasion, and aggravated domestic battery. The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding that defendant failed to comply with SCR 604(h). (McBRIDE and HOWSE, concurring)
Defendant was found unfit to stand trial and was transferred to the Illinois Department of Human Services for treatment. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to make a determination as to the least physically restrictive form of treatment. The appellate court affirmed in part and vacated in part and remanded to allow the trial court to select the least physically restrictive form of treatment that is therapeutically appropriate and consistent with defendant’s treatment plan and to clarify whether the treatment should be on an inpatient or outpatient basis. (STEIGMANN and VANCIL, concurring)
Defendant was found guilty of multiple drug-related charges and was sentenced to two concurrent 15-years sentences in prison for methamphetamine conspiracy and unlawful possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence and that the police officer improperly extended a traffic stop to conduct a drug interdiction investigation. Defendant also argued that the State failed to prove the conspiracy charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not err in its decision to deny the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence and that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction for drug conspiracy. (MOORE and SHOLAR, concurring)
Defendant was found guilty of multiple drug-related charges and was sentenced to two concurrent 15-years sentences in prison for methamphetamine conspiracy and unlawful possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to suppress evidence and that the police officer improperly extended a traffic stop to conduct a drug interdiction investigation. Defendant also argued that the State failed to prove the conspiracy charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not err in its decision to deny the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence and that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. (MOORE and SHOLAR, concurring)
Defendant was found guilty in state court of reckless homicide and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. After exhausting state court appeals, defendant filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court in which he argued that one of the jury instructions improperly lowered the government’s burden of proof and that the prosecutor’s closing arguments improperly imposed on him the burden of proving his innocence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order holding that the state court reasonably applied Supreme Court precedent when concluding that it was not reasonably likely that the jury had applied a jury instruction in an unconstitutional manner and that defendant did not demonstrate that the prosector’s closing argument violated precedent. (ROVNER and SCUDDER, concurring)
Defendant appealed from his convictions for first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and aggravated discharge of a firearm, and his aggregate 40-year sentence. On appeal, defendant argued that his conviction should be reduced to second degree murder because no rational trier of fact could have found that mitigating factors were not present, that the State failed to prove that he acted with specific intent to kill without lawful justification, that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing admission of a 911 call into evidence, that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest, and that the circuit court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant. The appellate court rejected defendant’s arguments and affirmed his convictions and sentence. (MIKVA and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring)
Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of less than 15 grams of heroin, a controlled substance. Later, the State filed a new indictment charging defendant with possession of a substance containing fentanyl, also a controlled substance. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment and the trial court granted the motion on the basis that the defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated. The Stated filed a certificate of impairment and appealed. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that defendant had waived his speed-trial demand. (KENNEDY and BIRKETT, concurring)
Defendants pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to obstruct commerce by robbery and multiple counts of obstruction of commerce by robbery. On appeal, one of the defendants challenged the district court’s determination that he was competent to stand trial as well as the procedural soundness of his sentence and the second defendant objected to a supervised release condition requiring him to notify another person if his probation officer determined that he was a risk to that person. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the first defendant’s conviction and sentence but vacated the condition imposed on the second defendant’s supervised release and remanded for further proceedings. (ST. EVE and BRENNAN, concurring)
Defendants were found guilty of federal crimes relating to their work at a grain mill where an explosion caused the death of five employees. On appeal, they challenged the district court’s evidentiary rulings and jury instructions, the indictment, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the constitutionality of the convictions. The Seventh Circuit vacated the conviction on one count against one of the defendants but affirmed the remaining convictions against that defendant and against the co-defendant. (EASTERBROOK and BRENNAN, concurring)
Defendant was charged with several drug-related offenses and the State appealed after the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that his right to speedy trial was violated. The State argued that the trial court erred in granting the motion because its filing of a new indictment charging possession of fentanyl merely amended the original indictment and did not implicate compulsory joinder and, even if compulsory joined applied, defendant had adequate notice of the fentanyl charge so that the delays caused by defendant related to a charge for heroin should also apply to the fentanyl charge. The State argued in the alternative that defendant had waived his speedy-trial demand by failing to appear several times after demanding a speedy trial. The appellate court reversed, finding that the defendant waived his speedy-trial demand. (KENNEDY and BIRKETT, concurring)