Criminal Law

Defendant appealed from an order denying him pretrial release, arguing that when a court of review finds that the State failed to meet its burden of proof as to one of the elements pertaining to pretrial detention, the sole remedy is to remand for a hearing on the least restrictive conditions of release. The supreme court affirmed in part and reversed in part, agreeing with defendant that where the State fails to satisfy its burden the remedy is to remand for a hearing on the conditions of release. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring)

The trial court denied defendant pretrial release and the appellate court found that the circuit court erred in refusing to strike the State’s petition to deny pretrial release because the circuit court failed to hold a pretrial detention hearing within 48 hours of defendant’s first appearance. The supreme court reversed the appellate court’s judgment, finding that the trial court’s order was not contrary to the purposes of the Pretrial Fairness Act where the pretrial detention hearing was held less than three hours late, defendant did not alert the circuit court that it was required to hold the hearing earlier in the day, and defendant did not allege that he was prejudiced by the delay. (THEIS, NEVILLE, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of being an armed habitual criminal and was sentenced to 13 years in prison. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on necessity. Defendant had claimed that the civil unrest following the 2020 killing of George Floyd excused his firearm possession. Defendant also argued that the AHC statute violates both the federal and state constitutions. The appellate court affirmed, finding defendants constitutional challenges lacked merit and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the necessity instruction because the civil unrest was too general and remote to constitute a specific and immediate threat for defendant to reasonably believe it was necessary for him to possess a firearm. (LAMPKIN and D.B. WALKER, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of second degree murder and was sentenced to 18 years in prison. On direct appeal, defendant argued that the trial judge erroneously rejected defendant’s self-defense claim, that the State erred during closing argument by allegedly misstating the law of self-defense, that the trial judge erroneously admitted the victim’s 911 call under the excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay, and that the trial judge erred in considering the victim’s status in the community during sentencing. The appellate court did not find defendant’s arguments persuasive and affirmed. (MIKVA and NAVARRO, concurring)

Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated battery and was sentenced to four years in prison. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because the trial court and trial court attorney erroneously informed him that he was eligible for probation. The trial court denied the motion, finding that while it had erred in its admonition to defendant, he was not prejudiced. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel. (DOHERTY and GRISCHOW, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of one count of stalking and one count of identify theft. The court imposed financial assessments and ordered that defendant relinquish her firearm owner’s identification card and any firearms in her possession. On appeal, defendant argued that the statutory provision that provided the basis for her identity theft conviction was unconstitutional, that the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that the trial court erred in the admission of evidence, that her second amendment rights were violated by the prohibition on her possession of firearms, and that her attorney was ineffective for failing to apply for a waiver of fees. The appellate court vacated defendant’s conviction for identity theft on constitutional grounds but affirmed her conviction for stalking and her sentence. (KNECHT and CAVANAGH, concurring)