Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s section 2241 petition challenging his capital murder conviction on grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to appropriately object to state’s cross-examination of defendant’s expert witness, and that certain favorable evidence was withheld from him in violation of Brady. Defendant raised same ineffective assistance of counsel claim (albeit citing to different instances of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel) in his prior section 2255 habeas petition, and thus defendant could not show that original section 2255 petition was ineffective avenue to address said claim for purposes of allowing defendant to raise said claim in section 2241 petition. Also, evidence at issue in defendant’s claimed Brady violation was known to defendant during his 1990 trial on different charge, and thus defendant could not raise said claim (which was otherwise without merit) in any section 2241 petition.

Ct. of Appeals vacated injunction issued by Dist. Ct. in action by relatives of murder victim, seeking to enjoin scheduled execution of defendant on July 13, 2020 on ground that execution would be taking place during COVID-19 pandemic, which would prevent them from attending defendant’s execution. While Dist. Ct. held belief that Bureau of Prisons set execution date without consideration of rights of victim’s family members to be present at execution, Ct. of Appeals found that instant request for injunction to stay execution lacked any arguable merit, since family members of victim have no statutory right to attend defendant’s execution.

In prosecution on drug conspiracy and drug distribution charges, Dist. Ct. did not commit clear error in allowing DEA agent to testify as expert with respect to drug trafficking practices and use of code words in recorded conversations with defendant. Agent provided sufficient foundation with respect to said testimony, where he indicated that he had been involved in hundreds of narcotics-related investigations and was familiar with codes used in such transactions, as well as drug prices in Chicago area. Moreover, agent explained meanings of said words and how his experience led to his conclusions as to meaning of code words. Also, Dist. Ct. properly allowed another DEA agent to testify as lay witness under Rule 701 relating to words defendant used in conversation with agent during drug transaction, since agent could properly testify as to his understanding of meaning of said words during conversation to which he was party.

Ct. of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument, raised for first time on appeal, that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea on charge of unlawful possession of firearm by felon where nothing in his plea colloquy revealed definitively whether he had known that he was convicted felon at time he possessed firearm as required by Rehaif, 139 S.Ct. 2191. Record showed that defendant had prior felony convictions for physical abuse of child and operating vehicle without owner’s consent, for which defendant had served 13 months in confinement on both offenses, as well as felony conviction for failure to comply with police officer, for which he served one year in confinement. Moreover, defendant failed to establish that but for failure to establish knowledge of his felon status in his guilty plea, he would not have entered guilty plea. In this respect, defendant needed to show that he had plausible ignorance defense regarding his felon status, and defendant could not make such showing, where: (1) defendant would have been aware of his felon status since he had three prior felony convictions, each of which resulted in sentence exceeding one year; and (2) dockets in all three prior convictions indicated that defendant was told during sentencing that he could not possess firearm as felon.

Defendant pleaded guilty to charge of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of substance containing methamphetamine under sections 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. While defendant insisted that he had pleaded guilty to only conspiracy involving lesser quantity of drugs under section 841(b)(1)(B), record showed that defendant had admitted to facts implicating him in instant greater offense involving distribution of 500 grams or more of drugs in documents filed before plea hearing, at plea hearing itself, by admitting to facts in pre-sentence report and at sentencing hearing. Ct. rejected defendant's claim that: (1) he entered plea to instant charge without admitting to any drug quantity; and (2) he should only be sentenced on quantity of drugs he personally distributed to others. Fact that Dist. Ct. used short-hand description of instant charged offense by referring only to "section 846" when accepting plea did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his two separate rape convictions based on ground that his trial counsel was ineffective, where: (1) Illinois trial court, during Rule 402 pre-trial conference, recommended that defendant receive consecutive sentences of 20 and 21 years if he pleaded guilty to both rape cases; (2) after defendant consulted with trial counsel, trial counsel informed trial court that defendant had rejected plea offer; and (3) defendant eventually was found guilty in one rape case, but had pleaded guilty on second rape case and received consecutive sentences totaling 66 years for both cases. While defendant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of consequences of rejecting proffered 41-year plea deal and proceeding to trial, state court in defendant’s post-conviction petition could properly find that defendant failed to establish any prejudice arising out of counsel’s advice, because defendant had failed to supply any details about second rape case, so as to allow court to determine probability that he would have accepted plea offer or to determine whether defendant had received competent advice to reject plea offer.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition, challenging his murder conviction on ground that his trial counsel was ineffective, where: (1) counsel told jury during opening statements that co-defendant would state that he was actual shooter; (2) during trial, co-defendant changed his mind and indicated that his testimony would no longer be favorable to defendant; and (3) defendant’s trial counsel, with defendant’s approval in open court, did not call co-defendant to witness stand. Trial counsel’s representation did not amount to deprivation of fair trial, where: (1) trial counsel could reasonably believe initially that co-defendant would testify that he was actual shooter; (2) trial counsel’s failure to present co-defendant to jury did not rise to level of prejudice, where record showed that co-defendant’s testimony had wavered multiple times and could have been hindrance to defendant; and (3) trial counsel had discussed matter with defendant and made record of issue in open court, where defendant had agreed with decision not to call co-defendant as witness.