Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of possession with intent to deliver heroin, and sentenced to 11 years. After court denied his posttrial motion to reconsider sentence, Defendant pled guilty to 2 other felony offenses, and he was sentenced to 1 year for each offense, with all sentences running consecutively. Court was justified in "treating" Defendant's pro se petition as a successive petition. Defendant, in trial court and on appeal, undertook to combine the separate drug and traffic proceedings. Court was correct to dismiss Defendant's pro se petition because it was a successive petition and Defendant pled no facts under the cause-and-prejudice test. (HYMAN and WALKER, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated kidnapping with a firearm, 2 counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault with a firearm, attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault with a firearm, and armed violence. Court sentenced Defendant to a total of 52 years.Evidence of Defendant's guilt was overwhelming. Defendant's testimony about damaging evidence at trial was inherently implausible, and he acknowledged lying to the police about the incident. Defendant failed to meet his initial burden to show that the State's witnesses provided false testimony at trial and that the prosecution knowingly failed to correct that false testimony. Court's conclusion that there was no due process violation was not against manifest weight of evidence. Defendant failed to establish prejudice, and thus no ineffective assistance of counsel. Evidence was sufficient to support armed-violence conviction predicated on his possession of a converted motor vehicle, as the "converted" element of the State's theory was satisfied. (BIRKETT and BRENNAN, concurring.)

Defendant, age 17 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of attempted murder and aggravated battery with a firearm, and sentenced to 33 years, which included a 25-year mandatory firearm enhancement., Defendant presented new evidence, based on a theory of self-defense, consisting of an affidavit from a person who participated in the incident and had personal knowledge of what occurred. Affiant had not testified at trial, ad he did not provide the information in the affidavit to anyone prior to 2014. These statements are material and not merely cumulative to testimony presented at trial. Defendant sufficiently established his actual innocence claim, and thus court's denial of his request for leave to file a successive postconviction petition is reversed. Remanded for appointment of postconviction counsel and 2nd-stage proceedings. Court properly denied leave to file a successive petition as to his proportionate penalties claim. Mandatory firearm enhancement provisions do not violate the proportionate penalties clause the purpose in enacting them does not shock the conscience of the community.a(MIKVA and CUNNINGHAM, concurring.) 

Defendant was convicted of various offenses. Defendant was reconfined in a DOC facility for violating his MSR and stipulated to that fact prior to trial. Thus, at that time Defendant was no longer serving a period of parole or MSR but instead was committed to DOC for allegedly violating MSR. Commitment includes reconfinement of the accused. A defendant is subject to the speedy-trial statute that applies at the time he makes his speedy-trial demand. DOC transferred custody of Defendant to Whiteside County on 12/2/11, and Defendant did not make a speedy-trial demand until 12/6/11. The 120-day statute applied starting on 12/2/11, absent a demand while Defendant was in the custody of the DOC. Had Defendant made his demand prior to 12/2/11, he would have been subject to the 160-day provision of the Detainer Act given his reconfinement to a DOC facility. As Defendant's speedy-trial rights were not violated, court did not err in dismissing his postconviction petition, as appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the argument. (CARTER and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with 2 counts of domestic battery. Defendant pled guilty to the more serious charge, and entered a fully negotiated plea.. Six days later, Defendant appeared pro se and told court he wished to withdraw his guilty plea, and later filed timely pro se motion to withdraw his plea. On several more occasions, Defendant appeared without counsel, each time asking to withdraw his guilty plea. Court failed to comply with Rule 604(d) in failing to determine whether Defendant had legal representation until after the hearing when court denied his motion. Defendant's comments during postplea proceedings indicated he was unaware of his right to postplea counsel. (CARTER and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of armed robbery. Defense counsel rendered deficient performance when he mistakenly failed to request vital DNA testing. That error caused prejudice to Defendant, as a negative DNA test would likely have resulted in an acquittal on the armed robbery charge. A defendant need only show that a negative DNA result would probably change the outcome of trial to establish prejudice. (HOLDRIDGE, concurring; SCHMIDT, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted of burglary with the intent to commit a theft. Court did not err in barring Defendant's expert's testimony to show that, at the time he entered the laundromat, he could not form the specific intent to commit a theft, because expert was not present when Defendant entered the laundromat, and because that would have usurped the province of the trier of fact. The lack of direct evidence did not justify admission of the otherwise prohibited expert testimony. (JORGENSEN and BRENNAN, concurring.)