Criminal Law

In prosecution on drug distribution charge arising out of seizure of drugs found in defendant’s trunk following traffic stop, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress seizure of said drugs. Record showed that: (1) officer smelled burnt marijuana upon approach to defendant’s car; (2) officer searched inside of car and found no marijuana; (3) when officer asked defendant how to open trunk, defendant looked shocked and officer became suspicious about what was in trunk; and (4) officer removed keys from ignition and opened trunk, where officer found bags of marijuana and methamphetamine. While defendant argued that smell of marijuana in passenger compartment of car did not give officer probable cause to search trunk, Ct. of Appeals found that smell of marijuana and defendant’s reaction and behavior when officer asked him about trunk gave officer probable cause to search trunk.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged her murder conviction on grounds that her inculpatory pre-trial statements were admitted into evidence in violation of her Fifth Amendment rights because they were taken during late-night interrogation at police station under circumstances where she was in custody and during time when she had not been given Miranda warnings. State court could properly find that prior to giving defendant Miranda warnings, defendant was not in custody, where: (1) defendant had readily agreed to come to police station with her daughter to answer questions about victim; (2) defendant continued to answer questions up to time of her confession; and (3) state court thoroughly considered factors contained in Howes, 565 U.S. 499, in finding that defendant was not in custody. Fact that defendant disagreed with court’s balancing of factors did not require that Dist. Ct. reweigh factors as de novo matter. Also, state court could properly find that defendant’s statements were voluntary, even though defendant argued that police improperly used her concern for welfare of her daughter as interrogation tactic as means to coerce her confession, where, although police mentioned daughter, no officer suggested up to time defendant confessed to murder that police would take her daughter away from her unless she confessed.

Dist. Ct. committed procedural error in denying defendant’s motion under First Step Act to reduce his 18-month term of incarceration and 42-month term of supervised release that was imposed after Dist. Ct. revoked defendant’s term of supervised release that defendant had been serving as part of his original sentence on drug conviction. Defendant was eligible for consideration of reduced sentence, since First Step Act retroactively reduced statutory minimum penalties for his drug offense. Moreover, while defendant had completed both his incarceration portion of his original sentence and his 18-month term of incarceration that had been imposed following finding that defendant had violated conditions of his first term of supervised release, defendant could still ask for reduction of second term of supervised release, where, had First Step Act been in force at time of original sentence, defendant only would have been subjected to maximum revocation sentence of three years.  As such, Dist. Ct. could not fail to decide defendant’s eligibility for reduced sentence under First Step Act and state that it would have imposed same sentence regardless of whether First Step Act applied.  Accordingly, remand was required for Dist. Ct. to make determination as to what lower statutory sentence would have applied to defendant’s original conviction under First Step Act prior to making determination as to whether reduced sentence was appropriate.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to 262-month term of incarceration in drug conspiracy charge, where Dist. Ct. based said sentence on large quantity of drugs at issue in conspiracy, as well as defendant’s extensive criminal history that included 13 felonies and several felonies involving acts of violence. Moreover, there was nothing substantively unreasonable about said sentence, where said sentence was less than applicable guideline range. Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant’s argument that Dist. Ct. erred in denying his counsel’s request to review certain sealed documents, where Dist. Ct.'s order was entered after date of defendant’s notice of appeal, and where defendant had failed to file second notice of appeal that had encompassed said order.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying three defendants’ motions to reduce their sentences under First Step Act. Record showed that all three defendants had covered drug-related offenses, and that Dist. Ct. held erroneous belief as to one defendant that it could not reduce his sentence for non-covered offense, where said offense had been grouped with other covered offenses to produce aggregate sentence. Moreover, with respect to two other defendants, Dist. Ct. held erroneous belief that First Step Act required sentencing guidelines to have changed as result of application of said Act for court to consider whether to reduce aggregate term of incarceration. While guideline range remained same for both defendants, both defendants were eligible for reduced sentences due to presence of covered offenses, and Dist. Ct. may consider all relevant factors in defendants’ request for reduced sentence, including different statutory penalties, previous and current Guidelines, post-sentencing conduct, and other factors regarding defendants’ history and characteristics.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 72-month term of incarceration on unlawful possession of firearm charge, where said sentence was based, in part, on finding that defendant’s prior Illinois aggravated assault conviction qualified as crime of violence for enhanced sentencing purposes under section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) of USSG. Illinois aggravated assault conviction qualified as crime of violence under elements clause as set forth in section 4B1.2(a), since said Illinois offense had as element use, attempted use or threatened use of force, where review of relevant documents indicated that defendant had swung shower curtain at police officer, and that defendant was close enough for officer to have had reasonable apprehension of some sort of physical touching by defendant. Fact that Illinois aggravated assault offense is general intent crime did not prevent its classification as crime of violence for Guideline purposes.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on charge of use of facility or means of interstate commerce to attempt to persuade or entice minor to engage in sexual activity in violation of 18 USC section 2422. While defendant argued that his conversations with police detective posing as mother of 12-year-old girl were not intended to portray himself as attractive sexual partner to said minor and to gain minor’s assent to sexual activity with him, Ct. of Appeals found that defendant’s conversations with detective, during which defendant discussed minor’s sexual experience and preferences, as well as sexual acts that interested both defendant and minor and potential for continuing relationship with minor, fit within terms of section 2422. Moreover, defendant’s intent to persuade or entice was shown by: (1) defendant’s attempt to assuage detective’s concerns about defendant’s suitability as sexual partner for minor; (2) defendant’s offer to bring gifts to minor; and (3) defendant’s inquiry about minor’s awareness of defendant’s interest in her.

In prosecution on gun and drug charges, Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to below Guidelines, 108-month term of incarceration, where said sentence was based in part on finding that defendant’s 2006 Illinois conviction for distribution of cocaine qualified as prior “felony drug offense” for purposes of imposing enhanced sentence under 28 USC section 851. Dist. Ct. could not look to defendant’s 2006 conviction to qualify defendant for enhanced sentencing treatment under Section 851, since Illinois statute was categorically broader in its definition of cocaine than definition set forth in federal cocaine statute. As such, remand for new sentencing hearing was required, even though defendant had received below Guidelines sentence, because Dist. Ct. labored under incorrect sentencing range. However, Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that defendant qualified for enhanced treatment as career offender under section 4B1.1 of USSG based, in part, on same 2006 conviction, since career offender guidelines included state-law offenses relating to controlled substance punishable by imprisonment for term exceeding one year.

In prosecution on drugs and weapons charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized in search of defendant’s home, even though defendant argued that search warrant lacked probable cause to support instant search. Instant application for warrant noted that defendant had participated in recorded controlled purchase of drugs, and that informant had provided reliable information for over 10-year period. Fact that officer failed to tell court that informant had long criminal history, and that officer had failed to search informant prior to controlled purchase did not translate into finding that warrant lacked probable cause, where audio and video evidence of controlled purchase rendered informant’s reliability and motivation immaterial as to determination of existence of probable cause. Moreover, fact that there was period of time between controlled purchase and application for warrant did not imply that defendant no longer sold drugs from his home, since there was no evidence that officer knew that defendant’s home no longer contained cocaine, and instant delay was motivated by police desire to prevent defendant from inferring identify of informant.