Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiff-prisoner’s section 2241 petition that challenged defendant-prison official’s finding that plaintiff had violated Code B-220’s prohibition in engaging in unauthorized financial transactions, where another inmate reported to prison officials that plaintiff had directed him to send $400 to plaintiff’s mother as compensation for drugs that plaintiff had supplied to him. While inmate did not testify at hearing, his hearsay statement provided “some evidence” to support defendant’s finding against plaintiff and prison’s takeaway of 30 days of good-time credit. Moreover, instant transaction fit within prohibition contained in Code B-220, which was contrary to Dist. Ct.’s belief.
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his murder, robbery and theft convictions on ground that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of plea offer. Prosecutor had offered plea deal that would have allowed defendant to plead guilty to robbery and theft charges, but only within certain deadline. In pre-trial hearing on defendant’s motion to remove his trial counsel, defendant complained that: (1) his counsel had failed to advise him of plea deal; and (2) defendant was dissatisfied with plea deal, but wanted to make counteroffer. Dist. Ct. properly found that defendant failed to establish any prejudice in trial counsel’s failure to advise him of plea deal, where: (1) defendant was inconsistent with his inclination to accept plea offer; (2) there was no evidence that defendant made any attempt to counteroffer within six months prior to trial; (3) defendant’s claim that he would have accepted plea deal was unpersuasive considering his insistence on making counteroffers, and (4) defendant remained committed to advocating his innocence, which showed no probability of abating.
Defendant, age 16 at time of offenses, was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st-degree murder and 2 counts of attempted murder with a firearm and sentenced to 97 years. Supreme court found sentence was unconstitutional, and upon remand court sentenced Defendant to 66 years. Despite noting the Defendant's age, trial court never commented on Defendant's immaturity, impetuosity, or ability to understand risks and consequences, and did not mention the finding in the PSI report that Defendant was at a medium risk to reoffend, or that Defendant had earned several certificates in prison and had expressed remorse in his written statement. Although court imposed a de facto life sentence, record does not show that court determined that Defendant was beyond rehabilitation. Sentence did not comply with Supreme Court decisions in Miller and Holman. Sentence vacated, and remanded for resentencing. (McLAREN and BRIDGES, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted of possessing more than 30 grams of marijuana. State did not show that the officer who made warrantless search of Defendant's car had valid grounds for the search. Court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Conviction reversed, because State has no basis for the charge without the evidence. (GRIFFIN and HYMAN, concurring.)
In prosecution on charge of impersonating U.S. employee under 18 USC section 912, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting government’s motion in limine by precluding defendant from arguing that his romantic motivation toward victim to whom defendant had impersonated Drug Enforcement Agent (DEA) negated any culpable state of mind, because defendant’s romantic motivation had no bearing on whether he knew he was not DEA agent. Dist. Ct. also properly rejected defendant’s proffered jury instruction that asserted that govt. had to show intent to defraud or deceive, since fraudulent intent was not essential element of section 912. Moreover, section 912’s “act-as-such” clause concerned only actions taken to cause victim of impersonation to follow course of action that he or she would not have otherwise pursued, and record established existence of such actions. where defendant sought to cause female victim to engage in conversation with him and to go out with him, which victim was unlikely to do absent defendant’s pretense. Ct. further noted that defendant had asserted authority of DEA agent by representing that he was investigating suspect, showing victim pictures of fake suspect, and giving victim fake business card.
In 2015, circuit court issued written order finding Respondent to be a sexually dangerous person and that it is substantially probable that he would continue to commit sex offenses in the future if he were not confined. During hearing court relied upon Respondent's 2014 convictions, although they were the subject of a pending appeal, which appellate court reversed in 2017. Court's 2015 judgment was based, in part, on convictions that were reversed. Court's 2015 order is vacated, and matter is remanded to circuit court for a new trial on State's petition to declare Respondent a sexually dangerous person. (ROCHFORD and DELORT, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. Defendant argued, in his motion to suppress, that the arresting officers had no warrant for his arrest and were not authorized to affect such an arrest. Because motion to suppress did not specify immigration issue as a reason to suppress evidence, he is precluded from arguing on appeal that officers lacked probable cause to arrest him for an immigration violation. Defense counsel conceded, at hearing on motion for new trial, that officers had probable cause to arrest Defendant for being in the country illegally, Defendant cannot argue this basis as grounds for appealing denial of motion to suppress. (JORGENSEN and BRENNAN, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. erred in denying without conducting evidentiary hearing defendant’s habeas petition alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by: (1) advising him not to accept govt. offer to plead guilty to wire fraud charge in exchange for probable sentencing range of 51 to 63 months in prison because, in counsel's opinion, defendant was not guilty of any crime; and (2) within two weeks of trial, advising defendant to enter blind guilty plea (shortly after defendant had rejected similar plea deal) because he would lose at trial, which resulted in Dist. Ct. imposing 92-month sentence based on 87 to 108 month sentencing range. While Dist. Ct. found that defendant could not establish prejudice in any ineffective assistance of counsel claim because counsel’s advice constituted reasonable strategic decision and because terms of any plea agreement were not binding on any accepted plea agreement, proper inquiry to establish prejudice in plea-bargaining context is whether it was reasonably probable that Dist. Ct. would have accepted terms of plea agreement and whether resulting sentence would have been less severe than one actually imposed. As such, because govt. conceded counsel rendered ineffective advice, remand was required for hearing to determine whether it was reasonably probable whether defendant would have accepted second plea offer that had same terms as original offer had his counsel advised him to do so, and whether Dist. Ct. would have imposed less severe sentence.
(Court opinion corrected 6/24/20.) After a Frye hearing, court found that the diagnosis of hebephilia has been generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, and found Respondent to be a sexually violent person (SVP). A rational trier of fact could find the elements of SVP proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Respondent's commission of some offenses while on b ond or on parole, and his above-high risk to reoffend, on risk-assessment tests, support a finding that it was substantially probable that Respondent will engage in future acts of sexual violence. Court did not err in finding that Respondent is a SVP. (HUTCHINSON and JORGENSEN, concurring.)
(Court opinion corrected 6/24/20.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of resisting a peace officer's performance of authorized act.Evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knowingly resisted arrest. at about 5:30 a.m., officers responded to a 911 call made by Defendant's sister; he exited the house when he heard her calling his name. No evidence that Defendant had been awake for more than 5 minutes when, despite the fact that he was voluntarily cooperating with police requests that he peak with them, he was restrained from reentering the home. Less than 10 seconds later, without telling him that he was under arrest, 2 officers grabbed him from behind and forcefully put him on the ground, telling him to put his hands behind his back. Defendant had not committed any crime, nor did police have probable cause to believe he had committed one.Police told him he was under arrest only after he was handcuffed.Officer did not have authority to detain Defendant and subsequently seize him, and thus Defendant was at liberty to ignore officer's commands to stay outside and put his hands behind his back, to pull away from officer, and to resist being handcuffed for purpose of temporary detention. (ZENOFF and JORGENSEN, concurring.)
