Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of misdemeanor domestic battery and sentenced to 18 months of intensive domestic violence probation. Court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's posttrial motion without first holding an evidentiary hearing at which he could present evidence that the State's witnesses had recanted. There was no physical evidence linking Defendant to the crime, the evidence against him was solely testimonial, and all key witnesses recanted their trial testimony. (CUNNINGHAM and CONNORS, concurring.)

Plaintiff was convicted, after jury trial, of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Although State's expert, a forensic scientist with Illinois State Police, did not testify that the GCMS machine (for conducting standard scientific tests on the off-white powder collected as evidence, and which she used to conclude that it contained cocaine) was generally relied upon by experts in her field, her testimony was sufficient to establish this foundational requirement. Expert's testimony was sufficient to show that the GCMS machine was functioning properly when she conducted the tests.(CARTER and McDADE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of aggravated domestic battery and domestic battery of her 17-year-old daughter. No ineffective assistance of counsel in counsel failing to object to admission of daughter's written statement to the police as hearsay, as statement complied with each of the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(A)(2)(a), and thus is "not hearsay" and was properly introduced as substantive evidence. Written statement was inconsistent with daughter's testimony that she was the initial aggressor.(HOLDRIDGE and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder of his girlfriend and aggravated battery with a firearm for shooting her mother with a shotgun.Allegations and supporting documentation of Defendant's postconviction petition did not show alleged side effects of medication Defendant was taking for severe depression rendered him intoxicated to the degree that he lacked substantial capacity either for appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. It is not apparent that increased thoughts of suicide would deprive him of this substantial capacity. Jury rejected forensic psychiatrist's opinion, in support of Defendant's insanity defense, that Defendant's ability to appreciate criminality of his conduct was substantially impaired by his distorted belief that killing girlfriend and himself would free them from a painful world and that this belief was due to Defendant's depression. (LYTTON, concurring; McDADE, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated domestic battery, home invasion, and possession of a stolen or converted motor vehicle, and court entered order of protection on behalf of the victim against Defendant, set to expire 2 years of his release from prison.  State presented sufficient evidence authenticating 2 threatening Facebook messages to victim that court reasonably could conclude were created by Defendant.Remanded for Krankel hearing on posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Court satisfied statutory dictates in entering order of protection. (HOFFMAN and DELORT, concurring.)

Defendant pled guilty to 1 count of residential burglary; State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts, agreed that it would not request a sentence greater than 12 years, and agreed that Defendant could post a recognizance bond until sentencing. State asked court to impose a 12-year sentence; plea counsel requested a 4-year sentence. Court warned Defendant that he could receive harsher sentence if he committed any crimes while out on recognizance bond. Court noted that Defendant had an extensive criminal record, and was arrested and charged with aggravated battery while on recognizance bond, and imposed a maximum 15-year sentence for residential burglary, and 2 concurrent 5-year terms for each count of aggravated battery. Defendant received the benefit of his bargain as State did request a sentence of 12 years. Defendant's only recourse would be to file a motion to withdraw his plea. Court did not err in declining to hold new hearing on Defendant's motion to reconsider sentence which court had denied. Court adequately considered relevant factors in aggravation, and there were no factors in mitigation. (McDADE and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

Respondent was found guilty of domestic battery and, in a separate proceeding, admitted to indirect criminal contempt of court. Court did not abuse its discretion by making contempt sentence and domestic battery sentence consecutive. Court clearly explained why it thought that the public needed to be protected against future offenses by Respondent. Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that incarceration was the only reliable way to stop Respondent from engaging in his pattern of abuse. (SCHOSTOK and BRIDGES, concurring.)

Defendant, a state trooper, was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder of his girlfriend at a child's graduation party, and was sentenced to 50 years. Neither Defendant's testimony nor his actions support conclusion that Defendant's conduct in shooting his girlfriend, who was seated and unarmed, 3 times was mere reckless conduct. No abuse of discretion in court's denial of Defendant's request to instruct jury on lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter. Autopsy photos were admitted into evidence during medical examiner's testimony as to nature and extent of injuries and cause of death, and testified with certainty that bullets were recovered from points lower than the entrances, supporting State's theory that Defendant acted with intent in discharging his firearm in a downward direction, in rebutting defense theory that Defendant recklessly discharged firearm in victim's general direction and did not intentional shoot to kill her. Court did not abuse discretion  by barring expert's testimony as to his voluntary alcohol consumption, as voluntary intoxication is not an affirmative defense. (FITZGERALD SMITH and LAVIN, concurring.)

After trial, Respondent was found by jury to be a sexually violent person (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act and ordered committed to institutional care in a secure facility. State focused on the fact that experts had relied on existence of a pattern of behavior and recited details of Respondent's prior offenses in context of describing that pattern. State did not make it appear as though Respondent was on trial for his past offenses. State did not use basis of its experts' testimony as substantive evidence in its opening, closing, or rebuttal and thus did not deprive Respondent of a fair trial. Evidence was not closely balanced; State presented testimony of 2 experts who both concluded that Respondent met criteria of being an SVP. (REYES and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, and entered open guilty plea, and was sentenced to 6 years. Defendant filed petition alleging unreasonable assistance of postconviction counsel, as counsel's failure to call witness to testify at evidentiary hearing was a matter of trial strategy, and Defendant did not argue that counsel failed to conduct any meaningful adversarial testing. Court properly denied postconviction petition after a 3rd-stage evidentiary hearing, and Defendant failed to demonstrate that he received unreasonable assistance of postconviction counsel. (HOLDRIDGE and O'BRIEN, concurring.)