Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder of village mayor. State's mischaracterizations in closing argument were not reversible error. Court did not manifestly err in denying Defendant's request for appointment of new counsel and further hearing on pro se ineffective assistance of counsel claims.Court erred by permitting State's adversarial participation in Krankel preliminary hearing, but error was harmless.  (BURKE, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, KARMEIER, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, after officer searched his vehicle and found a small rock of crack-based cocaine under the driver's seat. Officers had probable cause to search Defendant's vehicle. Officer saw Defendant delay in pulling over, and saw a loose "bud" in the backseat and smelled strong odor of cannabis. The facts available to officer would put a reasonably prudent person on notice that the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of a crime.(BURKE, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, THEIS, and NEVILLE, concurring.) 

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of being an armed habitual criminal. State presented sufficient evidence of Defendant's possession of a firearm as defined by the FOID Act to sustain his conviction. Police officer saw Defendant "in plain daylight" come out of a building and walk near her vehicle holding a firearm, and saw him enter a vehicle, and court noted that officer was familiar with firearms, works with firearms, and was trained with firearms. Another officer testified that the weapon recovered under the vehicle close to the door where Defendant exited , and that he saw a weapon matching the other officer's description. (BURKE, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, KARMEIER, and NEVILLE, concurring.) 

Defendant was convicted, after 6-person jury trial, of 1 count of identity theft for unauthorized use of another person's credit card to buy cigarettes at a gas station.Evidence of guilt was overwhelming, as it shows that on 2 prior occasions Defendant knew that he was not authorized to use other people's credit cards. Jury was given appropriate limiting instruction before that evidence was presented. Record supports inference that Defendant was fully apprised of his rights as to a jury and knowingly waived them, even though defense counsel did not specifically state that he discussed the choice of a 6- of 12-person jury. (BURKE and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 4 counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. Court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss indictment based on a violation of his cooperation agreement with the police. Defendant's due process rights were violated when police breached the cooperation agreement, which Defendant relied upon to his detriment. Without warning or notice of dissatisfaction with Defendant's performance, Defendant was arrested, and policy thus made it impossible for Defendant to complete his performance. As police, not Defendant, breached the agreement, Defendant was entitled to dismissal of indictment. (HUTCHINSON and ZENOFF, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of aggravated battery with a firearm. Defendant claimed that some jurors may have witnessed incident in courthouse hallway when one of the victims was being intimidated and harassed by 2 persons. Incident was during voir dire and there was no evidence that any juror actually witnessed the incident. Thus, court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to discharge the jury. Court exercised adequate precautions to ensure that Defendant was not prejudiced by anything jury may have witnessed. Stipulation as to admission of Facebook photos was strategically crafted, carefully worded to make admission conditional on removing the writing from Facebook page, and forbid any testimony as to any writing on the page. (WELCH and BOIE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of unlawful delivery of heroin within 1000 feet of a church and sentenced to 7 years. Court dismissed Defendant's pro se postconviction petition, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective and that trial court violated his right to be represented by counsel of his choice, as frivolous and patently without merit.State Appellate Defendant (OSAD)'s motion to withdraw as counsel is granted, as any appeal would be frivolous. Claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is essential that evidence presented at trial was insufficient, but appellate court already rejected that claim, and thus res judicata bars consideration of that issue.  Defendant made no real effort to hire counsel, and waited until day of trial to seek more time to do so, and he failed to provide acceptable reason for desiring new counsel.(KNECHT and DeARMOND, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted in absentia of possession with intent to deliver cocaine and sentenced to 60 years. Court did not err when it dismissed Defendant's postconviction petition at 2nd stage. As Defendant cannot show that appellate counsel's alleged ineffectiveness was the cause of the dismissal of his appeal, he cannot make the requisite substantial showing of a constitutional violation. It was Defendant's fugitive status that caused the dismissal of his appeal.  Petitioner had ample time to avail himself of jurisdiction of appellate court and participate in the appellate process. (GORDON and BURKE, concurring.)