Criminal Law

Defendant, age 18 and with no prior criminal record at time of offense,  was convicted after bench trial before Judge Frank Wilson of 1976 murder of  a Chicago police officer, and Judge Wilson then sentenced him to an indeterminate sentence of 200 to 600 years. A different trial judge denied Defendant's Section 2-1401 petition, after evidentiary hearing, and denied Defendant's motion for leave to file successive postconviction petition. Judge Wilson had accepted a bribe in an unrelated case seven months prior; this was one of the harshest sentences he had ever delivered; and there was there was a conspicuous police presence at this trial. No rational person would conclude that the conviction and sentence, by themselves, are evidence of bias. Defendant did establish cause; he filed his 1st postconviction petition in 1987, when he could not have anticipated the Miller line of cases starting in 2012 and could not have raised a claim based on those cases. Defendant did establish prejudice; he could not have raised an as-applied challenge to a de facto life sentence in his initial postconviction proceeding. Without a developed record, he cannot show his constitutional claim has merit, and without a meritful claim he cannot develop a record. Appellate court misstated Defendant's age as 19 at time of offense. Thus, court erred in denying Defendant's motion for leave to file successive postconviction petition. (LAMPKIN and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant, then age 20, was convicted, after bench trial, of attempted 1st degree murder, and sentenced to 31 years. Court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the physical lineup and the 2nd photo array on the ground that they were unduly suggestive.  There was no law in effect at the time requiring 6 photos in an array; the fillers were chosen to resemble Defendant, and they do; and 2 of the photos occupy a central position. Although Defendant was the only one in the lineup who was also in the photo array, that alone does not render lineup unduly suggestive.  Officer testified that all persons in lineup were in police custody at the time. Lineup was not unduly suggestive. (REYES, concurring; LAMPKIN, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of home invasion and aggravated criminal sexual assault of 2 victims, and sentenced to a total of 72 years. Officers had reasonable suspicion to briefly detail Defendant, as there was an initial tip from a 911 call, there was temporal proximity between time of tip and his location, and he matched the caller's description and general location. Officers had a strong interest in solving the reported crimes, which had already occurred according to the tip, which interest outweighed the narrowly tailored intrusion. Defendant failed to sustain his burden of persuasion in showing that the police conduct was unreasonable. Defendant was not arrested by being handcuffed, and it was reasonable for officers to handcuff him for safety reason given that he was alleged to have committed 2 felonies possibly using force or threat of force.Defendant's arrest incident to the investigative alert was supported by probable cause, which developed independently of the arrest. Evidence (statement, DNA swab, and lineup identification) was sufficiently attenuated from any illegality. Court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress. (COGHLAN, concurring; PUCINSKI, specially concurring.)

Defendant was charged with possessing a firearm without a FOID card. Defendant's estranged husband called sheriff's department and reported that Defendant was shooting a gun inside her home.  Officers went to her home to investigate and found a rifle in Defendant's bedroom, but found no evidence that rifle or any other gun had been fired in the home. Circuit court dismissed the charge, finding that, as applied to this case, section 2(a)(1) of the FOID Card Act was unconstitutional under the 2nd amendment, but also provided an alternative, nonconstitutional ground for dismissal, holding that the Act was not intended to apply in the home. Because of this alternative, nonconstitutional ground, direct appeal cannot lie in Illinois Supreme Court. Circuit court unnecessarily reached Defendant's constitutional challenge. Thus, court's constitutional holding is vacated, and cause remanded for circuit court to enter a modified judgment order that excludes the finding.(KILBRIDE, GARMAN, and NEVILLE, concurring; KARMEIER and THEIS, dissenting.)

Defendant pled guilty to aggravated battery of a child, having confessed that he shook his 7-month-old son, who was diagnosed with "shaken baby syndrome". Infant's injuries and resulting motor deficits were profound and largely irreversible. More than 5 years later, while Defendant was in prison, child was found face-down in a pillow, and he had suffocated to death. State charged Defendant with child's murder. State's theory was that child was face-down because he rolled over in his sleep was contradicted by his mother's testimony that he was unable to roll over on his own. State failed to carry its burden that no supervening cause was responsible for child's death. (McBRIDE and COBBS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. Because Defendant never submitted to officer's command to stop, that initial encounter does not rise to a level of constitutional magnitude. Thus, officer's lack of reasonable, articulable suspicion at that moment did not render his actions unconstitutional. Defendant was seized, for 4th amendment purposes, when officer tackled him.Defendant's flight was a strong indication of his guilty state of mind, and officer had reasonable suspicion required to pursue Defendant and continue his investigation. (O'BRIEN, concurring; WRIGHT, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance. Officer, on bike patrol near CTA stop, heard someone yelling profanity, and then saw Defendant staring at him; Defendant spat in officer's direction. Officer then stopped and frisked Defendant, locating a plastic pill bottle which officer pulled from Defendant's pocket, and found that it contained drugs. Once it was obvious that pill bottle was not a weapon, further search was not authorized by Terry. Court erred in denying Defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Officers lacked a reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop or a lawful reason to frisk him. Officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity when he stopped Defendant. Officer testified that he did not witness Defendant commit any crime or reasonably believe he was about to commit a crime, and did not see any object protruding from Defendant's pockets or any bulges in his clothing consistent with a weapon.  (GRIFFIN and HYMAN, concurring; HYMAN, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted in absentia of 2 counts of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault and 1 count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 15 and 7 years. Evidence was more than sufficient for jury to conclude that Defendant took a substantial step toward an act of sexual penetration upon minor victim and that he was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State was not required to prove actual penetration, but only that Defendant took a substantial step in committing the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Remanded to allow Defendant to move circuit court to correct any sentencing errors. (GRIFFIN and HYMAN, concurring.)