In prosecution on unlawful possession of firearm by felon charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress guns found by police in defendant’s backpack that he left in home that he had entered unlawfully. Homeowner gave permission for police to search his home, and Defendant, as trespasser, had no legitimate expectation of privacy in his backpack. Moreover, relevant inquiry is whether person challenging search had legitimate expectation of privacy in premises person was using, and person’s privacy interest is not reasonable when his/her presence in particular place is wrongful.
(Court opinion corrected 7/9/19.) Defendant, age 18 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated arson and the murder of 2 residents of an upstairs apartment in building where fire occurred; he was sentenced to natural life in prison without parole. Codefendant testified that he was physically abused by officers in police station, and that he eventually signed a statement implicating Defendant and another person because he believed he could go home afterward. Several witnesses testified that they were abused by one of those detectives during lengthy interrogations, and that detective told them they had to sign a statement the police had prepared. Admissible statements by persons other than Defendant of the intent to commit arson during the relevant time period is strong evidence of actual innocence, especially as the only evidence against Defendant were his own statements, which he contends were not voluntary. Defendant is entitled to a new suppression hearing and, if necessary, a new trial. (DELORT and CUNNINGHAM, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of obstructing justice for knowingly, with intent to prevent his arrest on warrants, providing a false name to a police officer. State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant obstructed justice. State presented circumstantial evidence from which a rational jury could conclude that Defendant knew the police were present before he entered hotel room's bathroom, and that he provided the false name with intent to prevent his apprehension. Defendant made eye contact with a uniformed officer when Defendant emerged from hotel room and then retreated back into room, slamming door behind him, implies that he knew police were present.(CHAPMAN and MOORE, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 2 counts of unauthorized video recording. Defendant hid an iPod and made a recording of his stepdaughter, age 12, while she was in the bathroom of her residence showering. Sections 26-4(a-5) and 26-4(a) of Criminal Code do not violate the 1st amendment. They are narrowly suited to their purpose of protecting personal privacy in a bathroom, where persons have a heightened expectation of privacy; and they require criminal knowledge that the offender's actions are likely to invade another's substantial privacy interest, including lack of express or implied consent.(ZENOFF and SPENCE, concurring.)
Defendant pled guilty to driving while license suspended, and after he failed to appear at sentencing hearing, court ordered forfeiture of his bond and issued a bench warrant. At hearing, court ordered that judgment be entered on forfeiture of his bond. More than years later, court granted defense counsel's request to vacate bond forfeiture. Court was without jurisdiction to vacate the forfeiture judgment as it was beyond the 2-year window of time under 735 ILCS 5-1401, and Defendant failed to show disability, duress, fraudulent concealment, or voidness of the original judgment, which are the only bases for attacking a judgment more than 2 years old. (HOLDRIDGE and WRIGHT, concurring.)
Dist.Ct. did not err in imposing two-year term of supervised release on wire fraud charge, even though defendant argued that imposition of any term of supervised release was unwarranted because of likelihood that she would be deported after her term of incarceration. Defendant waived issue due to her failure to raise said argument in Dist. Ct., and defendant otherwise declined Dist. Ct.'s offer to provide detailed explanation for each term of supervised release. However, govt.’s failure to assert waiver argument meant that defendant’s issue was only forfeited and was subject to plain error review, and Dist. Ct.'s explanation that supervised release was appropriate because of probable delay in defendant’s deportation was procedurally sufficient. Also, defendant could not establish prejudice with respect to her claim that condition forbidding her from leaving jurisdiction without permission was improper because it lacked scienter component.
Defendant waived her challenge on appeal of Dis. Ct.'s imposition of condition of supervised release requiring that defendant maintain employment and or seek education during term of supervised release unless excused by probation officer, even though defendant asserted that said condition was unconstitutionally vague. Record showed that defendant did not object to any of proposed conditions of supervised release contained in presentence report, even though she filed objections to other aspects of presentence report. Moreover, defendant stated during sentencing hearing that she intended to obtain college degree during her sentence to acquire useful skills, and her counsel waived Dist. Ct.'s offer to read into record all of defendant’s conditions of supervised release and to justify said conditions. As such, waiver, as opposed to forfeiture of said issue, applied, since record showed that defendant made deliberate and informed decision not to challenge instant employment condition.
Defendant, age 16 at time of arrest, entered negotiated plea of guilty to 1st degree murder during course of a robbery, in exchange for sentencing cap of 50 years; he was sentenced to 35 years.Court improperly denied Defendant's motion for leave to file successive postconviction petition. Illinois Supreme Court's 2019 Buffer decision, which applies retroactively, held that a sentence greater than 40 years is a de facto life sentence. appl Defendant has shown prejudice; his guilty plea was influenced by the State's sentencing recommendation and the repeated admonishments that he could receive a natural-life sentence which is no longer a reasonable threat.(OVERSTREET and CHAPMAN, concurring.)
Defendant either forfeited or waived any Double Jeopardy issue regarding second trial on charge of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, where jury at first trial had deadlocked on said charge and found defendant guilty on lesser offense of mere possession of methamphetamine, and where Dist. Ct. essentially declared mistrial on possession with intent to deliver charge and scheduled retrial on said charge. Although retrial following hung jury generally does not violate Double Jeopardy Clause, greater and lesser offenses are treated as same offense for Double Jeopardy purposes, so that Dist. Ct. should have either declared mistrial and allowed govt. to retry whole case or accept guilty verdict on mere possession charge and ended any further prosecution. However, defendant waived Double Jeopardy issue by failing to object to scheduling of retrial on possession with intent to deliver charge and by actually participating in said retrial. Defendant similarly waived Double Jeopardy issue associated with second trial on mere possession charge, where defendant agreed with Dist. Ct. that defendant would only be sentenced once on possession charge if jury found him guilty on said charge in second trial. Also, Dist. Ct. did not commit plain error in admitting evidence from three govt. witnesses regarding testimony about uncharged acts of using and receiving methamphetamine from defendant, since said testimony was relevant as to defendant’s intent regarding large quantity of methamphetamine found on his person at time of his arrest.
(Court opinion corrected 7/1/19.) Court entered sua sponte dismissal of Defendant's pro se Section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment. Defendant, as appellant, has burden of presenting a sufficiently complete record. Defendant mailed petition to court on California Avenue, where it was initially filed nearly 1 month later, sent to another court in Bridgeview, and filed a 2nd time the next day. The petition was discussed 1 month later. Record does not show that Defendant served State by registered or certified mail, or whether or when the State received service. Thus, record does not show when the 30-day responding period began. (PUCINSKI and HYMAN, concurring.)
