Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his aggravated battery conviction that arose out of incident in which victim was shot in his leg, where state court improperly violated defendant’s 6^th Amendment rights under Confrontation Clause, where court allowed govt. witness to refer to out-of-court statements made by others who purportedly identified defendant as culprit. Instant out-of-court statements made by individuals to police were testimonial in nature and were used by prosecutor for truth of matter asserted. Ct. rejected govt.’s contention that prosecutor’s elicitation of said testimony was either invited by defendant or harmless error, where: (1) prosecutor initially elicited said testimony during direct testimony of witness; (2) state court failed to use applicable standard that error was “harmless beyond reasonable doubt;” and (3) victim’s identification of defendant as culprit was tainted by fact that victim was drunk on night of incident, and by fact that police had suggested defendant’s name as culprit to victim on several occasions prior to victim initially identifying defendant as culprit.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to statutory minimum 10-year sentence on drug distribution charge, even though defendant argued that he qualified for “safety-value” provision set forth in 18 USC section 3553(f), which would allow Dist. Ct. to impose lower sentence. Section 3553(f) requires, among other things, that defendant not use violence or credible threats of violence in connection with charged offense, and record showed that defendant did not qualify for safety-valve treatment, where defendant’s actions, in traveling at high rate of speed between 45 and 65 miles per hour in 25-mile per hour residential area that resulted in collision with police car in attempt to evade arrest on instant charge, involved use or threat of force.

In prosecution on 2010 bank robbery charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress DNA evidence linking him to bank robbery, where sample of defendant’s DNA was obtained following his 2011 arrest on state liquor store robbery charge. Record showed that state court eventually granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence/quash his arrest on liquor store robbery charge based on finding that police lacked probable cause to arrest him on liquor store robbery. However, defendant was not entitled to suppression of DNA evidence obtained in his federal bank robbery charge, in spite of state court’s action on his liquor store robbery charge, since: (1) state court grand jury had previously determined that there was probable cause to arrest defendant on liquor store charge; (2) under Kaley, 133 S.Ct. 1090, defendant could not challenge grand jury’s determination of probable cause; (3) defendant’s DNA sample was taken after grand jury’s indictment, but before state court suppression order; and (4) police were entitled to rely on fact of defendant’s indictment to support its taking of his DNA sample, and federal govt. was entitled to rely on fact of state grand jury indictment in choosing to use that evidence for its own prosecution.

In prosecution on bank robbery charge, Dist. Ct. erred in imposing $3,676 restitution order, where said order included $2,107 in stolen money that was in govt.’s possession under circumstances where said money had been stained when red dye pack supplied by bank during robbery had exploded. Burden of establishing amount of loss sustained in robbery was on govt., and record failed to show whether stained currency was so badly damaged that it could not be replaced and returned to bank. As such, because bank could receive windfall to extent that it could obtain replacement currency, instant restitution order improperly exceeded proven loss to bank.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for violating “anti-spoofing” provision of Commodity Exchange Act arising out of defendant’s actions in utilizing computer program designed to place small and large orders simultaneously on opposite sides of commodities market in order to induce illusory and artificial market movement either upward or downward for purposes of moving market towards target price of order defendant wanted to execute. Govt. produced expert, who explained that nature and timing of defendant’s large orders were designed specifically to avoid being filled, such that jury could properly find that defendant placed such orders with present intent to cancel either bids or offers prior to their execution. Ct. additionally rejected defendant’s claim that anti-spoofing statute was unconstitutionally vague, where statute provided definition of spoofing as “bidding or offering with intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution,” and where defendant’s charged conduct fell within said definition.

In prosecution on drug conspiracy charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendants’ motion to suppress evidence obtain via wiretap, where said defendants argued that govt. failed to show that they could not have obtained same evidence through traditional means of discovery. Govt. satisfied necessity element of wiretap application, where govt.’s affidavits revealed that it was not attempting to use wiretap as initial investigative tactic and set forth many other investigation techniques that had been unsuccessfully used or ruled out in investigation of charged offense. Also, two defendants waived their appeal of denial of their severance motion since said defendants failed to renew their motion at close of evidence. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting evidence of drug-related death of wife of one defendant against said defendant, even though evidence demonstrated defendant’s appalling conduct towards his wife, since said evidence was necessary to connect defendant to his wife’s death by ingesting drugs that he and third-party had supplied to her.