Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of sexual offenses against 14-year-old girl whom he coached on elementary school track team. Court incorrectly told Defendant that he had to provide a written motion containing his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Court elicited details about Defendant's claims during numerous exchanges, and considered substance of his argument, and made legally sufficient inquiry into claims. Defendant admitted to all forms of sexual contact, as testified to at trial by detective, and along with evidence of texts between Defendant and victim, are persuasive evidence that counsel's failure to present records to attempt to show Defendant's whereabouts on certain dates would not have changed outcome of trial. (HYMAN and MASON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 3 counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and sentenced to natural life in prison. Officers, who came to Defendant's home in response to neighbor's 911 call, saw items in plain view in the bedroom, which they reasonably believed were associated with Defendant's assault on a 17-year-old prostitute, they were justified in seizing those items and court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress. Court properly allowed 16-year-old woman whom Defendant had sexually assaulted, given similarities with present charge including that Defendant used alias on chat line, and threatened victim with knife and forced her to engage in sex. No ineffective assistance of counsel in defense counsel's strategic decision to withdraw motion, filed by another attorney, to suppress statements Defendant made to police after arrest. (HYMAN and NEVILLE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial in 1999, of home invasion, armed robbery, and armed violence. In 2001, Defendant file pro se postconviction petition, which court dismissed. In 2015, Defendant filed 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment. Defendant should not be able to benefit from his own failure to properly serve the State with his petition. Defendant's petition was untimely, as it was filed more than 2 years of the challenged judgment. Court had authority to dismiss petiton sua sponte, and State's 30-day time to respond had not run because Defendant failed to properly serve State. (APPLETON and KNECHT, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 8/21/17.) Defendant pled guilty to aggravated battery in 2009, and he was sentenced to 10 years. Court dismissed his pro se petition for postconviction relief in 2012 as patently without merit. In 2014, Appellate Court affirmed summary dismissal but vacated Class X sentence and remanded with directions to resentence him to term between 3 and 10 years. Defendant forfeited his as-applied challenge to sentence as void by raising it for the first time on appeal.Class X sentencing was proper because Defendant was 21 when he pled guilty. (HARRIS and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of threatening a public official. State failed to adduce adequate evidence, as required by statute, that the sheriff's department employee working as a correctional officer, to whom Defendant conveyed the statement "I'm thinking about killing you" was a public official for purposes of that offense. State was required to prove that employee was a sworn law enforcement officer. Double jeopardy bars retrial.(CHAPMAN and OVERSTREET, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of 1st-degree murder of 6-year-old boy while he slept; intended target was boy's uncle, a member of a rival gang. Defendant showed that, by failing to present his nonfrivolous claims, his Krankel counsel provided deficient representation. Defendant showed that by rejecting those nonfrivolous claims and arguing adversely to his interests, his Krankel counsel failed to subject trial counsel's conduct to any meaningful adversarial testing and thus effectively deprived him of counsel during a critical stage of proceedings. Trial court is directed to appoint a different attorney for Defendant, and  then hold an appropriate adversarial second-stage Krankel hearing on those claims. (HUTCHINSON and SPENCE, concurring.)