Criminal Law

Defendant  was convicted, after jury trial, of 5 counts of 1st degree murder and 1 count of armed robbery. Court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress, as his statements (including statement implicating him in the murders), given before he invoked his right to counsel, were voluntarily given despite the denial of his requests to make a phone call, which did not render his statements involuntary. At no time prior to his invocation of counsel did Defendant state phone call was to request an attorney or request of his family that they find him an attorney. State used historical cell phone site data and Defendant's statement that he was a lookout to implicate him in the crimes. A Frye hearing was not required because information conveyed is not the result of new or novel scientific principles. State introduced evidence to show that cell phones, and by implication their owner, were in vicinity of crimes during relevant time. Discussion of possible sentence, within interrogation video, did not unfairly prejudice Defendant, as court admonished jury to disregard that discussion. (SIMON, concurring; MIKVA, specially concurring).

(Court opinion corrected 8/28/17.) Defendant was charged with aggravated battery to a police officer. After bench trial, Defendant was acquitted of that offense, but found guilty of resisting a police officer as a lesser-included offense.After new evidence was discovered, court vacated conviction and ordered a new trial on the resisting charge only. Defendant was, after jury trial, again convicted of resisting a police officer. There was no violation of Defendant's right to be free from double jeopardy and resolution of issues in 2nd trial was not precluded by collateral estoppel. Court did not err when it denied Defendant's motion to quash arrest. Defendant should have been recharged, and he was denied a fair trial because court refused to give a jury instruction on use of excessive force, which invokes right of self-defense, as it was amply supported by evidence. (HARRIS and MIKVA, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of armed robbery. Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for continuance of trial. Defendant's request to proceed pro se was untimely. Although Defendant sought substitute counsel multiple times earlier, he waited until day of trial to request to proceed pro se, which court granted, but Defendant only then sought a continuance for additional time to prepare. Court allowed Defendant to wait until the following day to present his opening statement, and he was ably assisted by standby counsel. Court properly entered summary dismissal of Defendant's postconviction, as he was not denied due process in court's denial of his request for continuance of trial. (BURKE and SPENCE, concurring.)

(Correcting case link.) Defendant was sentenced, as a juvenile, to 90 years for attempted 1st degree murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault; he receives day-for-day credit and may serve only 45 years, when he will be age 62. Because Defendant is not serving either a life sentence or a "de facto" life sentence without the possibility of parole, the recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, requiring that a juvenile's youth and immaturity must be considered before sentencing to life without possibility of parole do not apply to him.(NEVILLE and MASON, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 8/23/17.) Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver after narcotics were found in his vehicle. Court erred in partially denying Defendant's motion to suppress. Although order to stop Defendant on the road was given prior to an observed traffic offense, Defendant was speeding at the time he was pulled over and his detention was thus supported by a lawful traffic stop. Free-air sniff by drug detection dog did not unduly prolong encounter because dog was already near scene of stop. Probable cause dissipated when officers failed to find any narcotics or hidden compartments during first hand search of vehicle. Thus, search should have ended at that point. Officers acted improperly by relocating vehicle to other police department for 2nd search.(LYTTON and O'BRIEN, concurring.)