Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying portion of defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his murder conviction on ground that he was actually innocent of charged offense, where witness testified after instant trial that third-party was actual culprit who indirectly admitted to instant murders. Witness’ testimony was contradicted by another witness who testified at post-conviction proceeding that defendant was actual culprit, and forensic evidence did not rule out defendant as culprit. As such, defendant failed in his burden of establishing his innocence. However, defendant was entitled to new sentencing hearing, where his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to defendant’s wearing of stun belt during penalty phase of trial, which resulted in imposition of death penalty, since: (1) at least four members of jury saw defendant wear stun belt during penalty phase of trial; (2) there was no evidence of likelihood that defendant would act up during penalty phase of trial; and (3) defendant’s wearing of stun belt could have led jury to conclude that death penalty was appropriate because of perception that defendant was prone to violence.

In prosecution on drug charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence sized from his Indiana home, where Michigan police had obtained warrant to place GPS device on third-party’s car and discovered drugs in third-party’s car after third party had visited defendant’s home. Defendant did not dispute validity of either first warrant that authorized placement of GPS device on third-party’s car or that police had probable cause for issuance of warrant to search his home. Moreover, Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that Michigan police lacked authority to monitor third-party’s car once said car had crossed over into Indiana or that police were forbidden to learn who was doing business on defendant’s property without having obtained warrant based on defendant’s own activities. Also, process of tracking car’s location by GPS does not offend any state’s sovereign rights, and Constitution is not offended when, by executing warrant to search one person, police learn incriminating details about another person.

Defendant was entitled to vacatur of his conviction under 18 USC section 924(c) on charge of possessing firearm in furtherance of crime of violence, i.e., defendant’s conviction on charge of sex trafficking of minor. Sex trafficking of minor was not crime of violence under elements clause of section 924, since said charge did not have as element use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force. Moreover, said offense could not be crime of violence under residual clause set forth in section 924(c)(3)(B), since residual clause was unconstitutionally vague, as determined in Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, where Ct. found that similarly-worded residual clause in 18 USC section 16(b) was unconstitutionally vague. Also, Dist. Ct. erred in imposing manager or supervisor enhancement under section 3B1.1 of USSG based on defendant’s sex trafficking conviction, where “victim” in said offense was minor, whose status precluded her from also being “participant” in said offense for purposes of imposing manager enhancement.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in dismissing on timeliness grounds defendant’s habeas petition, where said petition was filed 108 days after expiration of applicable one-year period for filing same. Record showed that defendant had 156 days remaining on his one-year period to file habeas petition after denial of his state post-conviction petition had become final, and Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant was not entitled to equitable tolling of limitations period where defendant had 43 days to file his habeas petition after he had received all files on his case that he had requested. Moreover, defendant failed to establish that he lacked meaningful access to prison law library.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s habeas petition without conducting evidentiary hearing on his claim that he lacked competency to enter into guilty plea on charge of unlawful possession of firearm, where defendant was suffering from serious mental disease at time of entry of said plea. At time of guilty plea hearing, defendant had informed Dist. Ct. that he was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, as well as other conditions and that he was taking unspecified medications that allowed him to think clearly “as good as I can.” Moreover, presentence report indicated that defendant was suffering from three other psychological disorders that required him to take Thorazine, Tegretol and Ritalin, and his counsel reported during sentencing hearing that defendant’s behavior fluctuated over course of her representation due to jail’s inconsistent delivery of his medication. As such, defendant was entitled to evidentiary hearing to determine whether he was incompetent to enter guilty plea, since: (1) defendant’s disclosure at plea hearing of serious mental disease and his taking of unspecified medication should have alerted Dist. Ct. to possibility that defendant was not competent to enter said plea; and (2) Dist. Ct. lacked full picture of defendant’s mental condition at time of plea hearing to make any finding that defendant had capacity to enter his guilty plea. Also, hearing was required on defendant’s related claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to raise competency issue during plea hearing.