Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of home invasion, residential burglary, aggravated battery, and aggravated unlawful restraint. Defendant failed to assert a clear claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and thus trial court's duty to conduct a Krankel inquiry was not triggered. Simultaneous convictions of home invasion and residential burglary do not violate one-act, one-crime rule, because criminal conduct that was basis of those offenses consisted of multiple physical acts instead of precisely the same physical act. Residential burglary is not a lesser included offense of home invasion.Conviction for aggravated unlawful restraint must be vacated pursuant to one-act, one-crime rule because Defendant's action of unlawfully restraining her sister was inherent in aggravated battery.(LAMPKIN and REYES, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after a stipulated bench trial, of possessing child pornography. Detective sent document entitled "Grand Jury Subpoena"  to AT&T Internet Service, returnably to detective personally; and AT& then sent documents directly to detective. Irregularities in detective's exercise of his authority were substantial and were an improper end-run around protections courts have recognized. Court properly denied Defendant relief as he failed to show prejudice. Document inaccurately stated that detective had made a complaint before the grand jury, which he had not.3 d(HUDSON and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon.Defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move to redact or otherwise exclude final 2/3 of video recording of police interview. That portion of interview was comprised of comments by officers which impermissibly bolstered State's case and inflamed passions of jury. As Defendant was adamant that he was not involved in shooting and did not change his version of events throughout the interview, the final 2/3 of interview had no probative value,a nd was highly prejudicial, and removed finding of guilt from province of jury as detectives conclusively stated that Defendant was guilty of murder. (SCHMIDT and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Court denied Defendant's motion to reinstate a petition that he previously filed under Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Trial court had discretion to grant motion to reinstate if Defendant sufficiently pleaded that delay was not due to his culpable negligence.There is no absolute 1-year bar to seeking to reinstate a voluntarily withdrawn postconviction petition. This discretion corresponds to court's discretion, under Section 122-5 of Act, to extend time to file any pleading other than the original petition.(JORGENSEN and SCHOSTOK, concurring.) 

Defendant was found to be a sexually dangerous person and, pursuant to Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (SDPA) was committed to DOC until a court finds him no longer dangerous. No due process violation, as State's SDPA petition gave Defendant very specific notice as to purpose of psychiatric evaluations he was ordered to participate in and cooperate with, and he had opportunity to present objections to evaluations. No violation of right to confrontation, as his counsel had ample opportunity to cross-examine all witnesses at commitment hearing. No violation of his right to remain silent, as his compelled statements were used solely in SDPA proceeding, and there was no subsequent criminal proceeding. Even if SDPA petition did not satisfy all requirements for petition, it provided Defendant with full notice of allegations and ample time prior to hearing (CONNORS and SIMON, concurring.)

Defendant, then age 15, was charged with 1st degree murder in shooting of 13-year-old. At time of offense, 15-year-olds charged with 1st degree murder were automatically excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction, and thus Defendant was tried, convicted, and sentenced as an adult. The amendment to Section 5-130 of Juvenile Court Act, which increased minimum age for mandatory transfer of a defendant charged with 1st degree murder from 15 to 16, applies retroactively. Thus, Defendant's sentence is vacated and case is remanded to juvenile court, where State may elect to seek discretionary transfer. Toolmark and firearm identification evidence is not new or novel, and law in Illinois is consistent in its admission of such evidence.(HARRIS and SIMON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, for aggravated participation in methamphetamine manufacturing. Conviction reduced to simple participation in meth manufacturing. No officer testified at trial on whether the building near to where manufacturing occurred was actually a place of worship. State did not adduce sufficient evidence at trial to render reasonable the inference that the particular church nearby was functioning primarily as a place of worship.  In absence of a stipulation, State must present evidence, from witness sufficiently familiar with area in question, that supports a reasonable inference that building in question was functioning primarily as a place of worship on date of offense. (GOLDENHERSH, concurring; WELCH, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Defendant, who was front seat passenger in car stopped after high-speed pursuit by police, was convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, based on his failure to possess a valid FOID card. Handgun, in plain view, was discovered on floor in front passenger seat after occupants of car exited vehicle. Ample evidence to sustain conviction. No other occupant of vehicle was observed reaching over or around front seat or console.Absence of fingerprint or ownership evidence does not render evidence of Defendant's guilt less than overwhelming. Court's failure to give a limiting instruction as to officer's description that chase was in response to "shots fired" call did not contribute to conviction.(PIERCE, concurring; HYMAN, dissenting in part).

Court properly dismissed Defendant's petition for issuance of a certificate of good conduct under Section 5-5.5-30 of Unified Code of Corrections. Such certificates are for persons assisting with obtaining gainful employment. Defendant is currently in prison with projected discharge date in 2036. Thus, Defendant is not entitled to certificate of good conduct, as relief requested is inapplicable to Defendant under circumstances presented. (STEIGMANN and POPE, concurring.)