Criminal Law

Petitioner was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder in gang-related shooting death. Petitioner was age 16 at time of offense, and his 50-year sentence is an unconstitutional mandatory de facto life sentence. Court's reasoning in sentencing did not comport with juvenile sentencing factors which a court is required to take into account when sentencing a juvenile. On remand Petitioner should be resentenced in accordance with Section 5-4.5-105 of Code.(LAVIN, concurring; PUCINSKI, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder, with a finding that he personally discharged a firearm, and aggravated battery with a firearm. Case arose from drive-by shooting,when gunshots fired from a car struck and killed one person and struck and injured another person. Witnesses identified Defendant as the shooter. Relative credibility of State's identification witnesses over the reliability of Defendant's alibi witnesses was obvious and apparent. Error in admitting hearsay testimony did not severely threaten to tip scales of justice against Defendant. No ineffective assistance of counsel, as Defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to object to witness' prior inconsistent statement. Court properly conducted appropriate and impartial Krankel preliminary inquiry, as to ineffective assistance of counsel claims.(GORDON and REYES, concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 4/24/17.) Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of burglary and sentenced to 9 years. Defendant entered vacant home, moved his possessions in, and pried locks open; Defendant later stated that he believed he owned house because he was establishing adverse possession. Court erred in refusing to admit statements offered to show why Defendant acted as he did. However, error was not reversible error, as there was ample additional testimony as to Defendant's alleged attempt to acquire house through adverse possession. Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise hearsay issue in a posttrial motion,or by failing to file motion to reconsider sentence.(SIMON and MIKVA, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated battery and unlawful possession of a firearm, and was sentenced to 18 years and 3 years for these offenses. Court adequately considered relevant factors in mitigation, and Defendant offered no affirmative evidence to show that court did not sufficiently consider mitigating factors of Defendant's youth, history of mental illness, and rehabilitation potential. Sentence was not excessive.(CARTER and SCHMIDT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 4 counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (age 11), and sentenced to 32 year and 3 years mandatory supervised release. Court properly admitted victim's out-of-court videotaped statements through former interviewer at Child Advocacy Center. Court properly admitted victim's out-of-court statement through testimony of counselor who wrote report, based on her conversation with child at hospital, where victim was taken after she first reported the abuse. Court properly prohibited defense counsel from cross-examining victim about certain diary entries, as defense counsel disclosed he was in possession of diaries only 5 days prior to trial although he admitted he had possessed them for years. (CATES and OVERSTREET, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of unlawful and knowing possession of BZP, a controlled substance,  aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW), for carrying a firearm without a valid FOID card, and armed violence, based on his possession of the BZP while armed with a firearm. Defendant failed to establish that any relevant gun-related bias would not have been uncovered by court's general question about fairness and impartiality. Court's questioning of prospective jurors created a reasonable assurance of impartiality. State was entitled to argue that consciousness of guilt is a reasonable inference to be drawn from such conduct, that inference constituting circumstantial evidence of the Defendant's guilt. Convictions for AUUW and possession of a controlled substance, based on same conduct as conviction for armed violence, should be vacated in accordance with one-act, one-crime rule.(CONNORS and SIMON, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 5/1/17.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated battery. To complete impeachment of witness, State was required to call the impeaching witness to testify in rebuttal. Through testimony of impeaching officer, State needed to present extrinsic evidence of officer's prior statement to him that State maintained was inconsistent with her trial testimony. State argued, in closing argument and rebuttal, that witness was credible and jury should believe her, which was entirely appropriate argument.(APPLETON and KNECHT, concurring.)

Defendant pled guilty to unlawful possession of methamphetamine precursors without a prescription., after having been previously convicted of unlawful possession of methamphetamine. The exception for persons with a valid prescription for the precursor is not part of the body of the offense, but withdraws certain persons from the operation of the statute. Thus, the exception is a matter of defense, and the State has no burden to disprove it. Thus the State was not required to prove Defendant did not have a prescription for the precursor in her possession to establish a violation of Section 120(a) of the Methamphetamine Act. (HARRIS and POPE, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 5/26/17.) Defendant was convicted,after bench trial, of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF).  Defendant's prior aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) felony conviction, even if subject to vacatur under the Illinois Supreme Court's Aguilar decision, may still serve as a predicate felony for UUWF, until that prior felony has been vacated. Pat-down search of Defendant was justified and not unconstitutional, under the Terry standard, where police officers encountered 2 persons at night in a vehicle that matched description of a recently stolen car, and the Defendant's movements in the car supported a reasonable suspicion that he was armed or had access to a weapon in the vehicle. Handcuffing of Defendant was reasonable under these circumstances. (HARRIS and DELORT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of armed robbery and being an armed habitual criminal (AHC). As a result of Defendant's failure to vacate his prior AUUW (aggravated unlawful use of a weapon) conviction prior to the time he possessed a firearm, his prior AUUW conviction could serve as the predicate offense for his AHC conviction. State was required only to prove "status" of Defendant's prior convictions to establish AHC and not their reliability. The 2007 statutory amendment which revived sentencing enhancement is constitutional. Thus, Defendant's 15-year enhancement for use of a firearm was not unconstitutional.(NEVILLE and MASON, concurring.)