Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of 1st-degree murder.Court erred in failing to exclude Defendant's purported statement to officer and in barring testimony of attorney whom Defendant stated he had contacted, prior to time of murder, about getting legal status for his wife from Indonesia (to explain why he departed for Indonesia shortly after murder). Errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and there is virtually no likelihood that, had errors not occurred, jury would not have convicted Defendant of 1st-degree murder. Court permitted Defendant to introduce evidence that someone other than him confessed to the murder. Court properly found that other crimes of that person, that defense wished to introduce, were not similar to this robbery and murder, and thus court properly barred evidence of them.(HUDSON and SPENCE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder and aggravated discharge of a firearm in 2002 shooting death of a 15-year-old girl, in gang-related shooting. Detectives' testimony was inadmissible hearsay. State repeatedly elicited testimony with strong inference that Defendant's co-Defendants implicated him to police; and included serial questions to build inference that Defendant was named by his criminal cohorts, and reminded jury of this in closing arguments.Testimony as to steps of an investigation may not include substance of a conversation with nontestifying witnesses.Without inadmissible hearsay evidence, only evidence linking Defendant to crime is his foreign-language confession made with no official translator. (LAVIN and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st-degree murder and aggravated arson. Defendant's statements to police were given voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, and thus court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress his statements. Detectives were applying psychological pressure to Defendant in an unobjectionable way, and did not make promises of leniency, and they gave Miranda warnings at outset of interrogation and again when Defendant reinitiated discussion with police. State overcame presumption  of inadmissibility by showing that statements were given voluntarily and were reliable. State showed that electronic recording of smoking breaks was not feasible. (BURKE and SPENCE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder. As trial court had provided relevant IPIs, court did not abuse its discretion b y determining that any additional "clarification" could confuse or sway jurors, as court explicitly acknowledged its obligation to answer jury questions. Even if defense counsel was deficient in reaction to juror note, no indication that Defendant was prejudiced. Court granted State's Rule 329 Motion to Correct Record to reflect that one juror did not answer "no" but "yes" when polled for verdict. Evidence at Rule 329 hearing, including testimony of court reporter and ASA and detailed recollection of trial judge, was sufficient, and court's granting of Rule 219 Motion was not error. (GORDON and LAMPKIN, concurring.)

Defendant's wife went missing in 1990 and was never found. Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st-degree murder. Court admitted evidence that, 17 years after wife's disappearance, 3 detector dogs alerted to scent of human remains on a rug found buried in outdoor area of horse farm where State contended Defendant had buried her. Overwhelming evidence of Defendant's guilt rendered any potential error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Prosecutor did not mention human-remains-detector-dog evidence in his initial closing argument and mentioned it only briefly in rebuttal, in response to defense counsel's argument. Defense counsel drew attention to it repeatedly, but prosecutor's restraint diminished any prejudicial effect of the evidence. Court admitted evidence of detector dog upon finding State's expert to be qualified and credible and the science to be generally accepted in its related field.( BIRKETT, concurring; HUTCHINSON, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated criminal sexual abuse of his 15-year-old niece, and sentenced to 20 years. Court failed to ask jurors whether they accepted that State must prove Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before conviction, but record does not indicate any prejudice. No error in court not excusing  juror who, after asking if she would have to stay all day for trial the next day, claimed she didn't feel comfortable with English, as defense counsel raised no objection as to her services, and juror answered individual questions responsively and appropriately. Hearsay statement was properly admitted as party admission, and jury could infer guilt from statement because it demonstrated his knowledge of lockbox containing incriminating evidence of sex offenses. No prejudice in court admitting evidence of Defendant's sexual abuse of victim's younger sister, as focus of trial remained on victim and evidence was tailored to fulfill its purpose. (PUCINSKI and COBBS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of delivery of a controlled substance. Defendant argues that State failed to prove a chain of custody for the drugs. Defendant failed to show actual evidence of tampering, alteration or substitution. State made a prima facie case, where undercover officer testified to chain of custody of drugs while in his care, and parties stipulated that chemist would testify that a chain of custody was maintained at all times, and inventory numbers given by both undercover officer and chemist were the same.(HALL, concurring; LAMPKIN, specially concurring.)