Criminal Law

This case presents question as to whether, in trial on charge of aggravated criminal sexual assault, trial court abused its discretion in refusing to ask venire members about potential bias against persons who participate in prostitution. Appellate Court, in reversing defendant’s conviction on said charge, found that trial court should have asked said question, after noting that some sexual behaviors can evoke from many venire members strong responses that prevent them from assessing evidence without bias. It further concluded that instant question would have helped defendant determine whether potential jurors could fairly weigh evidence against him. (Partial Dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether 2011 Amendment to Sex Offender Registration Act, which required defendant to register as sex offender when defendant was convicted of felony theft in 2014 where defendant had previously been convicted in 1983 for attempted criminal sexual assault, is constitutional as applied to defendant. Appellate Court, in rejecting defendant’s claim that said statute was unconstitutional because requirement that he register as sex offender violated his substantive due process rights, found that defendant’s criminal history since 1983 indicated general tendency to recidivate. As such, Appellate Court found that legislature could rationally determine that registration was appropriate because defendant posed potential threat of committing new sex offense in future. Appellate Court also rejected defendant’s claim that 2011 Amendment violated ex post facto clauses of U.S. and Ill. Constitutions since registration requirement is not form of punishment.

This case presents question as to whether defendant’s 76-year sentence, consisting of consecutive sentences of 45 years for first degree murder and 31 years for attempt first degree murder, violated rehabilitation clause of Article 1, Section 11 of Illinois Constitution as applied to defendant who was 18 years old at time of said offenses. Appellate Court, in vacating defendant’s sentence and remanding matter for new sentencing hearing, found that instant sentence shocked moral sense of community because it sent young adult to prison for essentially remainder of his life. Dissenting Justice, though, would affirm on ground that it is legislature’s role and not court's role to determine whether convergence of consecutive sentencing and mandatory enhancement statutes that produce de facto life sentences for anyone (young or old) require that trial courts be given greater discretion in sentencing offenders.

This case presents question as to whether defendant’s convictions for armed habitual criminal and armed violence violated one-act, one-crime doctrine, where record showed that defendant possessed only one gun. Appellate Court, in affirming both convictions, noted split of authority on said issue, but found that both convictions could stand since they were based on separate acts, where defendant’s armed habitual criminal conviction required additional element of his status as offender with two prior felony convictions, and where defendant’s conviction for armed violence required additional act of possession of heroin with intent to deliver. Moreover, neither offense qualified as included offense of other offense.

This case presents question as to whether offense of being sex offender in public park under 720 ILCS 5/11-9.4-1(b)) is constitutional. Appellate Court found that said statute was facially unconstitutional because it was “irrational” and inconsistent with defendant’s substantive due process rights. Instant statute makes it misdemeanor for certain child sex offenders to knowingly enter or remain in public park, and State, as well as Dissenting Justice, contend that means adopted in section 11-9.4-1(b) constituted reasonable method of accomplishing legislature’s goal of protecting public from sex offenders. Appellate Majority, though, found that said statute was overbroad, where: (1) it contained no requirement that anyone, including children, be actually or probably present in park at time of offense; and (2) statute improperly criminalized wide swath of innocent conduct.