Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder in relation to shooting death. Defendant claimed, in motion to suppress his confession at trial, that his confession was obtained through coercive police tactics, and this acts as res judicata bar to his present coerced confession claim raised in postconviction petition. The only allegation that is "new" is not newly discovered, and is thus barred by res judicata. Thus, court properly held that Defendant failed to present any new evidence to allow for reconsideration of whether his confession had been coerced. (BURKE, concurring; ELLIS, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of armed robbery and aggravated battery. Considering testimony of State's witness and corroborating evidence, a rational trier of fact could have determined that Defendant committed the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant failed to sufficiently establish that trial results would have been different had defense counsel tendered accomplice-witness instruction. Given that jury did receive IPI instructions on prior inconsistent statements and general witness credibility, and that in their opening and closing statements and that parties repeatedly encouraged jury to question credibility of State's witness, Defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to tender accomplice-witness testimony. (HUTCHINSON and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Court abused its discretion in applying surveillance location privilege. Where State requests invocation of surveillance location privilege, court should hold an in camera hearing, and ensure that a transcript of that hearing is created; and court must balance public interest in keeping location secret against the defendant's interest in preparing a defense.(HOWSE and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder, vehicular invasion, and aggravated battery. Two physicians found that cause of victim's death was homicide, and evidence supports determination that codefendants were responsible. Trial evidence showed that Defendant was with members of his gang before, during, and after vehicular invasion and homicide. Defendant's involvement in the altercation and his affiliation with other offenders established accountability for both vehicular invasion and actions leading to victim's death. Evidence was sufficient to show that Defendant caused or was accountable for, and had requisite mental state for, 1st degree murder, as codefendant forced open door of vehicle and kicked victim in face or chest and Defendant squared his body to victim and punched him in the head.(LAVIN and COBBS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Section 414 of Controlled Substances Act, which provides immunity, in certain situations, from prosecution for possession of a small amount of a controlled substance for a person reporting or experiencing a drug overdose. Section 414 does not apply to Defendant, because evidence of Defendant's drug possession was not acquired as a result of Defendant seeking or obtaining emergency assistance. (HUTCHINSON and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Court properly dismissed amended petition for postconviction relief at second stage, as Defendant failed to make substantial showing of a constitutional violation. For purposes of ineffective assistance in context of guilty please, a particular showing of prejudice is required. A bare allegation that but for plea counsel's bad advice, the Defendant would have pleaded differently and would have gone to trial will not establish prejudice. The Defendant must also claim innocence or must identify a plausible defense to the charges.(KNECHT and POPE, concurring.)

Defendant pled guilty to 1 count of 1st degree murder and 1 count of residential arson with concurrent 40-year and 10-year sentences. Defendant filed pro se postconviction petition in 2013. Defendant attempted to but was denied leave to file pro se amendment to his petition in 2014, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request fitness hearing at time of his guilty plea. Illinois Supreme Court's 2015 Castleberry opinion abolished a rule, and did not establish a new rule. Thus, Castleberry decision is applicable to Defendant's case, and Defendant's claim thus attacks his sentence as merely voidable, not void. Postconviction counsel's Rule 651(c ) certificate was facially valid, and record does not positively rebut presumption of reasonableness of postconviction counsel in declining to amend petition to include argument that petition's untimeliness was due to Defendant's mental health. (FITZGERALD SMITH and PUCINSKI, concurring.)