Criminal Law

(Court opinion corrected 10/18/16.) After simultaneous, but severed, bench trials with two codefendants, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder based on theory of accountability. Evidence was sufficient to find Defendant guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of first degree murder under accountability theory. Defendant and codefendants went to train platform to confront rival gang members, and even if they did not intend to kill anyone at that time, the result of confrontation was codefendant and victim fighting on train tracks, which ended in victim falling on rail and being electrocuted. State was not required to prove that Defendant and codefendants shared same intent as to the charged offense. (MASON, concurring; HYMAN, specially concurring.)

Defendant, age 15 at time of offense, was sentenced to 60 years for first degree murder of a 15-year-old. For a juvenile's mandatory or discretionary sentence of life in prison without parole to be constitutionally valid, the sentencing judge must take into account his youth and "attendant characteristics of youth" to determine whether defendant is "the rarest of juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility." Amendment to Section 5-130 of Juvenile Court Act, which raised minimum age for automatic transfer to criminal court from 15 to 16 years old, is procedural in nature and thus may be applied retroactively. Sentence vacated, and remanded for resentencing.(CONNORS and CUNNINGHAM, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after 2013 jury trial, of 3 counts of attempted murder and 3 counts of aggravated battery with a firearm, and sentenced to 3 concurrent terms of 23 years. State's repeated references to Defendant as a criminal in its opening statement were prejudicial and inaccurate, with no basis other than to inflame passions of jury. Thus, Defendant is entitled to a new trial. On retrial, Defendant should be permitted to argue and present evidence that he acted in self-defense or defense of property when he told another person to shoot. Retrial should take place before a different judge, as trial judge made sarcastic and biased comments about Defendant at sentencing.(HYMAN and NEVILLE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of production of cannabis plants and sentenced to 24 months intensive probation. Court erred in denying Defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence and statements based on involuntary consent to search his residence. City police officer initially gave false information to Defendant to get Defendant to come home, and falsely stated to Defendant that he was with Illinois State Police and was investigating a break-in at his house. Officer told Defendant that he would go to jail unless he signed the form consenting to search of his house. No exigent circumstances precluded State from obtaining a warrant. (SCHWARM and WELCH, concurring.)

Respondent minor, after jury trial, was adjudicated delinquent of residential burglary and sentenced to Juvenile Department of Corrections. State's failure to provide any reason for its peremptory challenge to one black member of the venire and the court's failure to inquire into reason for challenge, and other irregularities in proceedings, require remand for a new Batson hearing.(NEVILLE and PIERCE, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with 1 count of possession with intent to deliver 900 or more grams of methamphetamine.  Court erred in granting Defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Under totality of circumstances analysis, initial stop of vehicle in which Defendant was riding was justified by reason of traffic violation which police observed and reasonable suspicion which officers had that occupants were engaged in criminal narcotics activity. Defendant was not under arrest solely by reason of having been handcuffed and placed in a police car. Resulting detention of Defendant prior to discovery of meth was reasonable in both scope and duration. Search of attache bag in which meth was found was conducted after police had probable cause to believe that narcotics were located therein. In addition, after car was lawfully stopped, owner of car gave consent for search of vehicle, and a narcotics-detection dog sniffed exterior and interior of car and alerted to presence of narcotics in attache bag, giving police probable cause to search bag. (ROCHFORD and DELORT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder, and of personally discharging firearm that caused a person's death, and was sentenced to total 90 years. Court properly refused to instruct jury on 2nd-degree murder, as there was no evidence of serious provocation to support Defendant's theory of mutual combat. Trial counsel's decision to open the door to prior crimes evidence (credit card fraud) did not prejudice Defendant, where State presented overwhelming evidence that Defendant shot 2 persons who were unarmed, including his own testimony admitting he shot them. Thus, Defendant suffered no prejudice, and thus no ineffective assistance of counsel. Any weight that court placed on fact that Defendant's conduct caused ultimate harm was insignificant, and did not result in a greater sentence.(HALL and REYES, concurring.)