Criminal Law

Court properly denied Defendant's post-conviction petition. Court properly sustained State's objection to admission into evidence of notes of law student interviewer of witness, as there was no evidence authenticating the notes. No ineffective assistance of counsel, as Defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to call notetaker at witness' interview as a witness. Court's conclusion that counsel's decision not to call a certain witness was a matter of trial strategy is adequately supported by record. Declining to call alibi witness whose testimony could be contradicted by Defendant's own postarrest statements as to his whereabouts is reasonable trial strategy, even if witness was never interviewed.(CUNNINGHAM and ROCHFORD, concurring.)

Section 3(a) of the Sex Offender Registration Act, which requires sex offenders to disclose and periodically update information on their Internet identities and websites, survives intermediate scrutiny because it advances a substantial governmental interest of preventing sex offenses against children and protecting the public from danger of recidivist sex offenders, without chilling more speech than is necessary. Defendant failed to establish that Internet disclosure provision of Section 3(a) of Registration Act is facially unconstitutional. (GARMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery and sentenced to extended-term sentence of 24 years based on prior juvenile adjudication of delinquency referenced in presentence investigative report (PSI). A prior juvenile adjudication of delinquency falls within Apprendi's prior-conviction exception and the exception in Section 111-3(c-5) of Criminal Code. For purposes of extended-term sentencing, juvenile adjudication is the equivalent of a prior conviction. Defendant's PSI conclusively established he had been adjudicated delinquent of residential burglary.(THOMAS, KARMEIER, and THEIS, concurring; BURKE, GARMAN, and KILBRIDE, dissenting.) 

Stipulated evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant of unlawful possession of methamphetamine precursors. By purchasing 12-hour Sudafed, and taking it with him from the drugstore, it can be inferred that Defendant was consciously aware he was in possession of the Sudafed. Knowledge the substance possessed contains a methamphetamine precursor is not required by Section 120(a) of Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act. A person who purchases medication containing a methamphetamine precursor is on notice the medication contains the precursor because the ingredients are listed on the medication container. (TURNER and APPLETON, concurring.)

Court properly denied Defendant's petition for postconviction relief, as Defendant was adequately alerted to possibility of adverse immigration consequences in entering guilty plea to armed violence. Defendant's ICE hold of more than one year alerted Defendant to the general risk of adverse immigration consequences, leading Defendant to raise the issue with counsel, who responded in a manner that acknowledged the risk. As the immigration consequences of Defendant's conviction were not truly clear, counsel's only obligation under Padilla was to warn Defendant of possible adverse immigration consequences, and counsel met that obligation. (BURKE, concurring; HUTCHINSON, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after 2014 jury trial, of attempted murder and aggravated battery with a firearm and sentenced as a Class X offender to 36 years. Defendant shot his then-girlfriend, after her car hit his ex-girlfriend's car, in which Defendant's 7-year-old daughter was a passenger. Court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to instruct jury on defense of others, as Defendant did not show that harm to his daughter was imminent. Absent evidence that Defendant was acting in defense of others, he is not entitled to instruction premised on finding that his belief in need to defend others was unreasonable. Remanded for factual determination on issue of provocation as to attempted murder charge. (HYMAN and PIERCE, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 10/21/16.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st-degree murder based on felony murder. Defendant shot toward a van which was driving wrong way down a one-way street toward group of people gathered at a party. One of the bullets shot and killed a friend of Defendant who was sitting in a car across the street. Jury reduced conviction on counts for intentional murder and strong-probability murder to 2nd-degree murder based on mitigating factor of unreasonable self-defense; and jury also convicted Defendant of aggravated discharge of a firearm. Felony-murder conviction was predicated on offense of aggravated discharge of a firearm, which was Defendant's act of shooting at the van, which was same act causing death of victim, which jury found warranted only a 2nd-degree conviction. Thus, State cannot use felony murder to obtain 1st-degree murder conviction that it otherwise could not secure.(COBBS, concurring; McBRIDE, specially concurring.)