Criminal Law

After 2014 jury trial, Defendant was convicted of 3 counts of 1st-degree murder in 2009 gang-related shooting deaths of 3 teenagers as they left high school. Court sentenced him to mandatory term of natural life in prison. Sentence in this case does not shock moral sense of community and does not violate proportionate penalties clause, as Defendant, age 20 at time of offense, was the person who pulled trigger. Court explicitly held that even if it had discretion in sentence, it would still impose sentence of natural life. Court indicated that it did consider mitigating evidence along with evidence at trial and in aggravation.(ELLIS and HOWSE, concurring.)

A defendant seeking to reinstate a voluntarily withdrawn postconviction petition after more than 1 year must be given opportunity to show that delay was not due to his culpable negligence. Section 122-5 of Post-Conviction Hearing Act grants postconviction courts discretion to extend the time of filing any pleading other than original petition, which would include a motion to reinstate the previous petition. (STEWART and CATES, concurring.)

In 1989, Defendant entered open plea of guilty to intentional murder and residential burglary; court entered sentences of natural life and 15 years, to be served concurrently. In 2011, Defendant filed pro se petition for relief from judgment pursuant to Section 2-1401 of Code of Civil Procedure. Illinois Supreme Court's 2015 People v. Castleberry decision applies retroactively to Defendant's case, and thus Defendant can no longer challenge his sentence as void. Although Defendant's natural life sentence was not authorized by statute at the time imposed, under the Castleberry decision, only the most fundamental defects, such as lack of personal or subject-matter jurisdiction, render a judgment void, and Defendant's sentence cannot now be corrected. (FITZGERALD SMITH and COBBS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of home invasion. Defendant, running from police while they were attempting to serve arrest warrant on him, ran out back door and broke into another apartment, running through apartment, while tenants, including 2 children, were inside. "Any injury", within the meaning of the home-invasion statute, means any physical, emotional, psychological, or traumatic injury intentionally caused by the defendant to a person inside the dwelling, with or without physical contact. Tenant's psychological injury was a natural and probable consequence of Defendant's conduct, and evidence was sufficient to prove Defendant's intent to injure tenant. (HOLDER WHITE and STEIGMANN, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 11/9/16.) Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of being an armed habitual criminal, possession with intent to deliver 900 grams or more of heroin,a nd unlawful use of weapon by a felon. No ineffective assistance of counsel; there was no conflict of interest that existed that adversely affected performance of Defendant's trial counsel. When viewed in light most favorable to prosecution, State established guilt of  possession with. Court did not render inconsistent verdicts as Defendant and codefendant were not tried on identical facts. intent to deliver beyond a reasonable doubt.  (REYES and BURKE, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 11/3/16.) Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated battery of a child, based on injuries to Defendant's newborn son. Court accurately considered all of the evidence in reaching her verdict, including Defendant's theory of rickets as an alternative cause of some of infant's injuries. Court commented on defense theories and evidence, but knew and properly applied burden of p[roof. A reasonable trier of fact could infer that infant was shaken on a prior occasion and that Defendant shook him. State's experts did not rely on infant's constellation of injuries for any opinions that he was shaken. State elicited evidence of abusive causation as to each separate injury and offered evidence to refute that infant suffered from preexisting medical conditions to explain those injuries. Evidence was sufficient to prove Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (ELLIS and BURKE, concurring.)