Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder and of personally discharging a firearm that proximately caused the victim's death. Ineffective assistance of counsel, as defense counsel failed to ask for a self-defense instruction or second degree murder instruction, although jury was to be given instruction as to accountability. Defendant sufficiently showed that he was prejudiced by his counsel's misunderstanding of applicable law.Defendant's concerns for his safety, in requesting that courtroom be sealed during sentencing hearing while mitigating evidence was presented, amounted to good cause. Defendant had previously been injured in prison, and feared for his safety should it become known that he acted as a "snitch" in an unrelated case involving solicitation of murder of minor criminal sexual abuse victim.(CUNNINGHAM and HARRIS, concurring.) 

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of several offenses relating to attempted first degree murder of a peace officer, and personally discharging a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to 20 years for attempted murder, with additional mandatory 20-year enhancement for personally discharging a firearm.  Illinois' "legally indistinguishable" automatic transfer has been held constitutional by Illinois Supreme Court. Thus, in the absence of actual punishment imposed by exclusive jurisdiction statute, it does not violate 8th amendment. Exclusive jurisdiction statute does not violate procedural or substantive due process. Court took into account Defendant's age and other mitigating circumstances, such as lack of criminal background and difficult upbringing, in imposing minimum sentence. Sentencing scheme, as applied to Defendant, violates proportionate penalties clause of Illinois Constitution, as it shocks evolving standard of moral decency. Sentence reversed, and remanded for resentencing in line with new sentencing scheme, without imposition of mandatory enhancement.in(CUNNINGHAM and HARRIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of burglary and possession of burglary tools. Charging instrument was sufficient, even though name of owner of warehouse from which tools were stolen was not correctly named. Ownership of premises burglarized was not material to indictment, as identity of property owner is not a necessary element of offense of burglary, and as variance did not prejudice preparation of defense. Defendant did not show any risk of double jeopardy. (CUNNINGHAM and HARRIS, concurring.)

More than 8 years after pleading guilty to 2 separate crimes of aggravated criminal sexual assault, Defendant filed a postconviction petition alleging court's error in failing to conduct sua sponte fitness hearing and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. No evidence in record of any basis to arguably raise bona fide doubt of fitness. Record shows that Defendant had presence of mind to engage court in question about his sentence, mittimus, and whether court could order him placed in protective custody. In instances where trial counsel found Defendant's fitness questionable, she alerted court and requested evaluation be done, and arranged for psychologist to evaluate Defendant. No ineffective assistance of counsel, as there was not a bona fide doubt as to fitness, and thus no arguable basis for counsel's failure to request fitness hearing. (GORDON and LAMPKIN, concurring.)

Failure of defense counsel to notify a defendant of his option to surrender bond and receive credit for the time he is spending in custody is objectively unreasonable. Defendant was prejudiced by this failure, as Defendant would otherwise have surrendered his bond and received credit for time served if he had been informed of this option. Alleged errors of counsel as to witnesses and investigation, even when considered in aggregate, would not be enough to undermine confidence in outcome of trial. Sentence of 23 years, for being armed habitual criminal, not excessive, and no authority for Defendant's argument that because his possession of firearm was constructive, rather than actual, his offense is inherently less serious. (McDADE and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in 2009. In 2012, Defendant mailed a postconviction petition to clerk of circuit court, but clerk did not docket his petition. Defendant inquired into status of his petition several times, and refiled it 1 year later. Court properly summarily dismissed petition. Defendant is not entitled to remand for 2nd-stage postconviction proceedings, because statute requiring clerk to promptly docket his petition is directory, not mandatory. Statute prescribes no consequences for clerk's failure to promptly docket a petition, and defendants' rights to timely consideration of their petitions will not be injured by a directory reading. No ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to gang evidence, as it was admissible to explain why trial witness recanted his grand jury testimony and testified differently at trial. As gang evidence was limited to relevant matter for which it was admitted, risk of unfair prejudice was slight. (McBRIDE and HOWSE, concurring.)

Defendant, age 15 at time of offense, was charged along with a codefendant, age 16 at time of offense, of armed robbery, aggravated robbery, and aggravated unlawful restraint for accosting a woman in an alley and taking 2 backpacks from her. Defendant and codefendant were tried at joint bench trial and convicted of aggravated robbery and unlawful restraint. At trial, State introduced evidence that both had confessed to offense. Only the codefendant admitted that, during robbery, he told victim, "Don't make him [i.e., Defendant] shoot you." Court, in its findings, expressly cited that statement as evidence supporting aggravated robbery charge, and stated that Defendant was "accountable" for that statement.  Trial counsel for Defendant was ineffective for failing to object to introduction of codefendant's inculpatory statement. That statement directly proved essential element of armed robbery, and it was inadmissible as evidence of Defendant's guilt, but court expressly considered it as such.   (HOWSE and COBBS, concurring.)