Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of a stolen motor vehicle and sentenced to 9 years.Court erred in admitting testimony of son of car's owner as to burglary of his parents' home, and that he saw Defendant coming out of pawn shop and driving his father's car, to extent that it contained improper other-crimes evidence. Court improperly precluded Defendant from introducing evidence that someone else had been arrested for that burglary, as Defendant was thus unable to counter prejudicial effect created by son's testimony. Thus, unfair prejudice was created by this evidence, and court abused its discretion. Error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus Defendant is entitled to new trial.(McBRIDE and HOWSE, concurring.)

Defendants was charged with attempt (residential burglary) and possession of burglary tools. Prior to trial's evening recess on first day, court swore 8 jurors. Prior to trial resuming the next day, father of ASA died. That day, court sua sponte declared a mistrial. Court began jury selection for Defendant's second trial 13 months later. Defendant never filed motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy. Second jury convicted Defendant of both offenses. Jeopardy had not attached, as entire jury was not sworn. Jury was entitled to infer Defendant's intent to commit residential burglary from his conduct, and court did not err in allowing State to present single prior residential burglary conviction for limited purpose of showing knowledge and intent. Court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to extended term of 10 years for attempt (residential burglary) conviction. As both charges originated from a single course of conduct, court should not have sentenced Defendant to extended, 6-year term for offense of possession of burglary tools, because that offense was not the most serious conviction. Court was statutorily authorized to impose extended term only on conviction with most serious class. (HOLDER WHITE, concurring; STEIGMANN, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of criminal sexual assault. Court was without statutory authorization to impose $200 domestic-violence fine. Illinois Supreme Court's 2015 holding in People v. Castleberry may be applied retroactively to collateral proceedings, where a defendant attacks a sentence imposed in underlying case that concluded prior to Castleberry decision. Under Castelberry, a criminal sentence is not void for lacking statutory authorization.(TURNER and POPE, concurring.)

Court entered first-stage dismissal of Defendant's postconviction petition.Defendant may not raise issue of computation of time spent in presentence custody for the first time on appeal, arguing that he was entitled to one additional day of presentence credit. Provisions of Rule 615(b)(1) do not allow appellate court ot modify Defendant's sentencing order because it is beyond scope of appeal. Defendant may petition trial court to correct simple error in arithmetic. Clerk of court ordered to correct fines, fees, and costs order to reflect $5-per-day credit against fines. (TURNER, concurring; HARRIS, specially concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 10/3/16.) Court erred in making credibility determination as to affidavit of a person who was also charged, along with defendant, with first-degree murder in 1998 shooting death, at 2nd stage of post-conviction review and based on its consideration of materials outside the record in Defendant's case.  However, because that affidavit would not change result on retrial, Defendant did not make substantial showing of actual innocence.  Court properly dismissed post-conviction petition at 2nd stage. Post-conviction counsel's remark that factual basis for affiant's plea was "probably important" did not represent a concession of petition's merits, and was not unreasonable representation.(CUNNINGHAM and CONNORS, concurring.)

The complainant in a criminal case does not have standing to bring a petition, pursuant to Section 2-1401 of Code of Civil Procedure, for purpose of challenging a court's prior grant of a certificate of innocence to a criminal defendant. Because court and prosecutor vacated Defendant's conviction and sentence, Petitioner/complainant was no longer a victim and thus was no longer an intended beneficiary of the new implementing statute. (REYES, concurring; LAMPKIN, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of delivery of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a church, and sentenced to 15 years. Although Defendant's drug transaction was for $20, sentence is presumed proper, as it falls well within statutory guidelines, and is not disproportionate to Defendant's 11th drug conviction and 15th felony conviction overall. Court properly considered aggravating and mitigating factors. (PIERCE, concurring; HYMAN, dissenting.)