Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of misdemeanor domestic battery. Court properly admitted other-crimes evidence as relevant for purposes of demonstrating Defendant's motive, intent, or absence of mistake in harming victim (his girlfriend). The fact that court did not base its ruling on another permissible basis, the continuing narrative doctrine, did not necessarily mean that court's ruling was erroneous. Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction. Victim testified about incident that gave rise to charged offense, and about 3 prior incidents of domestic violence and supporting photographic evidence. (CONNORS and HARRIS, concurring.)

Defendant, age 17 at time of incident, was convicted, after jury trial, of attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. Based on its plain language, legislature indicated a prospective application of the statute (Public Act 99-69, effective 1/1/2016). Thus, statute provides that a sentencing court's application of additional mitigating factors and discretion to decline imposition of applicable firearm enhancement will take place when a person under 18 commits offense on or after 1/1/2016. Exclusive jurisdiction provision is procedural as it specifies the forum where a defendant will be tried, and thus this statute does not impose punishment and does not violate 8th amendment.  (GORDON and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of possession of a controlled substance iwht intent to deliver and sentenced to 3 years probation. Police seized Defendant without reasonable suspicion, and thus court erred when it denied Defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Evidence shows that investigator immediately seized Defendant when he arrived at the scene, and admitted that Defendant was not committing a crime, and at that moment defendant was not free to leave. Defendant's compliance with investigator's requests to stop, return to the vehicle, and answer officer's questions was required.Officer's language or tone of voice compelled Defendant's compliance. As officers lacked reasonable suspicion that Defendant was committing a crime, seizure was illegal.(REYES and LAMPKIN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree felony murder while armed with a firearm. Charging instruments upon which Defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder was deficient in its failure to specify which of Illinois' 2 attempted armed robbery offenses State sought to prove as predicate offense. Indictment does not provide statutory citation to relevant provision, and does not include any specific detail or other indication of which offense State sought to prove at trial. Thus, indictment was defective in its failure to adequately inform Defendant of charges against him with sufficient detail to prepare adequate defense.(CONNORS and HARRIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of aggravated domestic battery and aggravated battery.Court's comments and sentence imposed show that court, at time of sentencing, did not believe Defendant to be extended-term eligible. Thus, court did not commit clear or obvious error in sentencing Defendant to 4 years for aggravated battery. No ineffective assistance of counsel in counsel's failure to raise issue of Defendant's extended-term eligibility, given court's apparent conclusion that Defendant was not extended-term eligible. Given the circumstances of offense, court could not have been more lenient in its sentencing. Court properly found that victim's injury was great bodily harm, as Defendant shattered victim's arm with broken end of golf club and injury required extensive rehab and further surgery.(LYTTON and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Motor scooter is a motor vehicle. As there was sufficient testimonial evidence for trier of fact to determine that motor scooter at issue met specifications of a motor vehicle, neither motor scooter itself nor a picture of it was required to find Defendant guilty of possession of  a stolen motor vehicle. Evidence showed that Defendant knew motor scooter was stolen. Defendant testified that he was familiar iwth motor scooters as he had previously owned one, and the motor scooter did not have license plate and its ignition had been removed.(CONNORS and HARRIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of unlawful delivery of controlled substance within 1000 feet of a public park and 2 counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a school. State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was guilty of offense, under theory of accountability, when Defendant used telephone to arrange drug transactions with undercover police officer. Defendant's consistent use of phone with certain number for voice communications is compelling circumstantial evidence that Defendant sent text messages that undercover officer received on date in question.(BURKE and HUDSON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of residential burglary. Defense counsel failed to move to bar testimony of detective and victims identifying stolen property. Defendant argued that police failed to comply with Section 115-9(b) of Code of Criminal Procedure. That section is limited to admission of photographic evidence in place of physical evidence. Thus, Defendant cannot establish prejudice from defense counsel's failure, as motion to bar evidence based on section 115-9(b) violation would not have been granted.(CARTER and SCHMIDT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (UPWF). Defendant was convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) and later convicted of UPWF, with each conviction occurring before Illinois Supreme Court's 2013 Aguilar decision.  At the time Defendant possessed a firearm, his AUUW conviction had not been vacated. Thus, even though Defendant was convicted of violating a statute later declared void ab initio, he was still subject to the "firearms disability" imposed by Section 24-1.1(a), and State sufficiently proved that fact.(HOLDRIDGE and CARTER, concurring.)