Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated battery, and unlawful restraint. Court properly admitted into evidence statements that victim (who resides out of state and did not testify) made to ER nurse. Verbal exchanges ER nurse engaged in with victim were primarily for purpose of gathering evidence. Medical exam properly entailed obtaining history from victim of events leading her to visit ER. No error in court's refusal to permit Defendant to introduce evidence that victim had engaged in sexual activity, with someone other than Defendant, within 72 hours before ER nurse examined her, as inadmissible under rape-shield statute. Evidence was not so relevant that its admission was constitutionally required, as Defendant's theory of defense was that sex was consensual. (JORGENSEN and SPENCE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated battery of a child. State alleged that Defendant had severely physically abused his 3-month-old son, which resulted in a constellation of injuries, causing him great bodily harm. A few days prior to trial, State amended charge in indictment, adding more limiting language, alleging that Defendant shook and beat child, causing skull fracture and arm fracture. Defendant's postconviction claims as to trial counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel should have been dismissed under res judicata and forfeiture. Trial counsel testified that he tried to obtain an expert but was unable to do so, and counsel conducted thorough and effective cross-examination of physicians. Defendant failed to carry his burden of proof under Strickland standards that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. (SCHWARM and MOORE, concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 9/6/16.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated battery with a firearm. Court properly allowed State to present other-crimes evidence related to alleged escape attempt from county jail. Escape evidence (recording of visitation at jail) had high probative value as it showed Defendant's consciousness of guilt, and was reasonably necessary to show Defendant's escape attempt. Prejudicial impact of escape evidence was low, as it was unlikely to inflame passions of jury, especially when compared with strong evidence of more heinous offense of attempted murder. Fines and fees imposed by circuit clerk vacated, and remanded for entry of order for fines and fees to be entered by trial court.(McDADE, specially concurring; WRIGHT, dissenting.)

Respondent was, in 2002, committed pursuant to Sexually Dangerous Persons "(SDP) Act, and filed application for discharge in 2012. Court abused its discretion in denying Respondent's motion in limine, in its entirety, seeking to exclude testimony of 4 witnesses about details of Respondent's underlying convictions and an uncharged incident considered by expert witnesses in reaching their opinions. Court did not err in refusing several of Respondent's proposed jury instructions which would have given jury definitions of various terms not defined under SDP Act. (WELCH and CATES, concurring.)

Defendant, age 17 at time of offense,  was convicted, after jury trial in 2003, of 4 counts of first degree murder and 1 count of first degree felony murder, and was sentenced to natural life in prison. No indication that court considered improper factor or rationale in issuing sentence.  Court properly considered Defendant's age and based on circumstances of crime and Defendant's history, a natural life sentence was appropriate. As Defendant does not challenge trial court's personal or subject matter jurisdiction, under Castleberry case, Defendant cannot challenge his sentence as void. (TURNER and HARRIS, concurring.) 

(Court opinion corrected 9/1/16.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF). Court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.  Officer's warrantless search of other areas of Defendant's motel room, namely, area above bathroom ceiling, was not justified, as it exceeded scope of Defendant's consent to enter his room to find alleged perpetrator of theft of cash from that room. That search was not justified as search incident to Defendant's arrest or by exigent circumstances.(FITZGERALD SMITH and LAVIN, concurring.)

Court properly dismissed case for violations of Defendant's right to a speedy trial.There was a delay of more than a year between date Defendant was arrested and detained on original charges and date of his indictment on same charges. There was a delay of almost a year between dismissal of original charges and filing of bill of indictment on same charges.  Restraints on Defendant's liberty triggered protections of speedy-trial provision of 6th amendment.State offered no explanation to justify delay. Length of delay was presumptively prejudicial; defendant attempted to request speedy trial and disposition of charges; and Defendant made affirmative showing of actual prejudice as he endured lengthy incarceration.(GOLDENHERSH and CHAPMAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of several offenses, including those involving possession and use of a weapon. Court merged all counts and sentenced Defendant to 7 years on armed habitual criminal count. As Defendant's prior convictions for UUWF and AUUW had not been vacated at the time he possessed a firearm, and prior to his armed habitual criminal conviction, they could properly serve as predicates for that conviction.(FITZGERALD SMITH and PUCINSKI, concurring.)