Defendant was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and aggravated criminal sexual abuse. State's expert testimony, even though admitted improperly without proper foundation, was harmless error. Expert's testimony did not show that Defendant had committed alleged crimes, but only showed potential reasons why victim did not display physical abnormalities several days later. Victim's testimony, along with DNA evidence, overwhelmingly supported convictions. (CARTER and SCHMIDT, concurring.)
Postconviction counsel failed to provide reasonable assistance because counsel did not obtain and review Defendant's pretrial mental health records to adequately present Defendant's pro se claim that he was unfit to waive his constitutional right to trial counsel. .Defendant's pro se allegations placed counsel on notice of evidence needed to support his claim, and postconviction counsel was obligated to at least attempt to obtain evidentiary support for claims raised in postconviction petition. (LYTTON and McDADE, concurring.)
Because imposition of a fine is a judicial act, and circuit clerk has no authority to levy fines, any fines imposed by circuit clerk are void from their inception. The Castleberry court decision, abolishing the void sentence rule, does not apply to unauthorized imposition of fines by a circuit clerk. All fines and fees imposed by circuit clerk are vacated, and case remanded with directions that court should impose each proper fine, fee, assessment, and court cost, in written order indicating statutory authority for each one.(CARTER, concurring; SCHMIDT, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 8-year term of incarceration on charges of possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine, even though defendant argued that Dist. Ct. had improperly found that he and third-party had jointly distributed between 500 grams and 1.5 kilograms of methamphetamine because, according to defendant, he personally sold only small portion of drugs in question. However, Dist. Ct. could properly base instant relevant conduct calculation on sales defendant directly made himself, as well as drug sales that third-party made in furtherance of their joint distribution scheme, especially where third-party testified that she and defendant coordinated certain drug purchases, shared customers and combined sale proceeds to purchase additional drugs. Moreover, counsel conceded that defendant and third-party distributed more than 500 grams of methamphetamine. Defendant also failed to overcome presumptive reasonableness of his below-Guidelines sentence.
Ct. of Appeals remanded case to Dist. Ct. for clarification of its order that partially granted govt. motion to reduce defendant’s 212-month term of incarceration based on his cooperation with govt. in testifying as witness in trial involving defendant’s trial counsel, who was charged with encouraging his clients to testify falsely in their criminal trials. Although Dist. Ct. granted 14 percent reduction, record failed to provide sufficient explanation for that particular reduction, and Dist. Ct. could not limit requested reduction by fact that defendant’s trial counsel was eventually acquitted in his trial.
Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to 24-month term of incarceration on charge of unlawful presence in U.S. after being removed, based in part on Dist. Ct.’s application of 8-level upward adjustment under section 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) of USSG that applies for aliens remaining in U.S. after being convicted of aggravated felony. Defendant did not qualify for said enhancement, since record showed that defendant was removed in 2002, which was long before he had committed relevant aggravated felony in 2013.
(Modified upon denial of rehearing 8/1/16.) Defendant pled guilty to predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and criminal sexual assault, for sexual conduct with 2 boys, age 13 and under, at parsonage where Defendant lived when he was a church youth minister. In exchange for plea, State agreed to aggregate sentencing range of 12-35 years on mandatorily consecutive sentences. Court properly dismissed Defendant's pro se postconviction petition, as it is not of sufficient constitutional dimension. Court reasonably cited Defendant's pattern of behavior, in performing sexual acts on victims in parsonage before taking them to church the next morning, in aggravation does not offend state or federal constitution. Court's repeated references to religion and church were invited by Defendant, who called 6 clergy members to testify in mitigation. (HOLDRIDGE and WRIGHT, concurring.)
(Modified upon denial of rehearing 8/12/16.) Defendant, age 16 at time of offense, was convicted, after bench trial, of armed robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated vehicular hijacking.automatic transfer provision in Section 5-130 of Juvenile Court Act. Defendant was tried and sentenced as an adult in accordance with automatic transfer provision in Section 5-130 of Juvenile Court Act. Section 5-4.5-105 of Juvenile Court Act, which took effect during pendency of his appeal, does not apply retroactively, as there is no express language of retroactivity for still-pending cases in which sentence was imposed prior to statute's effective date..(HOFFMAN and HALL, concurring.)
In prosecution on conspiracy to kidnap and conspiracy to extort charges, as well as unlawful use and possession of firearm charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence gathered pursuant to judicially-approved wiretap, even though defendant argued govt. had failed to satisfy necessity element for obtaining wiretap, where, according to defendant, govt. already knew identity of defendant’s accomplice in spite of agent’s claim in affidavit that wiretap was necessary to obtain said identity. While defendant listed four instances that tied defendant to said accomplice that was known to govt. prior to seeking instant wiretap, necessity element in application process is not difficult to meet, and said instances did not obviously tie accomplice to charged plot to kidnap and extort that formed basis of instant conviction. Moreover, wiretap served to ascertain defendant’s role in charged plot and to obtain evidence of defendant’s guilt. Defendant also raised Brady issue with respect to govt.’s failure to tender report regarding in ownership of gun found in building that defendant had rented, where evidence of ownership of gun would not have changed outcome of trial since other evidence indicated that defendant was aware of gun’s presence and of its planned use in charged plot.
In prosecution on drug charges stemming from govt. investigation of website that sold sassafras oil, which formed component of illegal drug known as ecstasy, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained via administrative subpoena from Microsoft regarding defendant's Hotmail account, which included defendant’s name and I.P. address that linked defendant’s activities to said website. Although government did not obtain warrant prior to issuing administrative subpoena, no “search” for purposes of 4th Amendment occurred, since, under “third-party” doctrine, defendant had no expectation of privacy in his I.P. address when he shared same with Microsoft, and where his I.P. address is transmitted during his use of Internet.
