Defendant was found guilty of aggravated sexual abuse and criminal sexual abuse. State presented sufficient evidence to show force was used to commit the sexual conduct. Victim confirmed that Defendant would “force” her to touch him and “grab” her arms to make her touch him. Court erred by delegating its judicial discretion to the McLean County court services department to impose probationary conditions on Defendant. The imposition of probationary conditions is a part of sentencing and the court must impose any such conditions at the sentencing hearing. (APPLETON and POPE, concurring.)
Plaintiff was shot in the leg during an altercation between two rival rap groups. Jury found Defendant guilty of attempted murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, aggravated discharge of a firearm, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. Court did not abuse its discretion by declining to question potential jurors about their bias towards gangs and rap groups. Court also did not err by admitting other acts of violence that occurred between the groups. The evidence was relevant to establish a continuing narrative between the groups. Additionally, the evidence was sufficient to show Defendant fired the bullet that entered Plaintiff’s leg. The fact that others discharged a firearm does not mean evidence was insufficient to show Defendant, in particular, shot Plaintiff. Lastly, the fact that the bullet could safely remain in Plaintiff’s body does not preclude a finding that the shot caused “great bodily harm.” (HARRIS and APPLETON, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his murder and arson convictions arising out of allegations that he stabbed former girlfriend and then later returned to victim’s home and set her house on fire in effort to cover-up murder. While defendant argued that he was entitled to hearing based on new expert witness testimony indicating that fire burns and estimated temperature of fire in victim’s home precluded defendant from being at said home at time when fire was started, Dist. Ct. could properly deny request for hearing on issue, where: (1) expert’s scientific opinion would not have excluded defendant as individual setting fire in view of other established facts in case; and (2) record showed that defendant had secreted himself during likely time of victim’s death. Ct. further rejected defendant’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for hiring different expert witness, where said witness was well-regarded fire expert who offered defensible though not definitive estimation of fire’s duration that supported defendant’s argument in case. (Dissent filed.)
Defendant was originally sentenced to 24 months probation with 180 days imprisonment. In a supplemental sentencing order the court erred by adding a $200 public-defender-reimbursement fee. Defendant was not given notice nor the opportunity to be heard and present evidence regarding his foreseeable ability to pay. The fee is vacated outright, and the case may not be remanded to the lower court to determine if the fee was appropriate. (KNECHT and STEIGMANN, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver after police, while executing a search warrant, found him in a home that contained a substantial amount of drugs. Evidence was insufficient to satisfy the State’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The only evidence the State offered was: (1) the Defendants presence in the room where drugs were in plain view; and (2) his flight from police. There was no evidence that Defendant exercised control over the premises or the contraband to prove possession, constructive or otherwise, beyond a reasonable doubt. (FITZGERALD SMITH and LAVIN, concurring.)
After a jury convicted Defendant of driving while his license was revoked, the court sentenced him to 18 months imprisonment for a Class 4 felony. Defendant appealed, arguing that his conviction should be reduced to a Class A misdemeanor because the State did not prove the reason for his license revocation beyond a reasonable doubt. Court properly found that the State is not required to prove the reason for the original revocation beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant also argued that the State failed to adequately establish that his license was revoked for DUI at sentencing. It was reasonable for the trial court to infer that Defendant's license was revoked for a DUI at the time of the offense, because Defendant’s presentence investigation report reflected Defendant's prior DUI convictions and did not indicate that his license was reinstated. (KNECHT, concurring; APPLETON, dissenting.)
Defendant was found guilty of reckless discharge of a firearm after a twitch caused him to fire off a round through his apartment wall and into his neighbors kitchen while he was attempting to unload the gun. This evidence is insufficient to prove recklessness beyond a reasonable doubt. Accidents such as these may not be equated with recklessness. (PIERCE and NEVILLE, concurring.)
In prosecution on charge of illegal re-entry in U.S. after having been removed, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss charge on ground of lack of venue, where: (1) defendant-non-citizen was arrested in Texas on unrelated charges and was “found” there by federal authorities while he was in custody in Texas; (2) while defendant was in continuous custody, federal authorities transferred defendant to Illinois, where he was charged with instant offense; and (3) Illinois was not proper venue, because defendant had not committed any element of instant offense in Illinois, did not re-enter country in Illinois, was not found in Illinois and was not apprehended in Illinois. Ct. further noted, though, that for practical purposes, govt. could release defendant in Illinois and then immediately re-arrest him and proceed on new charge in Illinois, or re-indict defendant in proper district under instant record such as Texas. (Dissent filed.)
In prosecution on theft charges arising out of defendant’s theft of cars, his alteration of VIN numbers on said cars and subsequent sale of said cars, record failed to support defendant’s claim that his speedy trial rights were violated under Speedy Trial Act and 6th Amendment, even though record showed that 79 days had elapsed between his arrest and indictment and 1,076 days had elapsed between his initial appearance and start of trial. Only 13 days had elapsed on defendant’s pre-indictment Speedy Trial Act clock, where Dist. Ct. granted two ends-of-justice continuances; and (2) both continuances were justified where time was used by both parties to negotiate resolution of matter. Moreover, less than 70 Speedy Trial Act days had elapsed after defendant made his initial appearance, where record showed that defendant had received 10 ends-of-justice continuances that were justified on grounds that defendant needed time to conduct discovery, explore plea agreement negotiations, conduct his own psychological examination and to allow substitute counsel to prepare for trial. Further, no speedy trial violation under 6th Amendment occurred since defendant was primarily responsible for instant delay. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in either granting govt.’s motion to dismiss 19 out of 25 counts in instant indictment, or finding that evidence that defendant's theft of 10 vehicles and alteration of their VIN numbers that were not included in charged offense constituted relevant conduct for sentencing purposes.
Seventeen-year-old defendant was entitled to new sentencing hearing on charges of vehicular robbery by force and discharge of firearm in relation to crime of violence. Dist. Ct. sentenced defendant to 50-year term of incarceration, while applicable maximum sentence under guidelines was approximately 18 years, and Dist. Ct.’s explanation for defendant’s sentence, i.e., that defendant’s shooting of victim in eye, which caused her permanent injuries, was “flat out evil,” and that said sentence reflected seriousness of offense and need to protect public, was inadequate to explain why Dist. Ct. deviated from sentencing guidelines by approximately 31 years beyond top of guideline range. Moreover, there was nothing in record to reflect why sentence between 20 to 40 years would have been insufficient to serve goals of punishment, and Dist. Ct. otherwise made irrelevant observations regarding dating girl in victim’s neighborhood and about Tet Offensive in Vietnam War.
