Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s section 2241 petition that challenged his piracy conviction on grounds that Magistrate Judge lacked authority to determine whether he was adult at time of charged offense, and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue said issue. Basis of denial was fact that defendant had waived said issue in language contained in his plea agreement that precluded him from seeking to withdraw his guilty plea or to file any kind of collateral attack challenging his conviction based on his age at time of charged offense. Ct. further found that instant waiver applied to section 2241 petitions.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition that sought new sentencing hearing on child pornography charges, where defendant received 198-month sentence under 360-month to life sentencing guidelines that were in force at time of sentencing hearing, rather than 121 to 151-month sentencing guidelines that were in force at time defendant committed charged offenses. While decision in Peugh, 133 S.Ct. 2072, required Dist. Ct. to use sentencing guidelines in force at time defendant committed charged offenses, said decision was handed down five months after defendant’s convictions and sentence had become final. Moreover, defendant was not entitled to new sentencing hearing, where: (1) defendant was given sentence that was not higher than statutory maximum; and (2) considerations of finality militated against finding that Peugh be applied retroactively.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition seeking to vacate his 327-month sentence on various child pornography charges on grounds that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in advising defendant to plead guilty to said charges, and that record failed to contain sufficient factual basis to support his conviction on charge of enticement of minor. Defendant sought certificate of appealability on new issue that he was entitled to set aside his sentence because Magistrate Judge had accepted his felony guilty plea in contravention with Federal Magistrate Act and Harden, 758 F.3d 886. Ct., though, found that defendant had procedurally defaulted said issue because had had failed to raise it in Dist. Ct. when he could have done so.

In prosecution on drug distribution charges, record demonstrated that defendant had validly waived his trial counsel during sentencing phase of trial under circumstances where: (1) Dist. Ct. had previously granted defendant’s motion for new counsel after original trial counsel had filed post-trial motion; (2) week before original date of post-trial-motion/sentencing hearing, substitute counsel obtained competency evaluation for defendant that ultimately resulted in finding that defendant was competent in spite of claims that defendant had exhibited bizarre behavior; (3) on day of rescheduled post-trial motion/sentencing hearing, Dist. Ct. granted defendant’s request to proceed pro se, after defendant had claimed that he was not satisfied with substitute counsel’s efforts at obtaining discovery; and (4) on date of re-scheduled post-trial/sentencing hearing, Dist. Ct. denied defendant’s request for appointed counsel. Dist. Ct. was not required to expressly ask defendant whether he understood charges or penalties during instant post-trial waiver of defendant’s right to counsel, and record otherwise showed that defendant understood nature of charges, as well as potential penalties. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant’s late request for appointed counsel was strategic and based on motive to delay proceedings.