Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. Photo arrays are only potentially useful and not material and exculpatory, and thus Defendant was required to show that State acted in bad faith in failing to preserve photo arrays. As no evidence that State acted in bad faith, no due process violation. Court was within its discretion in not imposing sanctions for missing photo arrays, and was reasonable in admonishing jury that it was permitted to make a negative inference. Court properly allowed testimony of codefendant's confession, and State and court took significant precautions to not introduce substantive evidence from confession. (McBRIDE and HOWSE, concurring.)

Defendant was sentenced to 2 years probation after pleading guilty to vehicular burglary. State then filed petition for violation of probation after Defendant was arrested for another vehicular burglary; defendant was then found in violation of probation and sentenced to 6 years. Court erred in focusing on underlying merit of Defendant's claim as to event query, rather than addressing merits of whether his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain it.  By proceeding directly to hearing on Defendant's substantive claim where he was forced to participate pro se, and where his counsel he claimed was ineffective  participated in hearing, court deprived him of benefit of new counsel in exploring his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (FITZGERALD SMITH and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of felony of resisting or obstructing a police officer. Failure to instruct jury on the proximate cause element of the offense (that his resisting or obstructing officer proximately caused injury to officer) was error. Evidence was closely balanced, as conflicting testimony at trial as to whether Defendant's kick to officer's face or hand resulted from his resisting arrest, and judgment depends solely on credibility of trial witnesses.  Thus, plain error exception to waiver rule does not apply.(CUNNINGHAM and CONNORS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of armed habitual criminal (AHC) and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF). A conviction under the portion of the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) statute found unconstitutional under People v. Aguilar and People v. Burns cannot stand where the Defendant's predicate felony as alleged in the charging document is based on a conviction for a UUW or AUUW offense that is facially unconstitutional under Aguilar. A prior felony conviction is not an element of offense of AUUW, but a factor to be used in enhancing the sentence, and the Defendant's predicate felony drug conviction was not a valid constitutional basis to criminalize Defendant's firearm possession. As State alleged 2 prior felony convictions, and one conviction is fatally defective, State failed to prove essential element of offense of AHC. As to other count charging Defendant with possession of firearm after having been previously convicted of felony offense, Defendant had a constitutionally valid qualifying felony conviction and thus State proved all elements of the merged conviction for UUWF.(SIMON and HYMAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of second degree murder and aggravated battery (public way), and not guilty of aggravated battery (great bodily harm). Defendant struck victim in the face with his fist, causing victim to fall and fracture his skull, which caused his death.  Death is not ordinarily contemplated as a natrual consequence of blows from bare fists. Victim was not substantially smaller or weaker thank Defendant, and victim died from his head striking the concrete, and not from blow to face. Conviction for second degree murder vacated, and remanded for sentencing for aggravated battery (public way). State presented evidence that negated Defendant's self-defense claim, sufficient for jury to find guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated battery. (HARRIS and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder (felony murder) for shooting death of his cousin, who entered pizza restaurant while Defendant and 2 others, all with their faces covered, attempted to commit armed robbery of restaurant. Off-duty police officer, who was not in uniform, did not identify himself as officer, and was in restaurant waiting for pizza, fired several shots.  Court within its discretion in instructing jury that an officer could, as a matter of law, react with deadly force to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or others. Defendant put at issue reasonableness of officer's actions, as he was trying to show that actions were so outrageous they were not reasonably foreseeable. (HUTCHINSON and HUDSON, concurring.)