In prosecution on drug distribution charges, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress drugs seized from defendant’s vehicle, after police stopped said vehicle on ground that defendant had committed Illinois traffic offense by failing to signal continuously for 100 feet prior to pulling alongside curb to park. While said statute requires 100-foot signals when making left or right turns, said statute does not make similar requirement for pulling vehicle alongside curb to park. Moreover, instant mistake of law by police was not objectively reasonable so as to support instant search, where statute was clear with respect to any signal requirement. As such, motion to suppress should have been granted.
In prosecution on armed bank robbery and firearm possession charges, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence surrounding recovery of mask containing defendant’s DNA at location near another bank that occurred approximately one month after charged bank robbery. Defendant argued that although mask itself could be admitted into evidence to establish his identity, officer could not make references to nearby bank and its tellers because said testimony had no other purpose than to show that he had propensity to commit bank robberies. However, Ct. found that any error was harmless with respect to firearm possession charge, where defendant had admitted that he loaded gun that was found at scene of charged bank robbery. Moreover, record contained strong evidence to support defendant’s guilt on bank robbery charges, where: (1) witness placed defendant with others near scene of bank robbery shortly after said robbery had taken place, when accomplice handed witness bag containing money and cell phone taken during bank robbery; and (2) defendant’s DNA was found on inside of gun used at said robbery. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in sentencing defendant to 272-month term of incarceration based in part on two enhancements related to car chase that took place one month after charged offense, where Dist. Ct. failed to make any finding relating car chase to charged offenses.
Court erred in granting motion to suppress evidence found during a strip search conducted pursuant to search warrant. Because search warrant authorized a search of Defendant's person for narcotics, the strip search was within scope of warrant and did not violate 4th Amendment or Illinois Constitution's search-and-seizure clause or private clause.(SCHOSTOK and BIRKETT, concurring.)
Claimant, the Outlaws Motorcycle Club, appeals from circuit court judgment ordering that 3 black leather vests with attached Outlaws' patches be forfeited. Time frame in Section 40 of Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act to initiate forfeiture proceedings begins to run when trial court enters a conviction in underlying criminal proceedings. Defendants pled guilty to aggravated battery and mob action, and agreed to forfeit their jackets. As State initiated forfeiture proceedings within 60 days of date that Defendants pled guilty, State's action was timely. Wearing vests facilitated Defendants' goal of intimidation, to be achieved by violent means, if necessary, to show their dominance to others. Thus, court properly found that vests and patches were derivative contraband subject to forfeiture.(ZENOFF and SPENCE, concurring.)
Court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress statements he made during a police interview. Defendant was the subject of a federal use immunity agreement when he participated in the crime that resulted in a murder. Terms of federal agreement stated that immunity would no longer apply if Defendant participated in any criminal activity of any kind without authorization. Any belief that Defendant had that he was immune from prosecution when he gave his statement to county police detective was not reasonable under circumstances. Subject matter of interview was not related to subject matter of federal use immunity agreement.(O'BRIEN and SCHMIDT, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted of reckless conduct for causing damage to a van owned by narcotics enforcement unit, when his vehicle collided with van in narrow driveway of apartment building where a confidential informant had arranged to buy drugs from Defendant. Evidence was sufficient to establish recklessness, as 2 officers testified that when Defendant saw van approaching his vehicle head on, he accelerated, causing collision. As Enforcement Unit suffered out-of-pocket expenses as a result of Defendant's conduct, it was entitled to restitution. Remanded for calculation of imposing proper fine, fee, assessment and court cost in written order with statutory authority for each. (CARTER and SCHMIDT, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to three consecutive terms of incarceration totaling 80 years following defendant’s request to retroactively reduce his 100-year term of incarceration on drug distribution and possession charges, where Sentencing Commission retroactively reduced his base offense level under Amendment 782 of sentencing guidelines. In imposing 80-year sentence, Dist. Ct. was under erroneous belief that it was required to impose consecutive sentences, where, under Amendment 782, Dist. Ct. could have imposed concurrent sentence of 30 years on each count. Fact that defendant’s counsel misinformed Dist. Ct. that all three sentences had to run consecutively did not require different result. Thus, remand was required for determination as to whether defendant’s three sentences should run consecutively or concurrently.
Defendant, 13 years after his wife's death, was arrested for his wife's murder. Defendant had called 911 and claimed that his wife drowned in the bathtub. Trial court erred in granting defense motions to suppress Defendant's statements and exclude evidence seized from his home, after he consented to search. A reasonable person in Defendant's situation would have felt free to leave at any point during police questioning at police station that occurred 1 week after wife's death. Defendant was free to leave, was never formally arrested, and was given Miranda warnings as a precaution; he was allowed to go home, after agreeing to return in the morning.(PIERCE and NEVILLE, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated vehicular hijacking with a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm (AVH/DW), a Class X felony. Defendant, while armed with a BB gun, approached a woman as she was getting out of her pickup truck, and took vehicle from her.BB gun was a common-law dangerous weapon of the third type. Trial court properly denied Defendant's Section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment alleging proportionate penalties violation. Defendant's mandatory life sentence imposed as an adjudged habitual criminal under Section 33B-1 of Criminal Code is affirmed. (GARMAN, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)
Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant’s appeal that challenged certain conditions of his supervised release as being unconstitutionally vague, where defendant’s plea agreement contained broad waiver of defendant’s right to appeal any aspect of his sentence. Instant waiver prohibited defendant from appealing “on any ground” his sentence “regardless of how the sentence and offense level” were calculated, and instant enforceable waiver precluded defendant from raising any constitutional challenge to conditions of his supervised release imposed as part of his sentence. Ct. further noted that defendant had opportunity to seek clarification of his conditions for supervised release, where said conditions were contained in presentence report that was given to defendant months prior to sentencing hearing, and where defendant failed to raise any objections to said conditions in presentence report.