Criminal Law

Defendant''s 60-year extended term sentence for aggravated criminal sexual assault and 40-year extended term sentences for home invasion and armed robbery are unauthorized by law, as trial court did not find the required factors listed in Section 5-5-3.2(b) of Unified Code of Corrections when it sentenced Defendant to extended term sentence. Illinois Supreme Court's 2015 decision in Castleberry, was abolished the void-sentence rule, did not announce a new rule, but reinstated the rule that a sentence that did not comply with statutory guidelines was only void if court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, the Castleberry holding cannot be applied retroactively, and Defendant has the right to challenge his sentence for the first time on appeal. (NEVILLE and SIMON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder, and later filed pro se motion to modify-correct a void sentence, arguing that DOC improperly added 3-year term of mandatory supervised release (MSR) not imposed by trial court. Section 22-105 of Code of Civil Procedure applies to Defendant's motion, as motion is an action against the State within meaning of Section 22-105.  Motion had an arguable basis in law and was not frivolous.  Trial court alone has power to assign term of MSR, and DOC may not alter trial court's pronouncement. Thus, court's order imposing fees and costs against Defendant is vacated. (NEVILLE and HYMAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of 1997 first-degree murder of his former girlfriend.  Defendant was charged in 2005 with murder, after a bloody palm print discovered at crime scene was shown to match Defendant's palm print obtained by State through grand jury subpoena. Information provided by State to grand jury was sufficiently tied to Defendant to hold there was individualized suspicion to warrant grand jury subpoena. Defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced in any way by grand jury process employed by State to obtain palm prints.  Grand jury that indicted Defendant heard evidence from police that palm print discovered at crime scene matched Defendant's. Nothing in record indicates that when grand jury issued subpoena that it was asked to grant agency powers, or that it had granted ASA or police detectives agency powers.  Court properly denied Defendant's motion to quash subpoena and suppress palm print evidence. (GARMAN, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, and KARMEIER, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 2/25/16.) Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and sentenced to 9 years. Considering Defendant's written jury waiver, his colloquy with trial court, and his demonstrated familiarity with justice system, court did not err in finding that Defendant knowingly waived his right to jury trial. Court System fee of $50 is actually a fine.  State's Attorney's Records Automation Fee of $2 is legally a fee.  Public Defender Records Automation Fee is legally a fee. (MASON and FITZGERALD SMITH, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, found after pat-down search and then strip search. Court properly granted Defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Officer had probable cause to conduct a search of Defendant, given that when he approached his car (stopped for failure to use turn signal), he immediately smelled very strong odor of burnt cannabis coming from vehicle.  However, officer's strip search of Defendant was unreasonable. Officer's attempted steps to reduce intrusiveness of search were inadequate; search was conducted on a residential street on which numerous vehicles passed during stop and search, and streetlights provided some illumination of area.(O'BRIEN and HOLDRIDGE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of unlawful use of a weapon (UUW) by a felon and sentenced as a Class X offender to 9 years.  Residual category of forcible felony statute refers to felonies not previously specified in preceding list of felonies contained within that section. As Defendant's prior conviction of aggravated battery to a peace officer was not based on great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement, it was not within statutory definition of forcible felony, and court erred in using it to enhance Defendant's present aggravated battery conviction to a Class 2 offense. Illinois Supreme Court has, in 2015, abolished void-sentence rule.(FITZGERALD SMITH and LAVIN, concurring.)