The invitee requirement is an exemption to the offense of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute for possessing a handgun while under age 21 that the defendant must raise and prove. A defendant charged under that statute will avoid criminal liability if the firearm was carried while on the land or in the legal dwelling of another persona as an invitee with that person's permission. The invitee requirement is not an element of the offense. (GARMAN, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, and THEIS, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to rescind special condition of supervised release authorizing warrantless searches of his person and residence as part of sentence on his conviction for certain drug offenses. Ct. found that defendant could raise such substantive challenge under 18 USC section 3583(e)(2), but rejected defendant’s argument that such condition was inappropriate for drug offenders. Moreover, such condition was appropriate, where defendant had previously been discovered using drugs in violation of condition of supervised release prohibiting such use. Also, defendant waived any error with respect to Dist. Ct.’s imposition of 13 standard conditions of supervised release, where defendant had failed to raise such claim in District Ct.
Ct. of Appeals denied defendant’s request for certificate of appealability after Dist. Ct. denied defendant’s second habeas petition challenging his murder conviction on grounds that his trial court interpreter was incompetent, that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to object to said interpreter, and that he did not receive fair hearing on his state court post-conviction petition raising the interpreter issues. Defendant’s claims with respect to his interpreter and his counsel were barred as “second or successive” claims under 28 USC section 2244(b)(2) because he had failed to raise them in his first habeas petition when he could have raised said issues. Moreover, issue regarding fairness of his state post-conviction hearing was not addressable via instant habeas petition since: (1) any error in state collateral review proceeding cannot form basis for habeas relief; and (2) defendant failed to allege violation of any other independent constitutional right with respect to manner that State administered its post-conviction proceeding.
In proceeding to resolve disputes over terms of settlement agreement that defendant and govt. entered into as part of forfeiture order entered against defendant, who had been convicted on mail fraud and racketeering charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in rejecting defendant’s claim that govt. improperly failed to give him fair opportunity to purchase life insurance policies. Terms of settlement agreement provided defendant with 6-month period in which to inform govt. of his intention to purchase said policies, and defendant failed to give govt. such timely notice. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that 6-month period was too short to reasonably allow him to obtain funds to purchase said policies, and Ct. noted that option to purchase was not contingent on govt.’s release of other funds to defendant. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in failing to allow defendant to re-purchase at its appraised price govt.’s interest in Chicago Bulls (that had previously belonged to defendant) pursuant to right of first refusal clause in settlement agreement, even though govt. had received timely higher offer to purchase said interest from third-party that defendant had failed to match. Third-party’s offer was not “commercially reasonable,” where third-party could and did withdraw said offer at third-party’s discretion, and thus, in absence of any commercially reasonable offer to purchase said interest, defendant had right to purchase said interest at appraised price.
Does a stop's illegality taint the evidence obtained from it? A Fourth Amendment debate in the federal courts could spill over into Illinois criminal cases.
This case presents question as to whether trial court properly dismissed sua sponte defendant’s section 2-1401 petition, where trial court found that it was filed beyond applicable two-year limitations period, and that petition lacked merit. Appellate Court noted that defendant had failed to properly serve instant section 2-1401 petition by sending it via first-class mail, rather than certified mail as required under Rule 105, but that govt. had waived any issue regarding lack of proper service, where Assistant State’s Attorney appeared in court and failed to raise said issue. Appellate Court, though, further found that instant dismissal was premature, where: (1) it occurred within relevant 30-day period after initial appearance by Assistant State’s Attorney; (2) govt. had not filed response to petition at time of dismissal, and record otherwise failed to indicate when govt. had been served with section 2-1401 petition; and (3) Rule 105 allows responding party 30 days to file response to instant section 2-1401 petition. On remand, govt. may expressly waive 30-day time period to file response and consent to sua sponte decision by trial court on merits of petition.
This case presents question as to whether Appellate Court has jurisdiction to consider State’s appeal of trial court order that granted defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction on charge of aggravated unlawful use of weapon (where court in Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, found that similar conviction was void), but denied State’s request to reinstate four counts of aggravated unlawful use of weapon under different theory, where said counts had previously been nol-prossed at time defendant had entered his guilty plea on his conviction. Appellate Court found that Rule 604(a)(1) did not confer jurisdiction to consider State’s appeal, since: (1) State could appeal trial court’s order only if order had substantive effect of dismissing charge on ground listed in section 114-1 of Code of Criminal Procedure; and (2) instant denial of State’s reinstatement request cannot be so construed, where there was no indictment, information or complaint pending before trial court at time defendant sought vacatur of his conviction. Appellate Court also rejected State’s claim that Appellate Court had jurisdiction under Rule 304(b)(3) to consider its appeal under circumstances where trial court’s order had also resolved defendant’s section 2-1401 petition.
This case presents question as to whether trial court properly refused to inquire of defendant as to reasons supporting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that was made in defendant’s pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea and to vacate his 7-year sentence on charge of aggravated battery. Record showed that trial court did not address defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea and ultimately denied his counsel’s motion to reconsider instant 7-year sentence. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, found that trial court was not required to ask defendant about basis of his bare, four-word allegation that his counsel was ineffective, where there were no factual allegations to support such claim in his motion. Defendant argued in his petition for leave to appeal that he should have been brought back to court during hearing on his counsel’s motion to reconsider his sentence, when trial court could have asked him to clarify his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
This case presents question in prosecution on aggravated DUI charges as to whether trial court properly precluded defendant from presenting evidence that something other than her consumption of cannabis caused her to lose consciousness just prior to accident. Trial court found that such evidence was irrelevant, where govt. was not required to establish causal connection between consumption of drugs and instant accident once record established existence of any level of drugs in defendant’s system. However, Appellate Court, in reversing trial court, noted that: (1) trial court had also found that there was no evidence that defendant was impaired by drugs or alcohol at time of accident; and (2) defendant should have been given opportunity to present evidence that her low blood pressure, as Act of God, could have been sole proximate cause of accident.
In prosecution on drug and firearm charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing three terms of supervised release that directed defendants to limit contact with known felons, imposed alcohol-related restrictions and prohibited them from using dangerous weapons. Prohibition on knowingly having contact with felons was not impermissively vague since limitation had scienter element and defendants could seek permission from probation officer to contact other members of their family who were felons. Moreover, restriction on alcohol consumption was permissible, where both defendants had prior history of either excessive alcohol consumption or alcohol-related convictions. Also, Ct. rejected defendants' claim that instant firearm possession prohibition was improper because they had no prior notice of potential for Dist. Ct. to impose such condition, where Ct. noted that such prohibition was enumerated special condition of supervised release contained in sentencing guidelines. Also, said condition was proper given defendant’s convictions on unlawful possession of firearm charges.
