Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of home invasion and 6 counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, and sentenced to 75 consecutive years imprisonment. Court properly found that State had made a 30-year plea offer, and that there was no evidence that counsel ever conveyed the offer to Defendant.  Court properly concluded that Defendant failed to satisfy second prong of ineffective assistance of counsel Strickland test, as Defendant failed to show he would have accepted the 30-year plea offer absent counsel's deficient performance. Evidence established that Defendant either did or would have rejected a 30-year offer by making a counteroffer, and that State would have revoked any existing offer as prosecutor received DNA evidence. (HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring; McDADE, dissenting.)

Defendant pled guilty to predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, and was sentenced to 18 years.  Defendant filed pro se, after 2-year limitation period, Section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment, which was delivered to the State by standard U.S. mail. Court granted State's motion to dismiss on basis of lack of jurisdiction.  As Defendant was not prejudiced by dismissal, the dismissal is not considered a final, appealable order, such that appellate court is without jurisdiction to hear appeal.(LYTTON and CARTER, concurring.)

Defendant pled guilty to reckless homicide, and was sentenced to 30 months' probation, including 18 months' periodic imprisonment as a condition of probation.  As record does not indicate Defendant's employment was comparable to a county work-release program, his 18-month periodic imprisonment sentence is valid. Court's reference to the probation condition as "work release" was not indicative of court's intent to impose a sentence that qualified as a program comparable to a county or state work-release program.  Defendant's release was not limited strictly to employment, as he was ordered to participate in alcohol evaluation and treatment, and was allowed to attend birth of his child and remain with his wife during her hospitalization. (KNECHT and POPE, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 1/25/16.) Defendant, age 18 at time of offense, was convicted, after bench trial, of first degree murder and sentenced to 65 years. Defendant shot victim in alleged self-defense or defense of others after the victim punched one of his friends while on a public way. State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was not acting in self-defense or defense of others from death or great bodily harm.  Defendant's use of deadly force was not justified to prevent commission of a forcible felony. Defendant failed to show mitigating factors for reduction of conviction. Court erred in not allowing any questioning of a prosecution witness as to potential bias from hope of deal with State for pending charges, but error was harmless as testimony of other witnesses corroborated his testimony.  Court properly sustained objections to defense counsel's questions as to what Defendant thought would happen during incident, and Defendant otherwise testified extensively to his state of mind.  Sentence not in error, as court considered all relevant mitigating and aggravating factors. (FITZGERALD SMITH, concurring; MASON, specially concurring.)

(Correcting court designation.) Defendant's two notices of appeal were not filed within 30 days of sentencing nor within 30 days of orders disposing of timely filed motions against judgment, and thus appeals were not timely, and appellate court did not have jurisdiction.  However, given unique facts of case, Defendant was understandably confused about when to file appeals. Trial counsel and the court were confused as to time to file motion for new trial, and neither State nor court took issue with timeliness of Defendant's motions for new trial.  As the right to appeal a criminal conviction is fundamental, Supreme Court, in exercise of its supervisory authority, ordered appeal reinstated. (FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

A Franks hearing is not foreclosed on the sole basis that a confidential informant whose statements formed the basis for a warrant application appears before the judge at the warrant hearing.  Appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a motion for a Franks hearing is de novo.  Defendant made a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement was intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly included in the warrant affidavit, and he is, thus, entitled to a Franks hearing to determine whether the warrant must be quashed and the evidence obtained thereby suppressed. (FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Victim was shot to death while sitting on the unlit front steps of his home.  Victim, immediately after being shot, told family members it was Defendant who shot him, and this eyewitness identification was admitted into evidence under excited utterance exception to hearsay rule. The other eyewitness identification was by female companion who was sitting with victim on the steps when  a man dressed all in black approached the house and began shooting at them; companion admitted that she had seen Defendant only once or twice before shooting, and did not know him. Qualified expert would present relevant and probative testimony directly addressing State's only evidence against Defendant.  Court's reasons for denying expert's testimony were expressly contradicted by expert's report and inconsistent with actual facts. Under these specific facts, trial court abused its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion to allow expert testimony as to reliability of eyewitness identifications.(GARMAN, FREEMAN, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Petitioner failed to carry his burden to make substantial showing of a claim of actual innocence. Thus, court properly dismissed his successive postconviction petition at second stage. Proposed testimony would merely add to evidence jury heard at Petitioner's trial, and is not so conclusive in charaacter as would probably change result on retrial, either by itself or in conjunction with recantation of another witness.(FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Two different interpretations of Section 408(a) of Illinois Controlled Substances Act, advanced by State and by defense, are both reasonable.  Thus, Section 408(a) of the Act is ambiguous, and it is appropriate to invoke the rule of lenity. Section 408(a) of the Act applies only to offenses committed in violation of the Act, and cannot apply to double Defendant's enhanced Class X potential maximum sentence of 30 years.(GARMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.) 

A driver's license request of a lawfully stopped driver is permissible irrespective of whether that request directly relates to the purpose for the stop. Interest in officer safety permits a driver's license request of a driver lawfully stopped, and such ordinary inquiries are part of the stop's mission and do not prolong the stop for fourth amendment purposes. (FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)