Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first-degree murder and sentenced to natural life.  State may not introduce evidence that accused exercised his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, by refusing DNA testing, because prejudicial effect substantially outweighs probative value of allowing jury to infer the accused's consciousness of guilt from his exercise of his rights. However, in this case the error was harless beyond a reasonable doubt. State introduced overwhelming circumstantial evidence of Defendant's guilt, such that prejudicial testimony that he refused DNA testing did not contribute to conviction, especially because Defendant's DNA was not found at crime scene.(HUTCHINSON and ZENOFF, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of theft and other financial crimes for allegedly buying merchandise he was led to believe was stolen and then selling it online. Property obtained by Defendant from undercover police investigator was not stolen, and thus a necessary element of the theft offense is absent. As convictions for theft are vacated, conviction for operating a continuing financial crime enterprise, which is based on existence of theft convictions, must also be vacated. Defendant's conviction for online sale of stolen property, because State did not prove that property was gained by unlawful means. (PIERCE and HYMAN, concurring.)

Defendant and a co-defendant were charged with first-degree murder, and initially were both represented by the same private attorney. Conflict as to dual representation was resolved by court at an early stage during pretrial proceedings, when court found that a conflict of interest existed and appointed separate counsel for co-defendant, allowing private attorney to solely represent Defendant. Court had no additional duty to admonish Defendant about conflict of interest after dual representation was resolved and risk of conflict of interest was removed.Court properly dismissed postconviction petition at third stage, where Defendant failed to make substantial showing of denial of effective assistance of counsel due to conflict of interest, and failed to establish prejudice.(CONNORS and HARRIS, concurring.)

Defendant, aggravated criminal sexual abuse for having sex with a 16-year-old girl when he was 23 years old, argues for unconstitutionality of Sex Offender Registration Act, Sex Offender Community Notification Law, and other related statutes. Statutory scheme does not violate the eighth amendment or proportionate penalties clause, and is not a grossly disproportionate sentence for Defendant's offense, and serves legitimate penological goals. Statutory Scheme does not violate procedural or substantive due process, and is rationally related to goal of protecting public from possibility that sex offenders will commit new crimes. (HOWSE and COBBS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated robbery as a lesser-included offense of armed robbery, and other offenses. Evidence adduced at trial does not support defendant’s conviction for aggravated robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. State requested a lesser-included offense conviction of “robbery” only, never mentioning aggravated robbery. Convicting Defendant of the uncharged offense of aggravated robbery that is not a lesser-included offense of the charged offense of armed robbery violates defendant’s “fundamental due process right” and affects fairness of Defendant’s trial. Aggravated robbery is not a lesser-included offense of armed robbery.  Thus, conviction reduced to simple robbery, and remanded for resentencing.  (REYES and PALMER, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of second-degree murder.  Court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress text message obtained after warrantless search of his cell phone; officer stated that he took Defendant's cell phone to try to find way to contact his family members as he had sustained gunshot wounds, and saw a text message. Cell phones implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated in searches of objects such as purses or wallets. Given that Defendant's privacy interest in his cell phone was so substantial, officer's actions in searching phone to contact family members do not fall under the community caretaking exception, as officer had less intrusive means at his disposal for same task. No showing of exigent circumstances to justify search. (HOUSE and ELLIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of first-degree murder and 2 counts of aggravated kidnapping, for his role as a lookout, on theory of accountability. Court properly dismissed Defendant's petition for postconviction relief at second stage. No newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered with due diligence; and no showing of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mandatory natural life sentencing statute is unconstitutional as applied to Defendant. At time of offense in 1993, Defendant, at age 19 years and 2 months, was barely a legal adult and still a teenager. Young age, family background, and lack of violent criminal history are all relevant when considered along with his participation in shootings. (REYES, concurring; GORDON, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of attempt (criminal sexual assault), and sentenced to 30 years. Record contains no specific or express complaints by Defendant about his counsel’s performance, and thus no Krankel inquiry was required. Court appropriately relied on stipulated evidence as to psychiatric expert’s opinion testimony to find Defendant fit to stand trial.  Record does not indicate that Defendant’s mental health changed significantly from time of evaluation of his fitness for trial and time of his trial or sentencing.  Thus, court was not required to sua sponte order a fitness hearing during trial and sentencing phases of underlying proceeding.  (APPLETON, concurring; STEIGMANN, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first-degree murder based on fatal traffic accident that occurred when he and co-defendant fled from residential burglary.  DNA evidence, and other circumstantial evidence linking Defendant to car used in burglary, support verdict. Defendant was not entitled to additional language in jury instruction to state that Defendant could be found responsible only if death occurred before he reached a place of safety. Sentence of 42 years not excessive, given nature of crime and Defendant’s criminal history.  Court considered mitigating factors of his parents’ incarcerations and physical abuse he suffered when young.  (PIERCE and NEVILLE, concurring.)