Criminal Law

In prosecution on drug possession and distribution charges, Dist. Ct. did not commit reversible error by allowing govt. agent to testify that he had never prosecuted wrong person, that one of defendant’s co-criminals had firearm, and that surrounding neighborhood contained no other drug house. Testimony regarding agent’s track record was invited by questioning from defendant’s counsel who initially introduced idea of prosecuting wrong person. Moreover, while there was possibility that jury considered irrelevant testimony regarding presence of gun and lack of other drug house in neighborhood in its decision to convict defendant, other evidence against defendant overwhelmingly supported guilty verdict, where agents personally witnessed defendant selling drugs to others, and where defendant’s actions were caught on video.

In prosecution on bank robbery charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to admit out-of-court statement by co-defendant, who indicated that third-party, as opposed to defendant, was culprit who assisted co-defendant in robbing bank. Dist. Ct. could properly find that subject statement did not qualify for admission as statement against penal interest under Rule 804(b)(3), since it lacked sufficient indicia of trustworthiness, where: (1) co-defendant originally named defendant as individual who helped him rob bank; (2) other witnesses identified only defendant and co-defendant as culprits; and (3) other circumstances, such as defendant’s possession (at time of arrest) of almost exact amount of money taken from bank teller rendered proposed statement unreliable, especially where, at guilty plea hearing, co-defendant refused to name anyone as individual who helped him rob bank. Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that Dist. Ct. improperly looked to anticipated trial evidence to determine whether co-defendant’s statement was sufficiently trustworthy.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendants’ separate motions under 28 USC section 2255 to vacate or set aside their life sentences on RICO violations on ground that said sentences were unconstitutional under Miller, 32 S.Ct. 2455, since defendants were minors at time instant offenses were committed. Ct., though, found that Miller did not apply since: (1) unlike life sentence in Miller, instant life sentences were not mandatory for RICO offenses; and (2) record otherwise showed that Dist. Ct. made individualized assessments of each defendant prior to imposing instant life sentences.