Criminal Law

This case presents question as to whether under plain-error standard defendant is entitled to new trial on charge of resisting police officer, where trial court failed to properly ask prospective jurors if they understood and accepted four Zehr principles regarding presumption of innocence as required under Rule 431(b). While both parties agreed that trial court’s question to potential jurors as to whether they had any “problem” with Zehr principles of law failed to comply with Rule 431(b), Appellate Court found that evidence at trial was not so closely balanced so as to warrant reversal under first prong of plain-error doctrine. In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant argued that reversal of his conviction was required because of Rule 431(b) violation, where his guilt depended on credibility determination of witnesses, and where review of record indicated that either version of events was plausible. (Dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly imposed 6-year, Class X sentence on instant charge of aggravated battery to correctional officer. Appellate Court, in reversing defendant’s sentence and remanding matter back to trial court, found that defendant was not eligible for Class X sentencing because he was not 21 at time he was charged with instant offense. In its petition for leave to appeal, govt. argued that Class X sentencing was permissible in instant case since defendant was 21 at time of his conviction.

This case presents question as to whether 97-year sentence on instant murder/attempted murder convictions violated 8th Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, where: (1) defendant was 16 years old at time of offenses; and (2) U.S. Supreme Court in Miller, 132 S.Ct. 2455, found that imposition of mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole on juvenile was unconstitutional. In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant argued that holding in Miller applied to him because he received de facto mandatory life sentence in spite of his juvenile status where he will not be eligible for mandatory supervised release until he is 105 years old. Appellate Court, in affirming defendant’s sentence, found that Miller applied only to death penalty or mandatory life sentences and noted that length of defendant’s sentence was based on multiple convictions concerning series of offenses and victims.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly imposed 24-year extended term of incarceration with respect to defendant’s aggravated robbery conviction based, in part, on defendant’s prior adjudication of juvenile delinquency. While defendant argued that his extended term sentence violated Apprendi, 530 US 466, because govt. had failed to prove to jury beyond reasonable doubt fact of his prior juvenile adjudication, Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, found that instant adjudication of delinquency fell under Apprendi’s prior conviction exception, and thus said adjudication did not need to be set forth in indictment, or submitted to jury or proved beyond reasonable doubt. It also found that trial court could properly rely on presentence report that contained information about defendant’s prior adjudication of delinquency as basis for sentence enhancement.

This case presents question as to whether, in respondent’s application for discharge or conditional release from commitment under Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (Act), trial court violated respondent’s constitutional rights by granting state’s motion to appoint independent psychiatrist to examine respondent, but denying respondent’s similar request, where jury eventually found respondent subject to commitment as sexually dangerous person. Appellate Court, in reversing trial court, found that trial court violated respondent’s due process rights since: (1) said Act does not contemplate appointment of independent expert chosen by State’s Attorney; (2) trial court failed to require govt. to demonstrate unusual circumstances to support its request for appointment of expert; (3) govt. failed to show existing DOC report on respondent was biased; (4) govt. could not support request for appointment of expert simply because it disagreed with DOC report; and (5) once govt. was granted appointment for expert, respondent’s similar request should have been granted.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to dismiss instant traffic citation, where said citation had not been timely filed with circuit clerk within 48 hours of arrest in violation of Rule 552. Appellate Court, in affirming instant dismissal, noted that record contained evidence of consistent violation of 48-hour deadline and found that although said deadline was merely directory, dismissal was warranted, where record showed clear and consistent pattern of Rule’s violation. Ct. rejected govt. claim that remand was required to determine whether instant 4-day delay in filing citation was prejudicial to defendant.