Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of armed robbery, and alleged that his appointed postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance under Supreme Court Rule 651(c) by failing to review trial exhibits that contained evidence crucial to his pro se claims. Remanded to trial court to allow postconviction counsel to comply with Rule 651(c) requirements as to exhibits, and to allow a supplemental certificate to be filed, if requested; and circuit court directed to then reconsider Defendant's petition or amended petition. (NEVILLE and SIMON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated battery, criminal damage to property,and mob action. Court abused its discretion by imposing the most onerous sanction of excluding defense witness' testimony as sanction for Defendant failing to disclose witness until day of trial. Court is required to consider available alternative sanctions, materiality of evidence, prejudice, and bad faith, to exercise sound discretion. Imposition of sanctions was harmless error, and late disclosure was not ineffective assistance of counsel, as there was not a reasonable probability that Defendant would have been acquitted had witness' testimony been admitted.(KNECHT and APPLETON, concurring.)

One Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of attempted murder and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon; another Defendant was convicted, by same jury, of attempted murder. Court did not err by instructing jury as to whether Defendants personally discharged a gun proximately causing great bodily harm, where Defendants' indictments did not include such allegations. Indictments sufficiently notified Defendants that State would seek 25-year enhancement. Language of indictments clearly alleged that Defendants personally discharged a weapon, and sufficiently notified Defendants jury would consider whether Defendants caused victim's injuries. State's failure to include all sentence-enhancing elements in indictment did not deny Defendants a fair trial nor undermine integrity of judicial process. (CARTER and HOLDRIDGE, concurring.)

Defendant was indicted on a single count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (ketamine) with intent to deliver. Defendant's substantive due process rights were violated when State breached cooperation agreement police sergeant entered into with Defendant. Court properly granted Defendant's motion to dismiss indictment. Cooperation agreements, where State agrees to limit a prosecution in some manner in consideration for Defendant's cooperation, are construed under contract principles, and construed strictly against the government. Whether cooperation agreement was "valid" in sense that it was approved by State's Attorney is irrelevant. Defendant relied upon cooperation agreement and incriminated himself in the process of fulfilling his obligations under the agreement. Thus, Defendant suffered prejudicial violation of due process rights when, more than a year after Defendant was detained and after he had fulfilled his obligations, by assisting in undercover efforts leading to arrests, he was charged with possession of ketamine. (FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, and THEIS, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 10/8/15.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of possession of controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and was sentenced as a habitual criminal to natural life. Court properly denied Defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, and Defendant cannot show that his sentence is unconstitutional. Conviction for possession of controlled substance is vacated as it is a lesser-included offense of possession with intent to deliver. Evidence at motion to suppress hearing did not show that any conduct of officer unreasonably prolonged encounter. Officer testified that he found Defendant’s explanation of his route illogical, creating additional suspicion. It was reasonable for officer to ask whether Defendant had narcotics in car, upon learning that Defendant was on MSR for possession of cocaine conviction. (PUCHINSKI, concurring; HYMAN, dissenting in part.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated vehicular hijacking, vehicular invasion, attempted armed robbery, and escape, and sentenced to concurrent extended-term sentences of 50, 30, 30, and 14 years, to be served consecutively to natural life sentence he was serving on prior murder conviction. Court violated Defendant's right to due process by failing to undertake a Boose analysis and state reasons for shackling on the record before requiring him to remain shackled at trial, but error was limited and harmless. Where Defendant testified that he tried to escape out of necessity, to expose inhumane conditions in jail, State was entitled to present evidence of jury's finding in prior conviction to establish Defendant faced potential life sentence and sought to escape for that reason. Court substantially complied with Rule 401(a), so his waiver of counsel was valid. As convictions did not arise from unrelated courses of conduct, court could only impose extended term sentence on offenses within most serious class of felony. State failed to prove taking element of vehicular hijacking, as no evidence that he took possession or custody of bus he boarded upon escape from hospital prior to sentencing for murder conviction.(GORDON, concurring; PALMER, specially concurring.)