Criminal Law

Police sergeant was convicted of intimidation, a Class 3 felony, after he threatened not to respond to 911 calls from a local auto racetrack as long as 2 former police officers were employed there. Defendant's sentence to 2 years probation included condition requiring that he become current on child support. Plain language of Unified Code of Corrections authorizes a trial court to impose any of the enumerated conditions under Section 5-6-3(b), regardless of whether condition relates to nature of Defendant's conviction. Thus, that Section provides express statutory authority to impose payment of child support as a condition of probation. (GARMAN, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

DEA agents, without judicial authorization, installed a GPS tracking device on Defendant's car. Court properly granted motion to quash Defendant's arrest (a month later, for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver), and to suppress evidence. State failed to show that police acted in good faith when they installed GPS device on Defendant's car. Police failed to ask any attorney for advice on meaning of 7th Circuit's 2007 Garcia decision, and failed to show any grounds to suspect Defendant of criminal activity. (SIMON, concurring; LIU, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of home invasion, aggravated criminal sexual assault, domestic battery, and aggravated unlawful restraint, from incident when Defendant entered trailer of his estranged lover and physically and sexually attacked her over several hours. Later that month, Defendant pled guilty to harassment by telephone, when Defendant persuaded assault victim not to cooperate with prosecution in those cases; and violation of bail bond. State presented inadmissible hearsay and opinion testimony, and that was the only evidence supporting one conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault. Retrial for that charge does not violate double jeopardy; evidence presented at first trial would have been sufficient for rational trier of fact to find essential elements of crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus retrial is proper remedy. Affirming verdict on all other counts, as properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly proved Defendant guilty of remaining counts. (KNECHT and HARRIS, concurring.)

Defendant, age 34 and mentally retarded, was convicted after bench trial of first-degree murder and 2 counts of aggravated battery, and sentenced to total of 32 years. On appeal, Defendant asks court to reduce his murder conviction to 2nd-degree murder, arguing that he proved by preponderance of evidence a mitigating factor, that he had actual, although unreasonable, belief in the need to act with deadly force to defend himself and another. A rational trier of fact could have reached the same conclusion, that Defendant failed to prove his claim of imperfect self-defense, and thus refused to reduce murder charge to second-degree murder. Defendant made conflicting statements, and trial court did not believe Defendant's testimony, and concluded that Defendant did not act out of any belief that self-defense was necessary.(REYES and McBRIDE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after 2013 jury trial, of felony murder predicated on intimidation of 17-year-old who disappeared in 2002, having been last seen at grocery store co-owned by Defendant’s father where victim worked. Defendant was “unofficial manager” of stock boys there. State claimed that evidence proved that another stock boy committed intimidation as a principal, acting on behalf of Defendant. Jury trial in 2012 resulted in mistrial after jury failed to reach a verdict. No rational trier of fact could have found that State proved predicate forcible felony of intimidation beyond a reasonable doubt. Victim’s body has never been recovered, and evidence against Defendant was so lacking and so improbable that it is unreasonable to sustain finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (HUTCHINSON and SPENCE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first-degree murder and sentenced to 35 years. State’s apparent purpose in questioning witnesses was to answer doubts raised by cross-examination in eliciting testimony from its experts that Defendant could have requested evidence to be tested. State’s remarks in rebuttal closing were not error; State was reminding jury that case was not a referendum on propriety of victim’s life but trial on question of who murdered the victim. State made a few solitary remarks about defense counsel’s motives, and did not create theme of disparaging defense counsel. (REYES and PALMER, concurring.)

Court acquitted Defendant of armed robbery, noting that officers did not recover the weapon or the funds, but found Defendant guilty of lesser included offense of robbery. Evidence at trial was insufficient to convict Defendant, where numerous aspects of victim’s testimony contained material inconsistencies, including accounts contrary to evidence from surveillance camera and testimony from police officers. Viewed in their entirety, impeachments of victim show that victim’s account at trial repeatedly strayed from what he told police and from surveillance videos. (NEVILLE and SIMON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated battery and theft. Defense counsel operated under per se conflict of interest, as he contemporaneously represented Defendant and his girlfriend, who State called as a hostile witness. State used girlfriend’s testimony to introduce her prior inconsistent statements, made during her police interviews, as substantive evidence. Thus, girlfriend’s testimony was not beneficial only to Defendant. Defendant was not adequately informed of the significance of the conflict, and his waiver was not knowing and intelligent waiver of conflict. (STEGMANN and APPLETON, concurring.)

Defendant pled guilty to felony murder and sentenced to 60 years. Defendant was denied reasonable assistance of postconviction counsel, as counsel filed no affidavits or depositions and offered no oral testimony or other evidence to support Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his trial counsel's wrong advice about applicability to Defendant's sentencing of truth-in-sentencing amendments. Postconviction counsel failed to comply with Rule 651(c), in failing to make all necessary amendments to pro se petition.(HOLDRIDGE, concurring; SCHMIDT, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)