Criminal Law

Defense counsel was not obligated to inform Defendant of the specific consequences that pleading guilty to a drug crime and receiving Second 410 first-offender probation would have on discretionary immigration relief. Thus, counsel's performance was not constitutionally deficient under U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v Kentucky. In contrast to the defendant in Padilla case, Defendant here was aware of possibility of deportation based on his illegal presence in U.S., and the law was not succinct and straightforward, so defense counsel met his obligations by advising Defendant that guilty plea would have some sort of immigration consequences and that he should speak to an immigration attorney.(BURKE, concurring; HUTCHINSON, specially concurring.)

After denial of motion to suppress his confession, Defendant pled guilty to murder and armed robbery committed in 1990. Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission found that Defendant's confession was coerced. Court erred in denying Defendant's motion for leave to file successive postconviction petition and in denying Defendant's combined petition filed under Post-Conviction Hearing Act and Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission Act. Defendant's plea was voluntary as he chose to accept a 60-year sentence as opposed to possible death penalty, but he continued to profess his innocence. Evidence showed that detective James Pienta was directly involved in systematic torture and abusive tactics at Area 2 not too remote in time from when he inflicted injury upon an existing wound on Defendant's leg while questioning him. New evidence, together with Pienta's invocation of his fifth amendment rights, when weighed against State's original evidence, was conclusive enough that outcome of suppression hearing likely would have been different had that evidence been presented. (LAVIN and HYMAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of first-degree murder and robbery; co-Defendant identified Defendant as person holding cell phone and recording assault of victim. Defendant was a friend of co-Defendant, and knew that another co-Defendant had recently been released from juvenile detention and made statements indicating that illegal acts that could cause great bodily harm were going to occur. Court properly considered this factor, and the factor that Defendant did not call police and fled scene, in convicting Defendant based on theory of accountability.Court within its discretion in sentencing Defendant to 22 years for first-degree murder and 8 years for robbery.(CONNORS and HARRIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF). Defendant's prior 2010 conviction for aggravated felony (AUUWF), which was premised on a statutory provision which created Class 4 version of AUUW charge which was later held unconstitutional in Illinois Supreme Court's 2013 Aguilar decision, cannot stand as a predicate offense to support Defendant's UUWF conviction. Thus, State could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt an element of UUWF offense (a valid prior felony), and Defendant's conviction is reversed. (DELORT and HARRIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder and attempted armed robbery and sentenced to 55 years. Court properly denied Defendant's pro se postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The only supporting document is Defendant's own affidavit stating that ASA violated his Miranda rights, which is not enough to support gist of a meritorious constitutional claim that defense counsel was ineffective in not objecting to ASA's testimony as to interview with Defendant. Defendant failed to overcome presumption, created by his postconviction counsel's filing of 651(c) certificate, that Defendant received effective assistance of postconviction counsel.(McBRIDE and REYES, concurring.)