Criminal Law

Defendant was not entitled to new trial on mail fraud and theft charges, even though Dist. Ct. empaneled 13 jurors without designating alternate, who was then chosen randomly by defendant just prior to deliberations. While govt. conceded that method of selecting alternative juror violated Crim. Rule of Procedure 24(c), Defendant, who failed to object to said procedure, could not establish any prejudice arising out of said error, where: (1) defendant did not assert that any of 13 jurors were biased; and (2) record failed to support defendant’s claim that juror number 13, who wound up on jury, paid less attention during trial than other jurors.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing defendant’s habeas petition challenging failure of State of Indiana to expunge 1975 robbery conviction that defendant claimed was part of 1975 plea deal, where said conviction was used to lengthen his federal sentence on different charge under Armed Career Criminal Act. Record showed that at time defendant had filed instant habeas petition defendant was not in custody as result of 1975 robbery conviction and had not yet been sentenced by Dist. Ct. Thus, defendant had not yet suffered any direct or collateral consequence arising out of 1975 robbery conviction so as to support Dist. Ct.’s jurisdiction over his habeas petition. Ct. further observed that defendant could not establish viable claim, even if Dist. Ct. had jurisdiction over his habeas petition, where: (1) Indiana state court had previously found that defendant had waited too long to raise issue regarding any failure to expunge 1975 robbery conviction; and (2) state court’s ruling constituted independent state law ground that prevented defendant from obtaining collateral review of instant claim.

In prosecution on series of drug offenses, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress drugs found in back seat of vehicle in which defendant was passenger. While govt. justified stop of vehicle on information that police had received during drug investigation, govt.’s justification was insufficient, where arresting officers were unaware of said information. Moreover, while arresting officers explained that they stopped vehicle after having observed traffic violation, officers failed to cite or investigate any traffic violation. As such, evidence seized from vehicle should have been suppressed since record suggested that arresting officers had no reasonable suspicion to stop said vehicle.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on use of facility in interstate commerce with intent to commit murder-for-hire under 18 USC section 1958, even though defendant argued that said conviction required proof that he actually entered into murder-for-hire agreement. Actual murder-for-hire agreement is not necessary element of section 1958 offense, and said offense is complete once defendant used instrument of interstate commerce with intent that murder-for-hire be committed. Ct. also rejected defendant’s similar reasonable doubt argument with respect to his solicitation conviction under 18 USC section 373(a), after finding that there was no requirement that govt. show existence of actual economic agreement and noting that defendant’s offer of $50,000 to solicited individual to procure murder of third-party was enough to establish conviction on charged offense. Ct. further rejected defendant’s renunciation defense based on his testimony that he eventually told solicited individual to hold off on murder to allow another individual to murder victim, where: (1) defendant’s section 1958 offense had already been completed at time he told solicited individual to hold off on murder; and (2) defendant’s renunciation was incomplete where record showed that defendant had indicated that he might use same solicited individual to complete murder at future date.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as untimely defendant’s habeas petition challenging his 1996 first-degree murder conviction on ground that he should have been convicted on lesser-degree murder charge because he acted in “imperfect self-defense.” Record showed that defendant’s state conviction became final in January of 1999, and defendant did not file habeas petition until July of 2013, or well after applicable one-year limitations period set forth in 28 USC section 2244(d)(1)(A). Moreover, no form of tolling, beginning from 2010 discovery that trial counsel had failed to interview favorable witness, would render his petition timely. Also, while defendant argued that new evidence from potential witness would support his claim of actual innocence with respect to first-degree murder charge, which in turn would excuse untimely nature of instant habeas petition, said evidence would not have directly established defendant’s mental state at time of killing so as to support his actual innocence claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing 14-month term of incarceration after finding that defendant had violated (for second time) term of his supervised release arising out of defendant’s positive drug test. While defendant argued that Dist. Ct. had predetermined that he would be sentenced to at least 12-month term of incarceration without considering his mitigation evidence, record showed that Dist. Ct. held open mind about length of defendant’s sentence throughout sentencing hearing. Moreover, Dist. Ct.’s announcement that it would not impose lighter sentence than 12-month term that it had imposed upon defendant’s first revocation of his supervised release was reasonable.