Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 324-month term of incarceration on distribution of crack cocaine charge, even though defendant argued that said sentence was unreasonable. Instant sentence could not be viewed as unreasonable, where it was 36 months below relevant guideline range, and Dist. Ct. could properly base sentence on 280 gram drug quantity calculation, where defendant had pleaded guilty to distributing that amount. Remand, though, was required, where Dist. Ct. imposed gang-association and community service conditions of supervised release, where: (1) Dist. Ct. failed to set limit on amount of community service that defendant could be required to perform; and (2) Dist. Ct. did not clarify term “association” so as to rule out as violation any accidental or chance meeting with street-gang member.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s motion under Rule 36 to correct clerical error in written judgment that did not specify that defendant’s 77-month term of incarceration on charge of illegal reentry into U.S. was to be served concurrently with undischarged sentences on state convictions, as Dist. Ct. had orally stated during sentencing hearing. While Dist. Ct., in denying motion, observed that he meant to apply defendant’s sentence consecutively to defendant’s state convictions, Dist. Ct. lacked authority to deny instant motion where Dist. Ct.’s attempt to correct oral sentence came more than 14 days after date of oral pronouncement. Moreover, once Dist. Ct. announced at sentencing hearing that instant sentence was to be served concurrently, any written judgment that conflicted with oral sentence was nullity where, as here, Dist. Ct.’s oral pronouncement was unambiguous.

Ct. of Appeals granted defendant’s motion seeking leave to file successive habeas petition that challenged defendant’s 250-month sentence on unlawful possession of firearm charge, where said sentence was based in part on finding that defendant qualified as armed career criminal under ACCA’s residual clause as it pertained to defendant’s prior conviction on charge of criminal recklessness. Supreme Ct., in Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551, found that imposition of enhanced sentence under residual clause of ACCA violated due process, and Ct. of Appeals found that ruling in Johnson applied retroactively to cases on collateral review, so as to support defendant’s request to file successive habeas petition.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 78-month term of incarceration on wire fraud charge, where said sentence was based in part on Dist. Ct.’s decision not to reduce defendant’s offense level based on his entry of guilty plea, where defendant had previously fled country and remained fugitive for approximately one year before turning himself in. While defendant argued that, although he obstructed justice by fleeing country, he should have received reduction for acceptance of responsibility under section 3E1.1 of USSG in light of his prompt entry of guilty plea after his voluntary return to U.S., Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant’s conduct in fleeing country was so egregious that awarding credit for acceptance of responsibility was unjustified.

In prosecution on drug and firearm charges arising out of defendants’ participation in extensive cannabis grow operation located in basements of their homes, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendants’ motion to suppress evidence seized from their homes pursuant to search warrant, even though Dist. Ct. conducted Franks hearing to resolve defendants’ claim that police submitted false evidence to support finding of probable cause. Probable cause existed to support issuance of search warrant where: (1) anonymous tipster who turned out to be brother of one defendant informed police of his personal knowledge of existence of cannabis grow operation in defendants’ homes; (2) police verified that defendants were using large amounts of electricity; (3) police confirmed that defendants had prior convictions for cannabis possession; and (4) police corroborated tipster’s claim that defendants owned guns. Moreover, while affidavit supporting issuance of warrant included false impression that photographs of cannabis were of recent origin, defendants failed to establish that police were aware that said photographs were not of recent origin, so as to support defendants’ claim during Franks hearing that police deliberately put forth false information that was necessary to obtain finding of probable cause.

In prosecution on charge of interfering with commerce by robbery, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress certain post-arrest inculpatory statements defendant made to police while he was incarcerated. While defendant argued that his statements were product of coercive police tactics and his weakened physical condition, record, which included videotape of defendant’s waiver of his Miranda warnings and his inculpatory statements, did not support defendant’s claim that he was suffering from diabetic side effects at time of confession. Moreover, defendant made no incriminatory statements on day he claimed he was suffering from diabetic side effects, and defendant confirmed on videotape that he was feeling “alright” and that he understood what was going on. Fact that police officer made false representation about existence of defendant’s DNA did not render instant inculpatory statements involuntary.