Criminal Law

Ct. of Appeals lacked ability to consider defendant’s appeal of Dist. Ct.’s order denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea on money laundering charge, where her plea agreement contained clause waiving plaintiff’s appellate rights upon Dist. Ct.‘s acceptance of guilty plea. During plea hearing, plaintiff expressly acknowledged waiver of her appellate rights, and record showed that Dist. Ct. had accepted plea agreement, but had deferred adjudication of defendant’s guilt until her sentencing hearing in order to accommodate defendant’s fear of losing job upon finding of guilt. Moreover, under terms of plea agreement, defendant could withdraw her guilty plea only if Dist. Ct. had rejected plea agreement, and record showed that Dist. Ct. had accepted said plea by time defendant filed motion to withdraw said plea.

Dist. Ct. erred in imposing conditions of probation (on charge of interstate transfer of obscene material to person under age 16) that banned defendant from viewing legal adult pornography and from having knowing contact with minors. Ct. found that ban on legal pornography was inappropriate in light of lack of evidence that viewing legal pornography would increase likelihood that defendant would recidivate. Moreover, ban on having any knowing direct contact with individuals under age of 18 was overly broad, since it had no exceptions for contacts in course of normal commercial business or for case of unintentional or incidental contacts with minors. Dist. Ct., though, did not err in imposing condition that would allow probation officials to inspect plaintiff’s internet-capable devices, even without any reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed new crime, since said condition related to underlying facts of charged offense.

In prosecution on charge of manufacturing and dealing in explosive materials without license, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress seizure of “M-80s” found by police in basement of home that defendant shared with his grandmother, where Dist. Ct. could properly find that said search occurred pursuant to consent given by grandmother. Record showed that: (1) police drew defendant outside of home, where defendant denied police request to search home without warrant; and (2) while police were discussing matter with defendant, other officers obtained consent from grandmother who was in home. Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that his consent was required to search basement, where basement was area of home that was shared by both defendant and grandmother.

In prosecution on drug distribution charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress drugs seized from defendant’s vehicle in which defendant was passenger, where defendant’s vehicle had been subject of GPS device that had been planted by police, and where driver of defendant’s vehicle had been spotted making illegal lane change. Police had probable cause to stop defendant’s vehicle, where video confirmed that defendant’s vehicle had drifted into other lane, and instant search was permissible under automobile exception to 4th Amendment’s warrant requirement, since: (1) at time of instant stop, defendant was under investigation for trafficking narcotics; (2) police had obtained warrant to install GPS tracker after conducting controlled drug buys and obtaining information from informant; and (3) instant police had probable cause to believe defendant’s vehicle contained evidence of drug activity, where GPS’s tracking confirmed drug trafficking information supplied by informant.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his drug distribution conviction on ground that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to police officer’s testimony regarding alleged conversation he had with informant, who, according to officer, identified defendant as someone involved in distributing controlled substances. While Ct. rejected govt. argument that such testimony was permissible as “course of investigation” evidence that explained police conduct leading up to defendant’s arrest, where, as here, govt. had actually used said testimony in substantive manner that violated hearsay rule, any failure to object to said testimony was harmless, where govt. presented other eyewitness testimony to establish that defendant possessed at least 5 grams of cocaine, as well as 12 “bag corners,” which demonstrated defendant’s intent to distribute said cocaine.