Criminal Law

Ct. of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to consider appeal of Dist. Ct.‘s denial of defendant-Chinese corporation’s motion to quash service of summons on indictment alleging criminal copyright infringement and trade secret theft charges, where said summons had been served on defendant’s U.S. subsidiary corporation, since said denial was not final order in criminal case, and since said denial did not qualify for review under collateral order doctrine. Moreover, Ct. observed that defendant will have opportunity to appeal Dist. Ct.’s denial upon completion of case and further rejected defendant’s claim that review of order was warranted because: (1) China owned 18% of defendant; and (2) continued litigation in instant case would imperil foreign relations between U.S. and China. Also, defendant failed to meet standard for issuance of writ of mandamus where defendant had adequate remedy to obtain eventual review of Dist. Ct. order.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his armed robbery conviction on grounds that state court’s denial of public defender’s motion to withdraw filed on morning of trial violated defendant’s 6th Amendment right to self-representation under Faretta, 422 U.S. 806. While record showed that defendant had vigorously argued with trial court following trial court’s denial of counsel’s motion to withdraw and had declared wish to be able to “speak for himself,” defendant never clearly asserted right to self-representation to establish any violation since: (1) defendant’s request that his attorney be discharged, by itself, did not signal clear desire for self-representation; and (2) defendant’s request that he be allowed to speak for himself was, in context, suggestion of intent to disrupt trial proceeding. Moreover, defendant’s statement to trial court that he was not “going to no trial today” suggested that he was merely seeking more time to retain counsel.

In prosecution on bank robbery charge, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek suppression of in-court identification of defendant as culprit or for failing to challenge credibility of FBI agent’s testimony concerning license plate identification process used by police to link defendant’s vehicle to getaway car at scene of crime and agent’s misstatement as to amount that defendant’s bank account was overdrawn on day of crime. Any misstatement regarding process used to identify defendant’s car as getaway vehicle was immaterial since defendant and his girlfriend admitted that his car was at scene of crime. Moreover, $600 difference in amount that defendant’s bank account was overdrawn would not have effected outcome of trial given strength of evidence against defendant. Also failure to contest in-court identification of defendant as culprit was not unreasonable where: (1) standard for striking in-court identification is high; and (2) defense counsel was able to point out weaknesses of said identification during cross-examination.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s guilty verdict on charge of harboring illegal aliens, where defendant admitted in recordings that he knew that certain employees working in kitchen of his restaurant were illegal aliens, and where defendant expressed concern that said employees should be working harder in light of fact that they were receiving free rent (in house owned by defendant and located near restaurant), utilities and food. Moreover, defendant’s actions, in providing said employees with housing to help compensate them for low wages and instructing them not to clock in like other employees was sufficient to establish that defendant was “harboring” said employees in sense that defendant intended to safeguard his employees from authorities.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on charges of attempted extortion, corrupt solicitation of funds and wire fraud, except for five counts that concerned allegations that defendant proposed to appoint Valerie Jarrett to Senate in exchange for Presidential appointment of defendant to Cabinet post. Ct. found that defendant’s conduct in this regard was akin to “political logrolling,” i.e., proposal to trade one public act for another, which was not covered by any charged offense. However, govt. may re-prosecute defendant on said charges since jury could have concluded that defendant had asked President-Elect Obama for private sector job or funds that he could control in exchange for favorable appointment to Senate. Ct. further rejected defendant’s claim that he was entitled to “good faith” instruction if he believed that his conduct was lawful, since none of applicable charged offenses had “willful” element that made knowledge of law essential. Moreover, although prosecutor erred during closing argument by commenting on lack of evidence supporting defendant’s claim that he always intended to appoint Lisa Madigan to Senate seat and by making hearsay reference to testimony of one witness, said errors were harmless in light of overwhelming nature of defendant’s guilt. Finally, defendant was entitled to new sentencing hearing where instant 168-month sentence was based in part on now-reversed convictions, although Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that instant sentence was too long.

In prosecution on unlawful possession of firearm charges, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress gun seized from defendant after police confronted him in alley near location of reported gunfire. Record showed that: (1) prior to confrontation, police positioned their bicycles at 45 degree angle that impeded defendant’s forward progress in alley; (2) one officer approached defendant had asked him sole question as to whether he had gun; and (3) said officer arrested defendant and seized gun after defendant admitted to having gun. While Dist. Ct. found that encounter with police was consensual in nature, Ct. of Appeals found that motion to suppress should have been granted because defendant was seized at time of encounter since reasonable person would not have felt at liberty to ignore police presence and go about his business, and because govt. otherwise conceded that officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify defendant’s seizure.