Criminal Law

Court erred in dismissing postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of guilty plea counsel where plea counsel's advice was incorrect as to available sentencing credit. Defendant attached affidavit to his petition, averring that he would not have pleaded guilty but for erroneous advice of plea counsel that he was eligible for good-conduct credit for participation in certain Department programs. This averment is sufficient to entitle Defendant to evidentiary hearing. (CATES and CHAPMAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated sexual assault and sentenced to 30 years. Court did not err in allowing State to introduce testimony about a computer printout showing that another man's DNA profile (who was previously selected by victim out of photo array as possibly her assailant) was entered into State's database three months after assault. State offered record not for mere purpose of showing that his profile was stored in database, but for fact that database was continually generating comparisons against stored profiles.State failed to establish adequate foundation for record for business record exception to hearsay to apply, but error is not reversible, as other properly admitted evidence against Defendant is overwhelming.(PALMER and McBRIDE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of residential burglary and aggravated battery of security guard and resident of apartment building who discovered Defendant attempting to remove his flat screen TV from his apartment. Physical altercation ensued in which Defendant bit off resident's lower lip which, after surgeries, resulted in speech impediment. Court within its discretion in sentencing in making reasonable inference as to long-lasting effects of attack. Defendant had 9 prior residential burglary convictions and was on Mandatory Supervised Release for 8 of those convictions at time of offense. Defendant did not have a substantial change in criminal objective, as his only real objective was to finish burglarizing and then escape, and any harm done to resident was a means to effectuate that objective. Thus, Defendant's effort to escape should not be basis for extended term upon lesser offense. Thus, mittimus is modified to reduce aggravated battery to 5 years, and to run concurrently with 30-year residential burglary sentence. (PALMER and REYES, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder of one victim, and of attempted murder and aggravated battery of another victim, and sentenced to total 75 years. Court did not err in admitting MySpace photographs, as Defendant was not identified as a suspect based on MySpace photos, and presence of caption does not impact Defendant's case so as to cause prejudice to Defendant. Photos were relevant to show course of investigation, which led to co-Defendant, who later implicated Defendant. (PALMER and REYES, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of theft for stealing a bicycle. At trial, court improperly allowed evidence that four years prior Defendant had stolen another bicycle in same area, as it did not prove intent to commit theft or his identity in a permissible way, but relied on inference that he possessed propensity to commit theft. However, error was harmless as evidence was overwhelming against Defendant. Court erred in delivering incomplete version of IPI Criminal 3.14, but not plain error, as jury was told that it "may" consider evidence of prior conviction, and other instructions told jury it could give whatever weight it deemed appropriate. (FITZGERALD SMITH and COBBS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated discharge of a firearm and sentenced to seven years. Court properly exercised its discretion in admitting Defendant's prior UUWF conviction for impeachment purposes. Although defense counsel failed to accurately inform court of Defendant's prior convictions, Defendant failed to show reasonable probability that outcome of case would have been different but for counsel's errors. Plain language of sentencing statute reveals intent that Defendant who commits offense of aggravated discharge of firearm after 6/23/05 must serve at least 85% of sentence regardless of whether conduct resulted in great bodily harm to victim. (FITZGERALD SMITH and HOWSE, concurring.)