Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder in beating death. Ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to videotaped statement, that Defendant told him that he beat victim, as substantive evidence that Defendant struck victim numerous times with a bat. As person giving statement had no personal knowledge of beating, out-of-court videotaped statement was not given imprimatur of admissibility required for prior inconsistent statements. Reasonable probability that outcome would have been different, but for defense counsel's ineffectiveness. Eyewitness, age 74, was not able to identify Defendant or codefendant at trial 4 1/2 years after incident.(GARMAN, FREEMAN, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 1/23/15.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first-degree murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault. State's rebuttal, that it did not make sense that victim would have consensual sex with a stranger, did not improperly exploit motion in limine which prevented any reference to evidence that victim had acted in an uncouth or flirtatious manner. Rape-shield statute does not bar all evidence of past sexual activity, only evidence of past sexual activity that is not relevant to charges at issue. Court properly admitted other-crimes evidence as relevant to Defendant's propensity and his intent to commit sexual assaults, though not relevant as to motive. (HUDSON and SPENCE, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 1/23/15.) Defendant, then age 17, allegedly drove away from scene of shooting, with shooter in his vehicle. Shooter was acquitted, but Defendant was convicted by separate jury in a simultaneous trial of first-degree murder on theory of accountability, and sentenced to 30 years. On direct appeal, finding that trial court erred by failing to clarify statutory language for jury, and remanded for new trial. Defendant was convicted on retrial and sentenced to 47 years. No evidence of prior intent or advance planning by Defendant to transport shooter to shoot victim, or of Defendant's participation in common criminal design, or that Defendant acted to facilitate shooting. Defendant's presence at crime scene, his knowledge that a crime had been committed, and subsequent flight, do not amount to accountability. Consent to commission of crime or mere knowledge of it is insufficient to constitute aiding or abetting. Evidence at retrial was so lacking that subsequent retrial would violate double jeopardy.(PALMER and REYES, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with multiple offenses arising from shooting. Defendant was convicted of attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm, and sentenced to total 55 years. No ineffective assistance of counsel; counsel's decision to not call two alibit witnesses was trial strategy, as those witnesses did not do well in Defendant's first trial (which ended in mistrial). No ineffective assistance of counsel in counsel's failure to object to court's polling of only 10 out of 12 jurors. Posttrial counsel's strategic decision to stand on posttrial motions and to offer no argument during sentencing was within range of professionally reasonable judgments. Firearm enhancement statute of 25-years-to-life is not unconstitutionally vague.(PUCINSKI and LAVIN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of unlawful possession of controlled substance with intent to deliver and sentenced to 8 years. Court erred in admitting photos of drug-related text-message conversations with the name "Charles" found on a cell phone in close proximity to drugs as evidence that Defendant had connection to cell phone and, circumstantially, to the drugs. Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Defendant's prior conviction for possession of cannabis with intent to deliver as some evidence of Defendant's intent to deliver cocaine in this case. Requirement of general threshold similarity between facts of prior crime and current offense was satisfied. (HOLDRIDGE, concurring; WRIGHT, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of two counts of armed robbery and two counts of aggravated unlawful restraint. Convictions for both offenses violate the one-act, one-crime doctrine, where restraint was inherent in and concurrent with the armed robbery. Concurrent 12-year sentences for each armed robbery count are not excessive. No indication that court failed to consider mitigating factors, and sentence was well within statutory range.(PUCINSKI and LAVIN, concurring.)

Separate juries returned verdicts convicting Defendant of two 1985 armed robberies. In doing so, juries rejected Defendant's version of events, set forth in his postconviction petitions, that weapon at issue was a toy gun. Eyewitness testimony that offender was armed with a gun, where witness could see the weapon, is sufficient to allow reasonable inference that weapon was a real gun. Defendant's Class X felony armed robbery convictions may not properly be compared to Class 2 felony offense of armed violence with a category II weapon. Thus, no disproportionality exists, as a conviction under either statute would be a Class X felony subjecting Defendant to mandatory natural life sentence as a habitual offender. Thus, Defendant's adjudication as a habitual criminal, convictions and natural life sentences do not violate proportionate penalties clause. (CUNNINGHAM and CONNORS, concurring.)

Probable cause for vehicle search existed at scene, and relocation of vehicle did not necessitate a warrant prior to search at station after canine reacted positively to contraband. Factors supporting probable cause arose at scene when vehicle was pulled over and probable cause developed at scene further supported warrantless search at police station.A delay in searching vehicle until it is relocated to police station does not diminish original justification for warrantless search. (PUCINSKI and HYMAN, concurring.)